

The dissertation consists of an introduction, two parts, each of which contains four chapters, and a conclusion.

The first part, entitled *Anthropology of Libertarianism*, presents a general analysis of the foundations of the libertarian concept of man, and the theory of laws being the basis and the introduction to the problems of libertarian concepts of the state.

The first chapter is of an introductory nature and it presents general remarks on libertarianism, combined with the development of methodological assumptions to be used. Any philosophical analysis should commence with the establishment of its objective, subject matter, and method of conduct. Each of these three components is viewed separately, which allows for the precise definition of both the methodological assumptions adopted, and a general outline of the problem, as well as the recognition of the nature of the subject of the analysis. This applies in particular to the definition and general assumptions of libertarianism. The key elements of libertarianism are property rights, self-ownership, the principle of non-aggression, and freedom – jointly creating the theoretical foundation of the entire doctrine. Recognition of those components and showing their mutual relations is the key to a full understanding of arguments and disputes existing within libertarianism. This chapter also deals with the formulation of the definition of libertarianism and the clarification of some of the concepts used. It also explains why the views of Robert Nozick are of particular concern.

In the second chapter, different varieties of libertarianism are presented in order to sort out the divisions, and explain their characteristics and differences between them. It is possible to mention a dozen or so variants of libertarianism which have their own names. Some of them reflect deep divisions within the theory, while others concern only specific practical solutions, which creates a false impression of their fundamental difference or significance. This chapter also comprises an attempt to introduce a new classification of libertarianism based on three fundamental problem axes (attitude to property, state, and origin of rights), and to reduce all existing types of libertarianism to six clearly defined categories.

Chapters three and four include a more thorough analysis of the libertarian concept of man and its most important element: the theory of rights.

The third chapter outlines three basic elements of the libertarian concept of man: individualism, the problem of the origin of rights (which divides libertarians into two groups – advocates of natural law and consequentialists), and the principle of non-aggression. It is possible to show the logical order governing the arrangement of these problems. Individualism is for libertarians both a methodological assumption and a dogma of social ontology, whose predominant thesis states that society consists of nothing but individuals. Therefore, the entire social theory that can be practiced within the scope of libertarianism is essentially a theory of laws governing the

relationships between individuals. Libertarian legal theory is built upon the primacy of private property and justified in two different ways. The so-called libertarian deontologists derive this theory from the concept of natural law, whereas consequentialists refer to the benefits and usefulness, by which they approach ethical utilitarianism. Regardless of how we justify their primacy, property rights break down into two important aspects: the non-aggression principle and self-ownership. The last part of the chapter examines selected problems related to the principle of non-aggression, and the difficulties resulting from its adoption. It also presents the method of introducing the non-aggression principle in Nozick's philosophy. Nozick applies his own specific justification, which is, despite its falling within the framework of deontological libertarianism, one of the most original ways of tackling this problem, opening the gate to the doctrine of minimal state.

The fourth chapter focuses on the problem of private property, presented from the perspective of the theory of justice constructed by Robert Nozick. Rules governing the acquisition and transfer of property titles set the framework of the libertarian legal philosophy. This enables to reveal the links between the concept of private property, self-ownership, and the principle of non-aggression, and to derive from them a scheme regulating interpersonal relations founded on the classical economy, temporarily only in the social and legal dimensions, but also in the axiological and moral, which has been presented more precisely in the eighth chapter. Nozick's theory of justice is an attempt at creating a general formal structure ordering permissible rights, and it gives another basis for the justification of the minimal state theory.

The second part of the dissertation, entitled *Libertarian Dispute over the State*, is devoted entirely to the libertarian concepts of the state.

The fifth chapter provides an outline of the libertarian dispute over the state, in which two main solutions may be distinguished. The first of them, anarcho-capitalist, rejects the idea of the state completely, postulating in return an anarchist social order based on the private property dictate. In order to justify their position, anarcho-capitalists use arguments which may be grouped into three types defining a general outline of the libertarian criticism of the state. Three main categories of arguments which may be distinguished are referred to in the dissertation as: arguments from coercion, from corruption, and from economics. The second solution groups proponents of the minimal state, or minarchists. Despite the fact that they generally accept the arguments of anarcho-capitalists, they postulate the introduction of a state with the competences of the classical-liberal night watchman. The chapter presents main postulates of both parties to the dispute and the problems faced by individual solutions. For anarcho-capitalists, this is a problem of enforcing the law, whereas for minarchists this is connected with the problems of financing the state, its tendency to excessive growth, but, in the first place, with the reconciliation of the existence of the state with the theoretical core of libertarianism.

Chapters sixth and seventh focus on the minimal state theory, developed by Robert Nozick, being a part of the minarchist discourse framework. Both the reconstruction of Nozick's arguments and constructive criticism thereof is undertaken. Nozick builds two sets of arguments justifying the adoption of the minimal state. The first of them, which is better-known, is a thought construction describing a process of a hypothetical emergence, in a way that does not break anyone's rights, of a just state from the state of nature, and the basis for justifying this argument is the theory of justice analyzed in earlier chapters. The second argumentation scheme, which has an auxiliary character, presents the idea of something that Nozick calls a foundation for utopia, and which may be referred to as socio-political environment in which people can freely experiment with lifestyles that suit them. According to Nozick, both arguments lead independently to the same conclusion, i.e., to the acceptance of the minimal state concept. He sees no difference between them – the minimal state and the foundation for utopia are the same – but he tries to convey both arguments in parallel and independently of each other. The sixth chapter contains the examination of the foundation for utopia concept, and the relationships between Nozick's views and the theories of social contract. The seventh chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of the main argumentation scheme, with giving an indication of its weak points. The objective of these efforts is to find an answer to the question whether Nozick managed to create a justification, which is consistent with the theoretical core of libertarianism, for the minimal state.

The eighth, final, chapter deals with the problem of practical implementation of libertarian principles, starting from a provocative question raised by Michael Lind: Why are there no libertarian countries? The strategies of implementing libertarianism analyzed here have been divided into two categories, distinguished according to the attitude of a given strategy towards the institutions of the state. Strategies which do not oppose the will of the state, such as the non-voting or the activities of libertarian political parties, fit into the peaceful path, whereas strategies which assume direct opposition to it, such as counter-economic activity, belong to the revolutionary path. Furthermore, the chapter addresses the problem of moral consequences of libertarianism and the utopianism of its assumptions, particularly in the hard-core version of this philosophy. An attempt was made to show how libertarianism, from a morally neutral philosophy, can eventually turn into an ideology founded on absolute values that condition certain moral and ideological attitudes.

The conclusion contains an attempt to summarize and provide a general overview of the difficulties generated by libertarianism, and at the same time to contribute to its critical evaluation.