

*Anti-realistic reformulations of realism–idealism controversy. A critical study concerning the account of the idea of nature*

## **Summary**

The thesis deals with two main topics: (1) realism, idealism and anti-realism philosophical controversy; (2) metaphysical naturalism and its account of the idea of nature. The main thesis of the dissertation is that anti-realistic reformulations of the realism–idealism controversy, made by the contemporary anti-realists: N. Goodman, H. Putnam and R. Rorty, are invalid, because they try to move away from naturalism, while assuming the same set of premises that naturalism does. The reason for this fallacy is interpreting contemporary metaphysical naturalism as a realistic conception, despite the fact that investigation into its history and theses reveals its idealistic nature. It is shown in the dissertation that refutation of naturalism, which is in fact a refutation of a variant of metaphysical idealism, is taken by contemporary anti-realists as a rejection of metaphysical realism as such. This misunderstanding makes them come up with the other kind of idealism – epistemological anti-realism. As a result the alternative offered by the anti-realists: metaphysical naturalism or epistemological anti-realism is in fact misguided, being a choice between two forms of philosophical idealism, with the genuine metaphysical realism not even considered.