III. Nominal Grounding
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A. Identification

(1)(a) A nominal serves a referential function: it allows the interlocutors to focus their attention on a particular thing out of all those we are capable of conceiving.
(b) That thing is the nominal’s profile and also its referent:
   (i) The term profile indicates its status as the momentary focus of attention (the target of joint attentional capture).
   (ii) The term referent indicates that it has some place in our mental universe—it is external to the nominal, which refers to it (achieving coordinated mental reference).
(c) The referential function is intersubjective: the speaker and hearer direct their attention to the same referent and realize (via mental simulation) that it is the same for both of them.
(d) For joint attentional capture, the interlocutors must apprehend some relationship connecting them with the referent; this constitutes grounding (in a broad sense).

(2)(a) As defined in CG, every nominal has a referent: a particular thing in our mental universe.
(b) With a narrow definition of referent, limited to actual real-world entities, many nominals are commonly said to be non-referential: (i) A tiger has stripes. (ii) Nobody will ever admit that he is wrong. (iii) He is hoping to find a new job. (iv) Any woman wants a diamond ring. (v) If I had a pet snake, I would try to catch mice to feed it.
(c) This narrow definition is inappropriate for linguistic purposes. The real world is only one facet of our vast mental universe; we can and do talk about any facet of it.
(d) Even with negation, we conceive of the profiled thing and establish it as a referent in the discourse. It can then be referred to with a pronoun (used for specific, identified things).

(3)(a) Besides what we call the “real world”, our mental universe includes an immense inventory of mental constructions (e.g. metaphors, blends, generalizations, projections, hypothetical situations), as well as the imagined worlds of stories, films, myths, etc.
(b) While we each have our own mental universe, there is enough overlap to serve as a common ground for communication. It provides a shared conceptual substrate.
(c) This substrate is an immensely complex structure, much of which is basically stable. It serves as a framework for apprehending and interpreting additional phenomena.

(4)(a) Nominal reference depends on the substrate. Without it there is no basis for talking about a particular thing or saying that the interlocutors direct attention to the same thing.
(b) A referent is identified—distinguished from others—by its place in the substrate. It is embedded in a vast web of connections defining its place and allowing it to be accessed.
(c) The basis for identification is a path—a series of connections—leading from the conceptualizer (the origin) to the referent (the goal or target). Metaphorically, the conceptualizer “follows” this connecting path and “reaches” the target.
(d) Reaching it constitutes “mental capture”. So for linguistic purposes, identification consists in joint mental capture by the interlocutors.
(5)(a) All nominals invoke a connecting path (*grounding* in the broad sense), but the details vary greatly, involving different facets of the substrate stable on different time scales.

(b) **Unique reference** is usually based on *global* aspects of the substrate, which are stable over a long period of time for all members of the speech community (e.g. cultural models). The referent has an *established identity* (*a known place* in the substrate).

(c) By contrast, **non-unique reference** is typically based on more *local* aspects of the substrate, notably the *immediate discourse context*.

(6)

(7)(a) With **unique reference**, the noun itself is sufficient to identify the referent—identification (*grounding* in a broad sense) is inherent. G is invoked in *generalized* fashion.

(b) By contrast, with **non-unique reference** the noun designates a type with multiple instances, all *candidates* to be selected as the nominal referent.

(c) There are various means or *strategies* for identification. Most commonly these involve an *explicit grounding element*—*grounding* in the narrow sense.

(d) Moreover, the basis for identification tends to be *local*, invoking *specific interlocutors* and the *current speech event*.

(e) **Current discourse space** (CDS): everything intersubjectively accessible to the interlocutors as the basis for communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse.

(8)(a) In actual use, all grounding is local in the sense of being effected by the speaker and hearer in the current speech event. And even with unique reference it depends on the CDS.

(b) Successful use of a proper name requires that the referent have a known place in the shared conceptual substrate accessible to both interlocutors. But it is not limited to them.

(c) Typical cases of non-unique reference are local in the stronger sense that identification is crucially dependent on *particular features* of the current speech event.

(d) In an actual *pointing gesture*, a **particular person** is pointing at a **particular moment** in a **particular direction**. The gesture itself is unique—a purely local occurrence.

(e) Unique reference is achieved based on uniqueness of the gesture. Identification is crucially dependent on the local context.
(9) Being conventional in nature, an **act of pointing** \[\rightarrow\] is a kind of linguistic symbol.

(a) \(S_0\) and \(H_0\) are the **actors** in this gestural “speech” event. \(G_0\) is the ground.

(b) Relevant portions of the CDS include the ground and the immediate physical context.

(c) OS is the range of potential referents **currently onstage** (hence identifiable by pointing). Already within the interlocutors’ **scope of awareness**, they have **immediate accessibility**.

(d) FOC is the **focus of attention**. Successful reference consists in **joint attentional capture**. The referent’s role as **target** constitutes its **identification** (place in the local substrate).

(e) The pointing gesture (bold arrow) has **directive force** (double arrow): it induces the observer to direct attention to the proper target.

(10) Pointing gesture: [\(\rightarrow\)]

![Diagram of CDS with S0, H0, G0, OS, and FOC](image)

**B. Definite Grounding**

(11)

(a) *that [\(\rightarrow\)] dog*

![Diagram of CDS with S0, H0, G0, OS, PROX, and FOC](image)

(b) *this dog*

![Diagram of CDS with S0, H0, G0, OS, PROX, and FOC](image)

(c) *that dog*

![Diagram of CDS with S0, H0, G0, OS, PROX, and FOC](image)

(d) *the dog*

![Diagram of CDS with S0, H0, G0, OS, PROX, and FOC](image)
(12)(a) Pointing is more precise when combined with verbal expression: *that* [dog]. The demonstrative symbolizes the referential action. The noun limits the range of candidates to (onstage) instances of its type.
(b) If there is only one demonstrative, it adds little to the pointing gesture. Languages always have more than one, the minimal system being a PROXIMAL vs. DISTAL contrast. By default, this distinction pertains to distance from the speaker.
(c) Whether minimal or elaborated, the demonstrative system contributes to identification by partitioning the set of candidates, thereby limiting the search to a subset.
(d) In context, this partitioning may be enough to identify the referent. Pointing is then not needed. Since many referents cannot be pointed to, the absence of pointing is the norm.
(e) *This dog* [the one I’m petting] is friendly. *That dog* [the one over there] is vicious.

(13)(a) *This chair is comfortable.* [proximity to S]  *Is that chair OK?* [proximity to H]
(b) *This table is too close to the door.* *That one would be better.* [proximity to S and H]
(c) Jill was starting to think that she would have to move—*this chair was just too uncomfortable.* [shifted perspective; proximity to Jill]

(14)(a) She’s very busy *this week.* She’s getting married *this Saturday.* [proximity in time]
(b) *Is this tooth the one that hurts?* [locus of interest; immediate concern]
(c) *That is {true / important / interesting}.* [normal response to a statement]
(d) *This is {true / important / interesting}.* [speaker intends to consider the statement further]

(15)(a) The directive force is normally aimed at getting H to select the referent from the range of onstage candidates. Alternatively, it is aimed at putting a single candidate onstage.
(b) S and H are both looking at a dog: *The dog is ugly.*
(c) A dog is visible to S and H, but only S is aware of it: *That dog is ugly.*
(d) In the bar I met a man named Felix. *This Felix was an interesting character ...*
   [focus of interest, no directive force]
(e) *That Obama is really {amazing / hurting the economy}.*
   [distancing, reflecting either a positive attitude (he is awesome, he stands apart) or a negative one (I don’t want to be associated with him)]

(16) Demonstratives exemplify the notion that all linguistic elements have at least some import with respect to four dimensions: individual, interactive, descriptive, and discursive.
(a) Matters like affect, distancing, and focus of interest are individual.
(b) Their grounding function of coordinating mental reference is interactive.
(c) They have at least minimal descriptive content (e.g. plural mass for *these/those*).
(d) They have the discursive function of indicating the referent’s discourse status.

(17)(a) Demonstratives are said to be definite, as is the definite article *the*.
(b) The definite article can be thought of as a “bleached out” demonstrative: as shown in (11)(d), it neutralizes the proximal/distal contrast and lacks directive force.
C. Articles

(18)(a) The **definite article** indicates that just one instance of the specified type is immediately accessible in the CDS: already onstage for both S and H (in their scope of awareness).
(b) With just one candidate, the nominal’s *type description* is enough to identify the referent.
(c) Unlike demonstratives, the definite article **lacks directive force**. It does not select the referent from a set of alternatives, but simply registers its **contextual uniqueness**.
(d) An **indefinite article** also lacks directive force, but indicates that the nominal’s type description is **not** enough to identify the intended referent—either because there are *multiple candidates* (onstage instances of the specified type) or because there are *none*.

(19)(a) *In the yard I saw a dog and three cats. Jill was petting the dog and a cat (*the cat).*
(b) Jill was petting a black cat and a white one. *The white cat* was purring.
(c) *The rare vase you bought at the auction* looks good on your desk.
(d) *The first man* to have walked on the moon
(e) *The only man* to have hit a golf ball on the moon
(f) *The tallest man* to have played center for the Houston Rockets

(20)(a) *Our basketball team keeps losing. The center (*the forward*) isn’t tall enough.*
(b) *Are you the Hillary Clinton?*
(c) *the sun, the moon, the atmosphere, the pope, the president, the government, the party*

(21)

(22)(a) Grounding is primarily **discursive**: it specifies a referent’s *epistemic status*, which changes from moment to moment depending on the *current discourse space* (CDS).
(b) A referent marked with the **indefinite article** *a* in one expression can take the **definite article** *the* in the next: *He was feeding a dog and a panda. The dog was really ugly.*
(c) The article changes because the *substrate* changes, altering the referent’s epistemic status.
(d) Indefinite nominals are **grounded**, but their referent is said to be *unidentified*. However, grounding is based on *identification* (S and H focusing on the *same referent*).
(e) The CDS is continually being **updated**. A nominal is definite or indefinite depending on whether or not the referent is identified at a *specific point* in the updating process.
(24)(a) Each clause updates the CDS. Clause\(0\) is the current target. CDS\(0\) is its substrate.
(b) Due to conceptual autonomy, a nominal has functional priority within the clause containing it. The clausal process is conceptually dependent on its participants.
(c) The basis for assessing definiteness is therefore limited to the immediate substrate, CDS\(0\), and the content provided by the nominal itself.
(d) Even if unidentified (hence indefinite) on that basis, the referent's role in the clause serves to identify it for subsequent purposes. It is an established discourse referent in CDS\(+1\).
(e) The discourse itself is part of the shared conceptual substrate, so the very fact of occurring in a clause provides a nominal referent with a place in this substrate.

(25)
(a) Jill was petting a dog and a cat.]\(_{\text{CDS}_0}\)
   > The dog looked friendly.]\(_{\text{CDS}_+1}\)

(b) Jill looked in the pet shop.]\(_{\text{CDS}_0}\)
   > She saw a dog.]\(_{\text{CDS}_+1}\)

(c) I saw dogs and cats there.]\(_{\text{CDS}_0}\)
   > Jill was petting a dog.]\(_{\text{CDS}_+1}\)

(d) Jill was petting a dog.]\(_{\text{CDS}_0}\)
   > It looked friendly.]\(_{\text{CDS}_+1}\)

(26) Noo=n ’awaal-i toow-q. Wa’i-q. ‘I see {the / a} dog. It’s barking.’ [Luiseño]
(27)

(28)(a) COUNT N: \{the / a\} lake  
Mass N: \{the / sm\} \{water / lakes\}

(b) He extinguished the cigarette by pouring sm water in the ashtray.

(c) ?They extinguished the campfire by pouring sm water on it.

(d) *They extinguished the forest fire by dropping sm water on it.

(29)(a) Mass nouns can be used without an indefinite article: They poured water on the fire.

(b) In such cases delimitation is inferred from the event the referent participates in.

(c) The referent is grounded and quantified by the clause containing it, which overrides (or elaborates) the baseline conception of reference to the maximal extension (ME).

(d) The result (in CDS+1) is a delimited, identified instance of the type. Using the noun in the context of the clause fulfills the referential function of a nominal.

(30)(a) There are a variety of grounding strategies: unique reference, overt grounding element, discourse construction, inference from containing clause.

(b) This reinforces the basic point that semantic function is more fundamental to grammar than specific structural implementation.

D. Virtual Referents

(31) The actual/virtual distinction is relative, not a strict dichotomy. There are dimensions and degrees of departure from the baseline reality of discrete physical real-world entities.

(a) Many referents are non-physical, e.g. mental (idea), social (law), or abstract (number).

(b) Reality can be defined as what has actually occurred. Unreal—because they have not (yet) been realized—are future occurrences (He may win) and conceived alternatives to reality, e.g. with negation (He didn't win) and counterfactuals (If he had won ...).

(c) The alternative worlds of films, novels, or myths are part of our mental universe. We apprehend them and talk about them (Santa Claus takes good care of his reindeer).
(d) **Other minds**: we cannot directly share the outlook and experience of another conceptualizer, but can only imagine or simulate them. In *Jill is sure the world is flat*, the flat world is in a mental space representing Jill’s (not the speaker’s) view of reality.

(e) Various sorts of **mental constructions** involving virtual entities nonetheless pertain to reality and are useful in dealing with it. Examples are hypothetical situations (*If he wins we will celebrate*) and generalizations (*Every nominal has a referent*).

(32)(a) A virtual entity is imagined (“conjured up”) for a particular local purpose, hence limited to the **mental space** established for that purpose.

(b) Nominals said to be “non-referential” are better described as having **virtual referents**:

(i) **Generalizations**: *A tiger has stripes; Nobody will ever admit that he is wrong; Any woman wants a diamond ring so she can show it to her friends.*

(ii) **Counterfactual conditional**: *If I had a pet snake, I would try to catch mice to feed it.*

(iii) **Future** event entertained by another conceptualizer: *He is hoping to find a new job.*

(33)(a) With an indefinite article, the referent is **momentarily virtual** for the **hearer**. Based on just the **prior substrate** (CDS$_0$), H has no way to identify it (it “floats unattached”).

(b) Clause$_0$ provides a basis for connecting it to the substrate. The referent is then **identified**, but can either be actual or virtual: *Jill saw an elephant* vs. *Jill imagined an elephant.*

(34)

(a) Jill saw an elephant.

(b) Jill imagined an elephant.

(35)(a) The **definite/indefinite** and **actual/virtual** distinctions are related but not the same.

(b) Definiteness pertains to **identification** of a referent. It is based on what the interlocutors **know** — its **epistemic status** — and changes through discourse.

(c) The actual/virtual distinction (roughly, real vs. imagined) depends instead on whether the referent actually exists — its **existential status**. This does not change through discourse.

(d) All combinations are possible:

(i) *Jill saw an elephant. It was very big.* [actual, unidentified > actual, identified]

(ii) *Jill imagined an elephant. It was very big.* [virtual, unidentified > virtual, identified]
(36)(a) The *discourse itself* is part of the shared conceptual substrate (CDS), and as such it provides a means of identification.

(b) Just by being referred to a referent has a *known place* in the substrate and is thus *identified* (hence definite) in the subsequent discourse.

(c) Minimally, it is identified as the entity which has just been mentioned.

(d) More importantly, it is identified through its role in the described situation.

(37)(a) **Baseline grounding**, as in *Jill bought this vase*, is largely independent of the discourse and the content of the containing clause:

(i) With proper names the referent has an *established identity* (a fixed place in the interlocutors’ *shared prior knowledge*).

(ii) With demonstratives the referent appears in the *immediate context*, where it can be pointed to or otherwise singled out.

(b) Canonically the referent is an *actual, discrete, physical* entity: a person or an object.

(38)(a) At the opposite extreme are **grounding quantifiers** like *most* and *any*, as in *Most dogs will eat any food*. These too are largely independent of the discourse context.

(i) The referent is a *mass*, not a discrete entity.

(ii) It is necessarily *virtual*, being conjured up to make a generalization.

(iii) It is *abstract* in the sense that it has no spatial location.

(b) Quantification constitutes an *elaboration* relative to baseline grounding, requiring additional conceptual resources.

(39)(a) Proper nouns and demonstratives are *definite* expressions. Quantifiers are *indefinite*.

(b) Articles are in the middle: *the* is related to the demonstratives, *a* and *sm* to the quantifiers *one* and *some*. The articles are unstressed variants of their counterparts, without enough semantic or phonological substance to stand alone as nominals.

(c) Unlike the extreme cases, which have a certain independence from the discourse, articles are *primarily discursive*.

(40)(a) *The tiger is a member of the cat family.* [taxonomy]

(b) *The tiger has stripes.* [generic]

(c) *All tigers have stripes.* [universal quantifier]

(d) *Tigers have stripes.* [maximal extension; unique reference]

(e) *A tiger has stripes.* [generic; representative instance]

(f) *Sm tigers have stripes.* [generic]

(41) A *tiger has stripes.*
(42)(a) *A tiger has stripes* invokes **virtual** instances of *tiger, have, and stripes* in order to generalize over actual occurrences. The virtual instances are **representative** of actual ones but cannot be equated with any particular ones (they “float unattached”).

(b) The nominals are **indefinite** because the profiled instances are simply “conjured up” in order to generalize. Having **no place in the prior substrate**, they cannot be identified.

(c) However, their role in this mental construction gives them a place in the substrate, making them definite in subsequent expressions: *A tiger has stripes. It counts them every day.*

(d) A valid generalization (*A tiger has stripes*) is “real” compared to an invalid one (*A tiger has feathers*): the situation it describes is an aspect of how our world actually works. It represents a **higher stratum** of reality (specific occurrences being the baseline).

(43)(a) Quantifiers with grounding as their main function are indefinite because their referents are necessarily virtual, e.g. *nobody, any woman, every nominal, most wine, some tigers.*

(b) They make generalizations concerning masses, for which identification tends to be problematic (though delimited instances can be definite: *The guests don’t like this wine*).

(c) Instances are usually not known individually or have an established identity. Masses being homogeneous, instances are basically equivalent and interchangeable. In practical terms, we are typically more concerned with quantity than with identification.

(44)(a) Grounding quantifiers incorporate **mental constructions** useful in dealing with masses. Only in a broad sense does their specification of **epistemic status** constitute **identification**.

(b) Baseline grounding and quantification can both be used in statements affording a degree of **epistemic control** (knowledge of the world), but different kinds of control:

(i) With baseline grounding, e.g. *This wine is made from grapes,* we learn something definite about a particular referent.

(ii) With a quantifier, e.g. *Most wine is made from grapes,* what we learn is only probabilistic but is a generalization with very broad applicability.

(c) These two sorts of identification differ in their **frame of reference**: space and time (real and conceptually more basic) vs. the **maximal extension** (virtual and more abstract).

**References**


