BOUNDARIES IN MOTION

Rethinking Contemporary Migration Events

Ondřej Hofírek, Radka Klvaňová, Michal Nekorjak (eds.)
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This book is here to contribute to current discussion about theorizing and researching contemporary migration events by the Migrations project – a circle of researchers from the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University involved in migration studies. Our aim is to reinforce critical thinking about migration in the contemporary world. The idea of this book originated at the first international conference “Migrations – Rethinking Contemporary Migration Events” held in spring 2008. A nice South Moravian town of Telč provided a wonderful environment for lively discussions among fifty scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds active in migration research. The conference was organized by Masaryk University in Brno with the support of the Department of Human Geography and Regional Development at the University of Ostrava, the Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture in Bratislava, the Institute of European Studies of Jagellonian University in Cracow, and the Tárki Social Research Institute in Budapest.

Many interesting topics and questions were opened in the course of the conference and we decided to discuss and elaborate them further in a joint publication. In the course of the following year we worked with several participants of the conference on deepening and elaboration of their arguments – this book is a result of this effort.

We would like to thank all the conference participants for their contributions to fruitful conference debates. Especially we wish to thank to Lydia Morris, Graeme Hugo and Csaba Szaló who inspired productive discussions at the conference as well as several contributions to this volume. Great thanks go to Kateřina Sidiropulu Janků, the author of the very idea of the Migrations project who has been a constant source of ideas and support and
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The second multidisciplinary Migrations conference is planned for 2010 in Telč. For more information about conferences and the Migrations project please visit http://ivris.fss.muni.cz/migrations.

RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION EVENTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES

Ondřej Hofírek, Radka Klvaňová, Michal Nekorjak

The migration phenomenon is generally connected in people’s thinking with the category of social problems. It does not matter on which side our sympathy lies, but few of us take a neutral stance and almost everyone can name a number of situations where migration can be taken to be the source or context of social tensions or conflicts. If in earlier times this was mainly from fear arising from the lack of jobs – which occurred particularly during the oil crisis in Western Europe in the mid-1970s – the greatest problem later turned out to be the issue of the integration of migrants and their descendants, which has become obvious even to the non-experts. The model of assimilation revealed as only one of the possible ways of immigrants’ integration, with others growing in parallel to it (Portes and Zhou 1993). As the “crisis of immigrant integration” was depicted in the media in apocalyptic visions supported by actual footage of street clashes, it was as if the arguments of those sceptics who were against migration had been fulfilled. But it appears that to a large extent we can perceive this crisis as a crisis of knowledge and the expectations linked to this knowledge. On the one hand, there has long been missing an understanding of the various forms of integration. On the other hand linear models of depicting it as inevitably leading towards assimilation in effect constructed false visions which could not be fulfilled.

The crisis of understanding of migration events is not just a crisis of scientific research and theories. We know that in order to understand the integration problems of migrants we must also understand and take into account attitudes of the majority population towards various migrant categories and ethnic groups. Not least we must understand the role of the legal framework and its associated practices, which regulate migration and integration.
(Morris 2002). Also these areas are a subject of scientific study of migration, since their positions manifested in specific actions are part of the overall problem. In this sense they also share in and are part of the crisis of knowledge and expectations. The problem is that the production and circulation of knowledge has a differing logic in the areas of politics, public life and the academic world. Although shifts in academic knowledge do exist, the transfer of knowledge to the public and to the political arena encounters problems which cannot be easily resolved. Put another way, what we know does not have the power to have a completely immediate impact on the world outside the academic field. A delay is almost inevitable, as well as problems associated with translations into other discourses.

This book thematises some aspects of the aforementioned problems associated with the production and circulation of knowledge. The contributions discuss methodological questions new research themes as well as policymaking and thus cover key dimensions of constructing of the migration phenomenon. The aim, however, is not to solve or outline a solution to the crisis in the production and circulation of knowledge. We take this subject to be a broader framework within which our own work takes place. Our aim in the first instance is to contribute to reflection on the production of science and its consequences on and links with the non-academic layers of social reality.

Migration as Multi-Level Phenomenon and Multidisciplinary Research

The study of migration was traditionally based on an interest in recognising the determinants of migration, migration processes and the strategies of some of the actors involved. Later, as Castles (2007) points out, separately from the preceding themes, research focused on the changes which migration brings about in the sending and receiving societies. Over a period of time, a large number of studies were produced dealing with particular themes. Voices were then to be heard calling for the knowledge thus gathered to be integrated and for the creation of a comprehensive theory of migration. The question is whether such a theory is at all possible or useful. One of the leading authors of migration studies, Alejandro Portes (1997) is sceptical about the search for and construction of a general theory of migration, for reasons of both feasibility as well as usefulness. Migration impacts on, and is affected by, a whole range of social spheres. It concerns the economy, is affected by the legal system, opens up questions of political and civic integration, is linked to cultural pluralisation and transformation, and is researched from the viewpoint of welfare policy, the education system, media representation etc. In short it is a subject for all social sciences as well as for a significant part of the humanities, such as history and linguistics, and also for “hard sciences” such as demographics and geography. According to Portes, the complexity of the migration phenomenon makes the creation of such a general theory effectively impossible. One may also assume that the results of such an effort would be a vague and excessively abstract theory, which would in practice have no elucidatory power. The creation of medium-range theories appears to be a realistic solution, whereby the multi-dimensional nature of the migration phenomenon would be reflected.

It would seem that this second challenge is met by a multidisciplinary approach. But this should not end in the “dilution” of individual scientific approaches and traditions into an “indifferent science”. The objective is not to disrupt the specific approaches of different disciplines, but to understand the fact that various disciplines have within their research traditions a well-developed perspective of their own, already established research and a defined body of knowledge, all of which can be beneficial for other disciplines which place their main emphasis on other aspects (Bommes and Morawska 2005; Brettell and Hollifield 1990). In the introduction to their well-known book Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines Brettell and Hollifield call for disciplines to explain their approach to migration research from the viewpoint of its several levels: methodology, theoretical starting points, units of analysis and the questions they formulate. As Brettell and Hollifield state, this clarification of the bases of the paradigms opens the way to better understanding (of the epistemological assumptions) and thus discussion between individual specialisations. The path of dialogue also deals with a second, practical, problem which is that of differing scientific cultures
and the apparent impossibility of establishing a common language. According to Morawska (2003) it is in interdisciplinary conversation that we can also find the feedback between various aspects of the research field and conceptualise the connection to macrostructural processes. The various findings and results from different research traditions can thus be mutually enriching and interlinked and thereby form a platform for the further guidance of social research in the migration field. Recently it has been shown that there exist themes and concepts which overlap across disciplines’ research agendas and theoretical backgrounds, and it is not a coincidence that these are precisely those which are considered a further path for the continued development of migration studies.

A prominent example of this is the study of transnationalism. For example Vertovec writes: “...in recent years transnationalism has become one of the fundamental ways of understanding contemporary migrant practices across the multi-disciplinary field of migration studies” (2007: 963). There is a huge variety of understandings of the concept as well as phenomenon of transnationalism not only across but also within different disciplines (Vertovec 1999; Kivisto 2001) and indeed the authors in this volume also use it in different ways. We agree with Csaba Szaló who proposes that the significance of the theories of transnational migration is their ability to “problematise categories, which privileged nation-state territories and conceived them as separate and autonomous units” (Szaló, in this volume: 29). In our view, transnationalism is a useful concept which opens sociological questions that have not been addressed so far and increases sensitivity towards cross-border processes in contemporary societies and the tensions that arise as a result of transnational processes in the world of nation states. Moreover, it forces us to rethink formerly established social categories and theoretical concepts as well as methodological approaches to migration research.

This book includes papers by authors from several social sciences: sociology, human anthropology, media studies, economic geography, political science, geography. We can borrow the subheading from the aforementioned book by Brettell and Hollifield (2000) Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines, since “talking across disciplines” is one of the important motifs of the present book. Contributions to this volume in different ways reflect paradigm shifts in migration studies away from static and bounded concepts and methodologies towards more mobile and unbound perspectives on contemporary migration events. Although sharing different epistemological assumptions depending on their disciplines they each shed light on different aspects of migration and related phenomena and contribute to the discussion reflecting the complexity of migration theorizing, researching and policymaking.

Knowledge Production in Migration Studies

The phenomenon of inter-state mobility has received constantly growing attention from scholarship in an increasing number of social science disciplines. Bommes and Morawska (2005: 2) note that despite the fact that international migration has become a “normal” feature of contemporary societies it has not been integrated into the mainstream research agendas of social science. Whether or not migration is indeed a standard part of social life nowadays, we believe that social science contributes to the definition of migration as an exceptional or mainstream social process. Thus it is important to reflect on the ways in which social and political events and changes intervene in the formation of the research agenda in social science in general and in the field of migration studies in particular. The question is not whether migration is a standard phenomenon in contemporary societies but what types of migration are constructed as a norm in the public as well as social science discourse and what types of migration are discursively produced as deviating from a norm.

The authors of this volume contribute in various ways to the discussion on how knowledge is produced in migration studies. The transnational paradigm discussed by several of them, and by Szaló in particular, is an excellent example of the way in which visibility of certain phenomenon is shaped by various social and political processes. As Szaló points out, what is particularly important is that transnational migration practices were not conceptualized as subjects of study under previous migration paradigms even though they might have existed: “The story of
transnational migration is the story of how everything new is only new from a certain point of view. The story of transnational migration is also the story of the nature of our world, including the nature of knowledge production” (2008: 23).

The contributions in this book also inform us that some groups of migrants and migration types become more easily subjects of the academic world’s interest while other are neglected in migration research as well as in the public sphere despite their social presence and relevance (Růžička; Freitas and Lacour; in this volume). This problem was perhaps most persuasively documented in the case of women, who became the subject of migration research only from the mid-1970s onward. Morokvasic points out that “migrant women acquired the right to a sociological existence once they were acknowledged as economically active, as productive” (Morokvasic 1983: 13–14). Similarly we could find other categories of migrants who stand outside of the focus of mainstream social research also due to the way migration is predominantly perceived in the public discourse of the sending and receiving societies. Mobile children, retired men and women, young people seeking adventure and extraordinary experiences abroad, short-term circular migrants, and well-to-do migrants are among groups that are not usually conceptualized in migration research, although this may vary in different socio-political contexts (see for example Szöke 2006; Morokvasic 2004). For example, in the Czech Republic, migration research has focused predominantly on labour migrants and refugees from “the East”, while almost entirely neglecting migrants from Western Europe and America. Further, it can be observed how under-representation of certain groups of migrants in migration research and the public sphere goes hand-in-hand and mutually reinforces each other.

On the one hand, such selectivity of various groups and migration patterns may contribute to the normalisation of certain types of migrants and migration patterns while presenting other types of mobility and the mobile as less normal and thus possibly less acceptable. On the other hand, the selection of topics in migration research is also driven by the “problem” perspective defined in the political sphere – migration patterns and categories of migrants who are seen as possibly problematic from the point of view of the receiving society are given the most attention. Financing of social research focusing on the solution of social problems and on population control is an important factor shaping (not only) migration research agendas (Favell 2005; Morawska 2003: 626). However, there are other types of migrants and mobility patterns that are less visible in the public sphere but may nevertheless contribute importantly to a better understanding of social and cultural patterns in contemporary societies (lifestyle migration, West–East migration/North–South migration, sport migration, tourism, etc.). Social sciences should not avoid them; nevertheless as the pressure on policy-oriented social science occurs, the problematic selectivity of migration research topics persists.

In sum, it is important to analyze the practices that transform an event into a research topic and the interests that stand behind it. Framing research questions in migration research might also shape the public perception of certain migration events as being more or less threatening for the social order of the sending and receiving societies, of which kind of mobility is considered normal and acceptable and which kind of mobility is considered abnormal and undesirable.

Transnational Paradigm: Challenges to Theorizing, Researching and Policymaking

The change of borders and boundaries as an ordinary part of social life has recently attracted the attention of a growing number of scholars, especially those studying migration – by definition a process that crosses various types of boundaries. Among the most dominant streams of thinking drawing attention to social life across borders have been the transnational theories that have developed as a critique of research on migration and related processes studied only within bounded units such as nation states. This theoretical as well as empirical paradigm has been discussed in migration studies since the nineties and has inspired lively discussions on contemporary migration events. Although originally developed and applied by social anthropologists (Basch et al., 1994), the transnational paradigm has in various
forms found its way into the study of migration in other disciplines (e.g. Baubock 2003; Faist 1998 /Political Science/; Gerber 2001; Morawaska 2001 /History/; Mitchell 1997; Smith 2001 /Geography/). The authors refer predominantly to social change related to globalization and the heightened intensity, scope and diversity of migration and other cross-border processes in the world. Social reality has changed so much that it made the existing concepts obsolete, calling for new ones (Khagram and Levitt 2008). As Khagram and Levitt (2008: 1) put it, transnational social processes call for a “new optic, which asks a different set of questions based on different epistemological assumptions”.

While in the beginning anthropological theories of transnational migration centered their attention predominantly on the discovery of a new phenomenon – new in a sense that it had become visible under the changing analytical lens for study of migration – later on, emphasis has been put primarily on the critique of assumptions of the society equated with the nation state labelled as methodological nationalism (Szaló, 2008: 23). While different disciplines and researchers accentuate to differing degrees the critical function of transnational migration theories – and thus the necessity for new interpretational strategies – and/or the changing nature of social reality (and thus the need for focusing attention on them which may also necessitate reconsidering methodological tools) in general they tend to contribute to the normalizing of mobility in contemporary societies. In our view, researchers should see mobility or uprootedness as equivalent states of existence to settled life as they are both co-existent in the ambivalent symbiosis. In the social sciences, the settler’s perspective is being given preference and put into the status as a norm of understanding one’s social situation as given. (e.g. Růžička, in this volume). We suggest that the social scientist should look for ways to deal creatively with this ambivalence instead of disregarding it. We see a role for social scientists in attempting to de-construct and falsify politics and practices that are rooted unconsciously in nationalized legal norms and the perspective of the settler.

The contributors to this book discuss challenges posed to the social sciences by cross-border social processes and the tensions between the mobile and settled perspectives on social life. The papers in this volume demonstrate a close interrelationship between theory, research and policymaking related to migration events and the importance of reflecting on them. On the one hand, theoretical assumptions and concepts guide the methodological approaches to data collection and thus the character of the data that are then used in designing migration policies. On the other hand, migration research is often driven by the need to obtain policymaking data which determine what kind of research questions are posed in migration research.

The Transnational Paradigm as a Challenge to Theorizing Migration

Applying a transnational instead of methodologically national paradigm in migration studies poses a challenge on many levels. According to Khagram and Levitt who belong to promoters of multidisciplinary transnational studies, the task of theoretical transnationalism is to “construct and test explanations and craft interpretations that either parallel, complement, replace, or transform existing theoretical accounts” (Khagram and Levitt 2008:7). Transnational theories move researchers towards rethinking the key concepts used in migration studies such as membership and citizenship, diaspora, inclusion/incorporation, identity and belonging, going so far as to proposing to change the key sociological concepts of society (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) and space (Pries 1999).

It also raises the question of to what extent it is enough to revise existing concepts and theories such as a “migrant” or whether we need a new set of concepts such as “transmigrant” (Basch et al., 1994). For example, Kivisto (2001) critically assesses the arguments for the need for a new theory of transnationalism proposed by Glick Schiller and her colleagues instead of revising existing theories of assimilation. He argues that their arguments for a new theory are not convincing enough and proposes to incorporate transnationalism into the assimilation theory (Kivisto 2001: 554). As Csaba Szaló notes in this volume, the discussion of the novelty of certain theoretical concepts is also part of the game in the field of knowledge production.

Reviewing studies of transnational media, Václav Štětka in this volume argues against the homogenizing and nation-like
conceptions of diaspora defined under the methodological nationalism paradigm. He suggests that studying migrants’ use of transnational and diasporic media can shed light on the construction of various ways of belonging beyond the narrow conception of national communities. Also, Radka Klvaňová in her contribution to this book argues for rethinking the concept of inclusion of migrants developed under the national paradigm. She proposes to speak of various ways of belonging and non-belonging of the migrants to civic communities in transnational social fields. She suggests focusing on the changing positionalities of the migrants in their original and new homes and on how these changes affect their potential for inclusion into different civic communities.

Thus, the change of the perspective from national to transnational leads to different types of theoretical questions being posed in migration research. Questions of whether assimilation or transnationalism of immigrants formulated under the national paradigm are replaced by questions of how various types of adaptation of immigrants in various social spheres are combined and what types of identities and ways of belonging are produced through migrants’ engagement in multiple communities. Moreover, it questions taken-for-granted dichotomies used as categories of analysis and puts them on trial as being only one among many variables. For example Al-Ali and Koser suggest that the transnational paradigm shifts the focus away from motivations to migrate that have been notoriously divided into either economic or political types of migrations towards treating them just as one of the many important factors shaping development of transnational activities and identities (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 3).

Morawska (2003: 624) warns that the ethnographic nature of data on immigrant transnationalism poses a challenge for research because it does not enable us to formulate general theoretical models. Thus, in her view, the call for middle-range theories of migration and migrants’ transnationalism by Portes and others (1999) seems to be promising. Indeed, careful contextualization of the observation of migration events in terms of time, location and sensitivity towards a cultural context is needed for producing valid findings.

The Transnational Paradigm as a Challenge to Researching Migration

The redefinition of existing theoretical concepts relating to migration, and the possibility of formulating migration theories which explain current migration events also requires the acceptance of methodological processes which permit the study of phenomena which cross nation-state boundaries and the production of data which captures various kinds of transnational migration and experiences. According to the aforementioned Khagram and Levitt article, methodological transnationalism “reformulates existing data and accounts, invents new kinds of information and evidence, applies existing investigative approaches in novel ways, and designs novel research tools and approaches with which to analyze, explain and interpret transnational phenomena and dynamics” (Khagram and Levitt 2008: 6).

Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) state that so-called methodological nationalism, or adaptation to the viewpoint of nation states, limits and hinders the development of our understanding of social reality. In the contemporary globalised world the administrative borders of nation states are losing some of their former significance and it is therefore necessary to react appropriately to this situation by changing our cognitive apparatus. This reaction can take the form of applying a transnational approach to the study of the movement of people. As both aforementioned authors state, the transnational approach is not something completely new, but appears rather to be a constant which was pushed aside by the strength of methodological nationalism, which assumed that the nation state is the natural social and political form of the modern world.

The attempt to apply methodological transnationalism, or to avoid methodological nationalism, also includes a redefinition of the units of study. For example Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2008), two authors who attempt to conceptualise alternative approaches to research on migration, criticise the use of ethnic groups as fundamental analytical categories. According to them, the use of ethnic groups as units of analysis is a logical but erroneous (and unacceptable) consequence of methodological nationalism, when scientists take ethnicity to be the most important social
and cultural difference between the populations of individual nation states. The authors maintain that research founded only on the basis of studying ethnic groups leaves out other, non-ethnic forms of co-existence and settlement and transnational linkage. Moreover, this kind of research also puts to one side the significance of specific localities. A transnational approach to the study of migration should research origin localities as well as migrants' settlement localities and also include the global power hierarchies of which these localities are part. We have already referred to the nation state as an important actor for the analysis of migration. However, Glick Schiller and Çaglar point to the importance of other units of study, such as the town for example. In the process of the unification of Europe it can be shown that the EU also can be a unit of study in its own right. Following the changes of administrative borders in Europe, Janicki in this volume argues against separate geographical research on internal and international migration and points to the need for a joint approach to studying migration events throughout Europe.

In the study of transnational migration, in terms of data collection techniques, there is a dominant emphasis on so-called multi-sited ethnography, which does indeed permit us to track migrants in more than one locality of living (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Their relevance is often revealed only during the research itself, as is shown for example by Růžička's article in this book, which began by studying gypsy settlements in Eastern Slovakia and later broadened its scope to urban areas in the Czech Republic, following upon the social networks of his informants.

In spite of the attempt to change the theoretical understanding of the issue under study, there still remain important circumstances, such as the requirements for grant financing or political involvement in a certain kind of research, that still direct social scientists' research efforts into space limited by nation state borders. It seems that methodological transnationalism poses a particular challenge for large scale quantitative research on migration. The production of quantitative data is more closely tied up with the nation-state conception of society than is qualitative research as it is often organized by state statistical offices. Moreover, it is difficult to design representative surveys of migrant populations when the characteristics needed for the construction of a sample are not known. Graeme Hugo (2008) shows how the availability of good statistical data on migrants can more accurately capture various forms of contemporary mobility and thus challenge existing assumptions about migration.

However Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) caution against the illusion that a newly created theoretical language could be protected from the social and political context in which it arises, and that it would be possible in the future to achieve a genuine objectivity of awareness. The new concepts which are now being discovered and whose significance is growing with time, will in all probability limit us and will distort our cognitive apparatus in the same way as was the case with the criticised methodological nationalism. The contemporary post-modern and globalised world is so complicated that any attempt to understand it of necessity assumes a certain reduction in this complexity. The crucial question thus remains in what way and with what tools this complexity is to be reduced such that we are enabled to know and understand the contemporary world as much as possible. However Wimmer and Glick Schiller also warn against the opposite approach, which they call methodological fluidism, to which in their opinion the larger part of social science theory tends, where structures are replaced by fluidity and settlement by movement (2002: 326). This leads us to the conclusion that apart from the creation of new theoretical and methodological approaches corresponding to methodological transnationalism, it is no less important to critically analyse how the theoretical and methodological tools work in reproducing certain types of depiction of migration events.

In spite of the fact that it is necessary in our opinion to shunt methodological nationalism into a dead end as an analytical apparatus valid at the time of its inception, it should be kept in mind that nationalism itself is still a significant force which has lost none of its influence as a category of practice with a strong impact in social reality. Thus, nationalism is not only in a position of subject participating in constructing social reality, it recently became also an important object of social-scientific reflection.
Transnational Paradigm
The as a Challenge for Migration Policymaking

It should be noted that many theoretical concepts and research topics are redefined in the political sphere, which for migration studies is an important initiator of research projects and their financial support. According to Castles (2007a), politicians and civil servants understand the regulation of migration as an engineering and managerial issue, which can be managed using appropriate regulatory instruments, which like cogs in the “migration machine” secure the required effect. They do not understand the dynamic nature and complexity of migration, that is, its interconnectedness with various social spheres and for this reason assignments from state institutions are often inappropriate, too narrowly focused and require too narrowly focused explanations, which through their unambiguity do not overcomplicate the making of correct decisions.

In addition, political players have only slight understanding for anything broader than a national perspective, since they consider things too “locally.” To be part of the administration of the nation state also means in some way believing in this “real fiction” or at the very least acting pragmatically in line with it. This means systematically taking up a position which is a priori only with difficulty reconcilable with a transnational perspective, which does not perceive the nation state and its societies as the single and principle unit of analysis. It is in the double limitation that Castles (2007b) sees one of the reasons for the failure of migration policies which, as can be seen from looking into history, quite as a matter of course fail to achieve their declared aims, including those which are anti-immigration. And even if it is acknowledged that the international nature of migration also demands measures above and beyond the nation state, these are brought into effect mainly by nation states, because no other player (from the standpoint of political legitimacy) exists.

One of the most marked expressions of the systematic failure of the nation state is its understanding of the integration issue and the securing of the rights of short-term and circular migrants who for the purposes of the nation state are considered to be subjects anchored in their country of origin, in spite of the fact that their lives are lived out elsewhere. In a similar vein the establishment of transnational social fields demonstrates the limited power of modern states to influence whatever exceeds the logic of nationally anchored players and institutions. A certain shift can be seen within the EU, where it has been possible to limit a whole series of barriers and discriminations against migrants coming from member states. Nevertheless the EU has “only” figuratively speaking, moved the borders of individual states out towards its external boundary and still applies the old politics of the nation state in relation to states which are not EU members. It is therefore a great challenge to consider how transnationalism is shaped by the institutions of the nation state and how transnationalism influences it and elicits a reaction from it.

Outline of the Book

In this book we try to contribute to the discussion and elaboration of the aforementioned theoretical and methodological starting points, which we consider to be significant inspirational elements for contemporary academic work in the area of migration research. Although not all the authors of this volume explicitly use the transnational paradigm, they react to the paradigm shifts in migration studies away from static and bounded concepts and methodologies towards more mobile and unbound perspectives on contemporary migration events. As we have already mentioned at the beginning, the chapters which follow were written by authors who have a background in various social science disciplines and traditions – sociology, social anthropology, human geography, media studies and political science. Through this variety of views of various specialisations we would like to add our own contribution to the multidisciplinary approach and reflexivity in studying contemporary migration events. In the same time, the papers are based on up-to date and highly analytically relevant empirical cases.

The first two articles discuss the so-called reflexive or discursive turn in social science and its implication for migration studies. In his paper, Csaba Szaló analyses the development of
transnational theories of migration with an emphasis on their critique of methodological nationalism from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge. He critically reconstructs the epistemological and social assumptions of theories of transnational migration in order to describe the processes of knowledge production through interpretational strategies formed after the reflexive change in anthropology and sociology. He focuses on the concepts of multi-local lifeworlds and diaspora taken up by theories of transnational migration to reformulate the processes of assimilation and identity formation by conceiving migrants’ simultaneous engagement in and orientation toward their original and new home. He concludes with a discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings in the context of the reflexive turn in social sciences.

Any Freitas and Philippe Lacour explore the epistemological and methodological aspects of the reception of the “discursive turn” in the social sciences, paying particular attention to the research produced in the field of migration studies from the political science perspective. They critically assess the impacts of the discursive turn in social sciences and immigration research, pointing in particular to the problem of knowledge production in mainstream migration studies that is driven predominantly by the problem-solving perspective required by policymakers which sometimes leads to legitimizing rather questionable policy solutions or politico-ideological standards. They argue for more discourse sensitivity in social research in general, and migration research in particular and careful analysis of legitimizing topics dealt with in migration research.

Michal Růžička brings the arguments of the previous paper out at a more concrete level. He shows how plurality of migration forms in the research agenda can be reduced only to politically visible forms of forced migration. In his contribution, the author argues that research interests are far from being politically neutral, which is in particular the case in research of Roma migration in Central Europe where Roma have been represented as notorious nomads perceived to be a threat to the symbolic order of a settled society. Voluntary forms of Roma migration are not included in the research agenda; even though they play a crucial role in Roma social life. Růžička also argues that contemporary research on Roma migration is a sort of micro-politics that can form the perception of Roma in the majority population.

The next two papers discuss the challenges posed to theoretical concepts of migrants’ settlement and belonging by the transnational paradigm. Radka Klvaňová discusses the re-conceptualization of the sociological concept of the process of integration of migrants – a term whose utilization has been linked with the image of migration as a permanent unidirectional movement between territorially bounded nation state societies. She brings attention to the ways of belonging and non-belonging of the migrants to the multiple communities both in their original and new homes and the ways their belonging is contested and transformed. She argues that the frame of belonging is an important empirical question, in order to avoid normative assumptions of migrants’ integration into the homogeneous receiving nation-state society.

Also inspired by the transnational perspective, Václav Štětka in his paper touches upon the tendency of studies on the influence of migrants’ diasporic media consumption on their settlement to frame the questions in terms of either assimilation or transnationalism. He shows that the studies of diasporic media spaces reveal that their consumption by migrants demonstrate diversity of effects on the reconstruction of cultural identities. The author argues in favour of abandoning the simple home/host dichotomy as a primary analytical tool for exploring the diasporic media spaces, and calls for devoting more attention to the ways the media contribute to the emergence of plural and hybrid identities, stretching beyond the imaginary spaces of nation states.

The last two papers written from the perspective of human geography discuss the implications of changing borders and forms of migration for the methodological approaches to data collection and analysis. Graeme Hugo’s article is concerned with the phenomenon of circular migrations, which is a prominent example of migration in transnational social fields. His main argument is that circular migration can have positive impact on economy in both receiving and origin countries; however, these impacts do not occur as a matter of course. They need to be supported by reasonable legal frames and policies. This reasonability
could be possible only when state authorities acknowledge that life in motion is an integral part of living strategies of many people. It has also important implications on the level of methodology – for example those strategies are hardly visible in statistics collected by state institutions lacking appropriate analytical tools to catch them. Moreover, circular migrations blurred some well established analytical dichotomies (e.g. temporal/permanent migration) and show them more like continuum which is not a challenge only to methodology but to our theoretical imagination and sensitivity too.

The final contribution by Wojciech Janicki focuses on the issue of administrative borders as barriers for migration and questions the internal vs. international migration division. He draws attention to a new challenge for migration studies – a unifying Europe, which is dissolving some formal barriers to movement between member states, while at the same time retaining cultural boundaries and political units. He argues that in the case of the European Union, migration research should not distinguish between internal and international migration, but approach them more and more uniformly with the lapse of time, especially in the field of geographical examination.

References


**TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATIONS: CROSS-BORDER TIES, HOMES, AND THEORIES**

Csaba Szaló

Theorising transnational migration has always been based on doubt for the mainstream, nationalist conceptualisation of migration that emphasised territorially defined national borders and populations. Transnationalism, by accentuating relations between localities and focusing on movements across nationally demarcated borders, problematises categories which privileged nation-state territories and conceived them as separate and autonomous units. It also makes necessary a rethinking of broader questions of identity formation under conditions of globalisation.

The overall objective of this article is the reconstruction of conceptual frames and theoretical presuppositions shared by recent theories of transnationalism which deal with the question of identity formation of migrants. In the first part of this article I am going to give a critical reading of Pnina Werbner’s book *The Migration Process* and by revealing theoretical dilemmas present in this book I attempt to sketch my interpretive strategy. To explore this issue further I am in the second part going to narrow my focus and concentrate on the concept of multi-local lifeworld as it was developed as a theoretical translation of a radical concept of transnational social fields. The critical intention of this paper developed in the second part as well as in the third part dealing with the concept of diaspora is the elaboration on the analytical distinction between heterodox and orthodox interpretive strategies in coping with the question of transnational identity formation.
Theoretical Dilemmas in Theorising Transnational Migration

Pnina Werbner (1990) in her important book *The Migration Process* disclosed the centrality of class relations in the reproduction of migration flows. The analytic dimension of social class is usually neglected by mainstream analyses of immigration. Werbner claims that to understand the migration process (not merely immigration) one have to analyse identities and social hierarchies generated by ethnicity, gender, race and social class. What is behind this neglect of social hierarchies, and especially social class relations by the mainstream migration theories? There is an implicit assumption shared by mainstream theories and research programs that no matter what is the class position of immigrants in their "ethnic community", they all must be located at the social bottom of the host society. Werbner argues that this is a fact clearly refuted by empirical evidence, at least in the case of South Asian migrants in United Kingdom.

In her book, Werbner remarkably analyses how the migration process constitutes a highly stratified and hierarchical community of South Asian migrants. This social hierarchy is perhaps partly a product of the economic success of some migrants in their new home. Nevertheless, it is mainly structured by their disposition brought from their original home, that is, by differences in education, caste, wealth, and by the impacts of their urban or rural background. The critical significance of this social hierarchy is generated its theoretical-methodological implication that no generalisation can be valid for the whole community of migrants. Social hierarchy destroys the possibility to generalise on ethnic identity, religious practice, youth culture, gender, education or poverty in case of a particular immigrant community. Simply, migrants do not form culturally homogenous and socially unified local or national communities. Werbner clearly demonstrates the importance of internal class and status distinctions among South Asian migrants by an analysis of their symbolic economy of consumption.

The theoretical limits of Werbner’s book can comprehensibly show why it is necessary to strive for a critical reconstruction of assumptions structuring out theories of migration. First of all, we can see that in spite of its critical perspective Werbner reproduces the symbolic boundary between the community of migrants and the host society. Her effort to reveal the social function of cultural and social diversity in migrant communities is exceptional; however, these differences are still treated as “internal” to the migrant community. In this sense, we have to face the theoretical dilemma of whether the crucial analytical divisions are relevantly conceived either as between migrants and natives or inside of migrant and native selves/societies.

Secondly, troubles with the validity of generalisations for the whole community imposes on us a dilemma on what “level” of social reality would aspire our interpretative strategies to generalise. In other words to demarcate the boundary we want to reach with our generalisations: all immigrants of particular ethnic background or of a particular country, or all immigrants living in a particular society, or all of the inhabitants living in a particular host society, or all human beings. Perhaps these boundaries can be modified during the phase of analysis; however, they are already present in our concepts in our theories at the beginning of our research efforts. For instance, one can ask whether the proposed stress on diversity, on internal differences, does not make impossible to reach universality, to fulfill the scientific normative ideal to universal generalisations. In spite of the later suggestion, the validity of generalisations is not merely a question of applying the accurate methodology of representation but also question of reflecting our position in the field of clashing representational claims and acknowledging a theoretical dilemma of why do not we universalise from or within a particular case if it is always possible.¹ That is, one of the main problems to cope with is to find out what kind of theoretical presuppositions are hidden behind the normative requirement of generalisation. What kind of philosophy of science forms the ground of our interpretive strategy as well as our professional identity?

Finally, we can observe a theoretical shift in Werbner’s argumentation from a critique the implicit theoretical assumptions of the mainstream perspective (the ignorance of social hierarchy because of presuppositions about the structure of dominance) to

¹ On the concept of universalisation in cases see Geertz (1993).
a positivist claim that mainstream theories of migration can be refuted on the ground of empirical evidence. But can we claim to refute theoretical assumptions on the basis of empirical evidence after the establishment of post-positivist philosophy of science several decades ago? This evokes the theoretical dilemma of basing the knowledge claims of our interpretative strategies on positivist or post-positivist epistemologies.²

The positivist perspective conceives the relation of theory and research on the ground of a radical break between empirical observation and non-empirical i.e. speculative statements. Theoretical knowledge is in this way reduced to a set of explicative statements which can correctly be dealt with only in relation to empirical research. Simply, positivism attempts to resolve theoretical conflicts by means of empirical proofs. Post-positivism is an alternative perspective on the possibility of scientific knowledge that draws attention to the fundamental importance of socially mediated intersubjectivity in scientific practice. Contrary to positivism it acknowledges that there are justifiable grounds for conceptual disagreements which cannot be resolved by means of observation because the intelligibility of empirical data depends on the conceptual framework that structures both observation and interpretation. For that reason it rejects the technocratic persuasion that the basic source of scientific advance is methodological innovation. To become aware of the fact this line of thought is is not a recent “postmodernist persuasion” let me quote Parsons from the end of the 1930’s: “Theory not only formulates what we know but also tells us what we want to know, that is, the questions to which an answer is needed. Moreover, the structure of a theoretical system tells us what alternatives are open in the possible answers to a given question...” (1968 [1937]: 9).

In the sense of above, there are two crucial theoretical issues we need to work with if we reflect on the possibilities of researching and theorising transnational migration. From an epistemological perspective there emerges a question how our work is structured along the theoretical-empirical continuum.

² On the debate between positivism and post-positivism see Alexander (1982).

In other words, how is our interpretative strategy related to the chances to transcend positivist empiricism? From a normative point of view we can observe a conflict between the scientific claim of universality and the moral claim of the respect for the otherness of the Other.

In this regard, I think we can learn a lot from the genealogy of critical anthropology that was constituted in the 1970s. It showed that it is possible to transcend positivist empiricism but still take research seriously and at the same time to reflect on the influence of our own theoretical and social constraints/roots. What is more, it made a step further away from the reflection of theoretical presuppositions towards their active transformation by creating new conceptual apparatuses. The discourse of critical anthropology and the experiences of its participants demonstrates the importance of coping with our normative presuppositions, too. Namely, that we share patterns of social imagination which makes credible the vision that not only our concepts and theories but also the social reality, the phenomena we study can be changed and is in constant flux. Similarly as Werbner focused on diversity existing inside of the symbolically delimited space of migrants, critical anthropology focused on the otherness of migrants, on their forms of subordination. In other words, while researching and theorising on migration, we have to take seriously the question of the otherness of migrants and the possibilities of their emancipation.

Multi-Local Lifeworlds

It is characteristic of transnational migration that both the individual self-identity of immigrants as well their various affiliations are formed in social worlds spread across more than one place (Vertovec 2001). Theories of transnational migration focus primarily on forms of migration leading to the creation of transnational social fields, which allow immigrants transnational political and cultural participation as well as giving them exchange of a variety of objects and letting them secure communication with friends and relations in both their new and original homes (or in a third country). Transnational social fields are not
However, in contrast to transnational social networks, normally formed on the basis of experience of shared affiliation of their participants. The social glue of the transnational social networks so far discussed is usually, apart from shared interests arising from the processes of exchange and communications, a sense of common affiliation to an original home, which is shown in the competence and will to participate in cultural practices linked to the language of their original home. If we disregard this orientation towards shared affiliation to an original home, the social identities of transnational migrants and their descendants are not formed exclusively in relation to transnational social networks. The social and cultural field of the formation of identities is always created by statements and stories spread about us by Others, as well as by discursive practices of self-identity. And these classifying Others, just like their "own" aids and guidelines which enable self-interpretation, are not found only in the immigrants' original home, in the set of their transnational social networks, but also in the transnational social field encompassing their original and new homes and sometimes other places.

Various theories of transnational migration have given rise to a number of similar concepts, such as for example translocation, transnational social fields, transnational social space and transnational village. The concept of a multi-local lifeworld (Vertovec 2001) represents according to Vertovec a suitable sociological translation of all of these interpretational attempts to grasp the complexity of the process of identity formation for transmigrants. In this sense we usually find in transnational migration theories references to cross-border systems of institutional contexts of action, of social and cultural conditions which fundamentally influence the process of immigrants' identity formation. These diverse identities give individuals a day-to-day sense of their own position in the various fields of solidarity and affiliation.

Both the concept of a multi-local lifeworld and that of transnational social fields are focused on the impact of transnational influences on the formation and expression of the social identities of migrants. These concepts differ, however, in that they are part of different interpretational strategies. The concept of transnational social fields was formulated as part of an interpretational strategy aimed at a radical innovation in the discourse of anthropological research into migration and currently forms part of an interpretational strategy which advocates a critique of the methodological nationalism which dominates the mainstream of sociology and anthropology. The heterodox nature of these interpretational strategies leads to the use of highly abstract and imaginative concepts, contributing to the development of innovative potential and emphasising the novel nature of these theories.

The concept of a multi-local lifeworld is on the contrary part of an interpretational strategy which – like the interpretational strategies seeking to rehabilitate the locality concept of Smith and Guarnizo (1998) or the attempt by Portes (2002) and his colleagues at an economic definition of transnational migration – are focused on the normalisation of transnational migration as a subject of research, thereby trying to incorporate theories of transnational migration into the mainstream of anthropological and sociological research. The orthodox nature of these interpretational strategies leads to the use of old and well-established concepts; in this regard "translation" is also part of this approach, as well as the subsequent critique of new, overly abstract and unintelligible concepts, while real conceptual innovations put these strategies into practice in the form of modification and careful reinterpretation of general understandable and already accepted theories.

A good example of the aforementioned translation of new concepts and the modifying forms of conceptual innovation can be found in Vertovec's exposition of the relationship between transnational migration and the forming of immigrant identities. The main theme articulated by the concept of transnational social fields is translated by Vertovec in the form of a question into a theme which appears to be classical: He asks how local identities are moulded by transnational influences. Of course his question matches the classical concept only on the surface because in the interpretational strategy which Vertovec represents there is a reinterpretation of the idea of local identities. Local identities in this modified sense need not be rooted locally, in other words they need not be of local "origin". A specific identity becomes local by becoming part of the local lifeworld. To be
more precise, one of the local parts of the multi-local lifeworld. The concept of lifeworld is fundamental in this case because it offers the chance of conceiving the social construction of identity and affiliation of immigrants at the day-to-day level. From the point of view of a socially constructivist approach the formation of individuals’ identity – in the sense of the dialectical relationship of the self-identity of the subject and the categorisation of the subject by Others – always takes place in the context of specific social interactions and worlds, while the core of this context is formed by the day-to-day (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Jenkins 1996). Social identities referring to various forms of affiliation are able to retain their relevance for social actors only when they are kept as part of their lifeworld. Exactly from this standpoint a specific identity becomes a local identity, part of the local lifeworld, by gaining day-to-day relevance for actors operating in this place.

Nevertheless both the idea of a multi-local lifeworld and the idea of transnational social fields still represent a useful analytical tool for making sense of that globally distributed social phenomenon called by Ulf Hannerz (1996): life in diverse habitats of meaning, or, in other words, the fact that an increasing proportion of people live their day-to-day lives in social worlds which are spread simultaneously across the territory of more than one state. But theories of transnational migration, besides showing the life of people living concurrently in more than one habitat of meaning, also contribute to the reinterpretation of the very phenomenon of life in a given habitat of meaning.

From the standpoint of classical cultural theories, each local culture possesses certain characteristics which act fundamentally in the identity formation of members of that culture. Experience gained during life in this local culture shapes the identity of those who belong to it. Of course this also applies in the case of those who do not consider themselves to be members of that culture, but still live in it. Their experiences gained “here” will have an influence on their self-identity. Theories of transnational migration have developed interpretational strategies aimed at deconstructing the idea of “one place equals one culture”. They have further demonstrated that the concept of culture need not refer to the local habitat of meaning, but can also include a body of shared knowledge and practices which can be found in more than one place at a time.

Theories of transnational migration have thus contributed to the reformulation of the influence of “habitats of meaning” on the formation of individuals’ identity in the following: experience gained in various places by means of various habitats of meaning expand or if we wish, enrich, individuals’ cultural repertoire – their reserve of knowledge and competences – and thereby act on the self-identity and sense of affiliation of these individuals. Often this is a case of how individuals’ self-identity is affected by changes in their ideas about Others. Since every identity is a relationship phenomenon, a change in relations to Others does not leave their own self-identity unaffected.

Habitats of meaning incorporate various cultural elements making up a reference framework, in relation to which experience gained in the social field defined by it is made sense of, and in relation to which various self-identity models and various affiliation types are crystallised. They take the form of stories, ideas and images testifying to what it means to be a local, or member, of the habitat in question. These stories, ideas and images, however, also include those which represent Others, that is, what it means to be excluded from the field in question, or not to belong to it. Here also are included stories and ideas on internal differences and hierarchies, as well as on the injustices, rights and obligations of individuals or groups within the habitat in question.

Diaspora and its Reinterpretation

In the middle of the 1990s, the experiences and identities denoted in theories of transnational migration as transnational were, primarily, articulated in the field of literature, with the help of the metaphor “state of in-betweenness” (Bhabha 1998: 2–5). This metaphor appears in the novels and essays of Salman Rushdie who views his position in the world in the form of constant and ever-returning experiences of a “state of in-betweenness” of an immigrant moving between three countries while not being able to find comfort in any of them (Rushdie 1997; Rushdie 1992; Sharma 2001: 599). The best example of this metaphor
is Rushdie’s own situation: Rushdie lives in the West and is regarded as a writer writing for a Western readership, his books are at the same time written from the perspective of immigrants, inasmuch as almost all of the characters and situations in them come either directly from the Indian subcontinent or come from the life of immigrants from that part of the world.

According to Homi Bhabha (1998: 2–3), spaces of in-betweenness can be analytically grasped only if we abandon the modern mode of thinking about identities as singular conceptual and organisational categories. Instead of conceiving subjects at times in terms of class and at times in terms of nationality or gender, it is critical to theorise the plurality of subject positions that subjects inhabit at the same time. In-between spaces emerge through the articulation of cultural differences, where various – individual as well as collective – strategies of subject formation set up claims to identity, and by this means establish sites of contestation and collaboration. In other words, spaces of in-betweenness are spaces of overlap and displacement of differences, that is spaces of shared histories and competing claims where the locations of the dialogue or conflict are not necessarily be found between subject but rather inside of them.

Salman Rushdie in his book *Imaginary Homelands* contemplates his resolution “to create literary language and literary forms in which the experience of formerly colonised, still disadvantaged peoples might find full expression” (1992: 394). Namely, his work attempts to express experiences of uprooting, disjunction and metamorphosis. The conditions which give a rise to these experiences are, however, very similar to circumstances which characterise the life of migrants. In this sense the postcolonial experiences are inseparable from experiences of migrants. What is more, this fusion of postcolonial and migrant experiences treats Rushdie as a metaphor for thinking about all humanity. Postcolonial subjects and migrants are interconnected by their everyday experience of marginality. Postcolonial writings in general while putting this experience into words worked out a suspicion toward the notion of authentic, centred cultural experience. Instead of searching for essential, purified cultural characteristics of postcolonial subjects as well as migrants, these writings have argued that the reality of these subjects is in fact dominantly marked by inauthenticity and marginality. The syncretic and hybridised nature of post-colonial experience demonstrates results in the same deconstruction of ideas of essence and authenticity as it was worked out by post-structuralist cultural and social theory years later (Ashcroft et al 2002: 40–41). The concern with displacement and with the metamorphosis of the relationship between subject and place is at the core of special post-colonial form of identity crisis.

The experiences and identities of immigrants whose lives cross geographical and political boundaries of modern states were, similar to the parallelism of their presence “here” in the host society and “there” in their original home thematised also in the middle of the 1990s in those texts of critical anthropology which attempted a reinterpretation of the diaspora concept. In his text on diasporas, James Clifford (1994) points to the fact that the study of diaspora communities – in his interpretation, communities of people who in addition to their present home also have a collectively shared home beyond the borders of their present one – has led to immigrants gaining the status of iconic representation of hybridity. Emphasis on the metaphor of crossing borders also led to the fact that immigrants have become a symbol of a liberating uncoupling of location, culture and identity. In this sense living conditions of the diaspora existence can give rise to a “double consciousness” which denotes a situation in which the identities of individuals are formed by means of crossing borders and refusing old certainties (Gilroy 1993).

The social and cultural conditions of transnational social fields like the conditions of existence in the diaspora create an environments for the emergence and growth of plural identities, for the reconstruction and reinterpretation of local and cross-

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5 Another important concept adding sense to the existential conditions of immigrants living in the diaspora is the so-called “third space” (Bhabha 1998: 53–56). This a space without certainty or anchorage. The third space is a space of alternating experiences of expulsion and integration.
border relations of belonging. At the same time, we should add that from the point of view of those interpretational strategies focused on the conditions of existence in the diaspora, transnational migration represents one of the forms of transnational cultural circulation which leads to the creolisation and hybridisation of contemporary cultural practices of the imagination (Bhabha 1998; Hannerz 1992). The affirmative action of this interpretational strategy on behalf of marginalised forms of the imagination led to an argument concerning borders and the possibilities of imagination. Critics emphasised the material limits of cultural practices on the one hand in the sense of limiting what could be imagined at all, on the other hand in terms of limiting what could be achieved from what had been imagined (Ong and Nonini 1997; Mitchell 1997).

In this sense emphasis on the transgressive potential of imagination of those under control does not take sufficient account of the very social conditions of marginalisation. An implicit theme of the argument is to what extent is the emergence of transnational social fields and hybrid identities a result of the impact of global social and economic influences, which have a purely oppressive character. Precisely the question of the nature of dominance and the possibility of resistance is present behind reflections on whether immigrants are taken to be victims caught in a trap of hybridised cultural forms which are a symptom of new strategies of dominance or whether they are portrayed as social actors who are joint creators of these cultural practices of imagination serving as means of resistance.

A diaspora need not be viewed as a community, but can be taken as a location (Werbner 2002). A diaspora is a location which forms a space for the existence of various communities, different cultural practices and identities. The location of a diaspora is effectively created by the set of various localities found in various corners of the world. According to Pnina Werbner it is precisely the paradoxical nature of a diaspora as a location – linking cultural diversity without unifying it – that allows us to consider it as a transnational social and cultural formation. The concept of a diaspora as a social space, as a location, differs from the classical sociological and anthropological concept of ethnic and religious collectives precisely by trying to overcome the theoretical assumption of ethnic and religious unity as the normal state of existence of these communities. She even refuses the possibility of a temporary unity of a diaspora as a consequence of political or cultural mobilisation on the grounds that even in this case, what can be interpreted as the symptoms of unity are only performative forms creating an image of unity and making up part of the very process of mobilisation. The concept of unity is simply not suitable for the anthropological and sociological interpretation of diaspora because it overshadows both the action of cultural diversity and social hierarchy and the constitutive role of action during existence in a diaspora.

However, so that diasporas are not viewed as boundless spaces without boundaries, so that the social space of a diaspora can be distinguished from other social spaces, Werbner finds a solution in the sphere of the theory of social action. The symbolic boundaries of a diaspora are in this sense formed during the actions of members of the diaspora as the latter during their actions share a specific form of orientation and a specific sense of joint responsibility. For example the diaspora nature of Pakistani immigrant communities in Great Britain is based according to Werbner (1990, 2002) on a specific orientation of the action of members of these communities on memories and locations which they do not share with members of other communities living in Britain. So rather than any political or historical unity or a cultural homogeneity shared by all members, it is diaspora forms of action which form the social reality of the diaspora.

Werbner emphasised that the diaspora does not exist only through shared imagination, but due to concrete and objectified practices of diaspora forms of action. For example some members of the diaspora participate in the life space by creating religious discussion groups. Others again take part by organising regular monthly poetry readings. In this sense, diaspora communities are the embodiment of political, philanthropic and cultural forms of action.

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6 For a conceptualisation of the relation of the diaspora and transnational migration see Levitt (2001), Brettell (2006).
7 For the critical confrontation between the “imagined futures” of transmigrants and the theory of transnational migration see Harney (2007).
Diaspora action has a performative character because part of the purpose of action – for example gestures of giving – are a requirement or the desire for acknowledgement by others of the sense of this action. These forms of action also contribute to the constitution of the diaspora space by referring the relations of acknowledgement and sense of joint responsibility inwards, into the transnational diaspora space. A desire for acknowledgement of the sense of action is always aimed at another member of the diaspora. A situation where members of a diaspora living in another country are suffering can in a similar way mobilise the sense of joint responsibility in the form of organising protests or collections. As Werbner (2002: 125) notes: “If Muslim women in Bosnia, in Kosovo or in Kashmir are raped or their husbands tortured, it affects Pakistani women in England.” Regardless of the transnational character of the structure of these relations of acknowledgement and sense of joint responsibility the social space of the diaspora is not organised or hierarchically arranged using the political or religious forms of institutionalised authority. This does not however mean that there do not exist various attempts to unify the diasporas from the side of the state institutions of the original home or of various “worldwide” associations. Nonetheless the diversity of diaspora space makes impossible any attempt by a single authority to control this space.

It is precisely the varied character of the location of the diaspora, the fact that a transnational network is created of various communities without a central authority that leads Werbner (2002) to use the concept of “sense of joint responsibility” in conceptualising the symbolic boundaries of diaspora location, instead of the classical concepts of solidarity and loyalty. Both solidarity relations and loyalty relations presume the existence of a core or centre which fulfils the mediating function between various individuals and communities making up a certain political unit. In contrast to this, the sense of joint responsibility limits the location of the diaspora without the mediating power of a central authority or a central location. They thus contribute jointly to the formation of the political character of diaspora communities without the political activity of these communities focusing on influencing the central authority or being defined by it.

The concept of a sense of joint responsibility does not lead to the idea of the diaspora location being a flat two-dimensional space of mutual relations without power structures, hierarchies and centres. The sense of joint responsibility – like the focusing of action on memories and places specific to the diaspora – is a mediating form of symbolic power which links communities with differing forms of influence, wealth or potential to produce cultural objects, into the transnational network. It is the global flow of cultural objects, political and philanthropic support, which creates hierarchies and various centres within the diaspora location. In this sense the original home or the state and cultural institutions of the original home can fulfil the function of one of the many centres of the diaspora location, but of course it need not be the only centre which structures action in the transnational social field of the diaspora.

The interpretational strategy which Pnina Werbner’s approach represents is an important part of the discourse of transnational migration because it shows a method of building on the attempts of the representatives of critical anthropology and critical cultural theory to reinterpret the classical concept of the diaspora as well as defining itself against those attempts. During the 1990s, interpretational strategies arose which in their reinterpretation of the concept of the diaspora, in contrast to the preceding concept, no longer emphasised the experience of loss and desire to return as key characteristics of the diaspora identity. Cosmopolitan forms of identity and the possibilities offered by a transnational type of life were understood in this new concept of the diaspora as symptoms of the potentially emancipatory character of diaspora existence. The diaspora could also become the subject of interest of these interpretational strategies because they embodied the hope of overcoming the cultural hegemonies of the national state and national identity.

The introduction of the concept “a sense of joint responsibility” is the result of a critical attempt to find a conceptual alternative to theories which aestheticise the concept of the diaspora. However, Pnina Werbner’s critique is not articulated from classical positions defining diaspora theory in critical anthropology and in post-colonial critical cultural theory. Her interpretational strategy, in particular the concept of a diaspora as a decentred
and deterritorialised location, is inspired by post-structuralist discourse from which the theories that she criticises also draw. Werbner (2000, 2002) states that these theories of the diaspora concept aestheticise, by focusing on the interpretation of the subjective experiences of members of the diaspora, while also emphasising the artistic forms for portraying these experiences. According to Werbner, the theory of the diaspora should not refer purely to the reflex of hybrid identity and experiences of the subjects, but should take into account the politicised forms of action which create and maintain the “material character” of the diaspora. Stress on the “material character”, in the sense of institutional anchorage of diaspora identities and experiences, attempts to be a counterbalance to theories which mainly emphasise the role of imagination in the constitution of a diaspora.

A diaspora is not an abstract social space, but a location full of tracks of history. Diasporas in this sense are deterritorialised imaginary communities. As in the theory of nationalism, in this case in emphasising the imaginary character of these communities, there is a conceptualisation of the fact that these are mainly shared forms of imagination, by means of which these societies operate and exist. While in the case of the constitution of nations as imaginary political communities territorial boundaries play the key role, it precisely the overcoming of the idea of territorial anchorage which is the assumption underlying the constitution of the diaspora. Diasporas are in this sense deterritorialised nations. While the interpretational strategy developed by Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, Arjun Appadurai or Paul Gilroy seeks and finds in diaspora identities an alternative to national identity, the interpretational strategy represented by Pnina Werbner, Nina Glick Schiller and Tölölyan seeks and finds in diaspora identities symbolic structures which these diaspora identities share with national identities. Diaspora identities, thus fully compatible with national identities, are viewed as identities symbolically mediated by shared memories, a sense of shared destiny and a sense of a shared present.

The critique of the aesthetic view of the diaspora aims to show that the interpretational strategy of critical anthropology and the post-colonial critical theory of culture are based on a theoretical assumption that the aforementioned mediating symbolic power of the imagination acts through cultural practices. In other words, this strategy finds an identity constituting and mediating forms of imagination in the sphere of art and popular culture. This form of favouring the aesthetic sphere is not a consequence of neglecting political forms of imagination. Nor is it simply a case of this interpretational strategy, in its search for suitable forms for the representation of reality, giving greater credence to artists than to politicians. Favouring interpretation of aesthetic forms of representation, apart from the already mentioned attempt to find an alternative to the national order of things, is based on two theoretical assumptions. On the one hand, it is grounded in an assumption of the anchorage of political forms of imagination in the everyday nature of shared meanings, ideas and experiences. On the other hand, a starting point for this interpretational strategy is the fact that it gains access to that everyday sphere of imagination through aesthetic forms of representation. The reason for reading and interpreting the novels of Salman Rushdie or Kiran Desai is not in this sense that their books are objective representations of the social reality of the diaspora or that they would in any decision manner directly form the imagination of the diaspora. On the contrary, these are books which contribute to an understanding of the forming of diaspora identities by giving us access to the link between the everyday sphere of the imagination and experiences in the lives of diaspora subjects.

Werbner (2000) objects that favouring aesthetic forms of imagination leads to an indefensibly narrow view of politics, in the sense of the politics of representation. At the same time conflicts and political influence are not shaped only at the level of the representation of reality. Her interpretational strategy aims at a theoretical emancipation of everyday political action and the political form of imagination while mediating the shared sense of existence in the diaspora. This is not to refuse the constitutive role of the imagination in forming diaspora and national identities, but is rather Werbner finding forms of imagination mediating and constituting diaspora identity also in the sphere of political action. At the same time, her view of the diaspora emphasises both moral and organisational, as well as aesthetic, aspects of action constituting the diaspora. The diaspora as
a location cannot exist without a shared sense of joint responsibility, which must however be implemented in organised forms of action. However, neither a (symbolic) sharing of a sense of joint responsibility nor its implementation in action can happen without the focus of diaspora existence on memories and places which are mediated by the symbolic power of imagination, articulated for example in transnational social fields by means of transnational consumer culture.

**Conclusion**

Modern sciences have from their inception shown signs of a reflexive relationship to their own discursive practices, which has become evident in prescriptive requirements for systematic theoretical and methodological consideration. Notwithstanding the presence of this reflexivity during the second half of the twentieth century in both sociology and anthropology there appeared interpretational strategies which were directed at the radicalisation of the reflexivity of the above-mentioned discursive formations in the area of science. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu is a good example of a critical sociology which is directed towards consideration of the epistemological and social assumptions behind sociological and anthropological interpretational strategies (Bourdieu 1990, 1992, 2004, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In his view, sociology will be able to reveal the nature of a game developed on social grounds only when it is also able to reveal the nature of the practices for revealing the nature of the game on social grounds.

Every interpretational strategy and every valid testimony is based on non-reflected (derived) assumptions. There is no investigative method or style of thinking which is not based on a certain set of non-reflected, non-theorised links to the conceptual structure which forms the background understanding to the discourses. All distinctions in interpretational strategies, for example the differentiation of relevant themes, problems or subjects for study, the choice of appropriate study methods and acceptable principles for testimony validity, are meaningful only in relation to this shared non-reflected background to the discourses. The very theme of justification of validity and legitimacy shows that the concept of non-reflected assumptions does not refer only to the epistemological background to knowledge. The set of non-reflected assumptions is created both by epistemological and by social assumptions. At the same time the critical consideration of the social assumptions of knowledge need not necessarily lead to a “sociology of intellectuals”. In other words, it need not necessarily lead to the revelation of the political and economic conditions which permit the development of discursive practices in the area of knowledge or the social basis of scientists’ intellectual practices, as understood by Gouldner (1970). The confrontation of anthropology and sociology with their own critical reflexivity shows how firmly linked these discursive formations are to the non-reflected assumptions in the form of the background concepts, procedures for the justification of testimony validity and legitimacy of the institutions of knowledge production.

Theories of transnational migration included from the beginning interpretational strategies which linked directly to attempts to radicalise reflexivity in anthropology and sociology. Theories of transnational migration were therefore formed in discursive formations in which it was “obvious” that – in the words of Pierre Bourdieu (2004) – the social field of science is not only a field of practices producing knowledge, but is also a field of arguments and struggles. With the radicalisation of reflexivity, the history of the linkage of anthropological and sociological practices in knowledge production with power also surfaced. The theory of Michel Foucault (1980), according to which modern scientific forms of knowledge are inseparable from power practices, worked in these interpretational strategies against a background of their ironic relationship to modern calls for scientific objectivity, which articulates an ideal of non-influence on the process of knowledge acquisition by power relations acting as part of the studied reality, while not reflecting the power impact of the process itself of knowledge production.

In this paper I have attempted an critical reconstruction of the epistemological and social assumptions of theories of transnational migration precisely because I wanted to describe the processes of knowledge production through interpretational
strategies which were formed after the reflexive change in anthropology and sociology. Theories of transnational migration are a good example of how radical reflexivity in the social sciences does not lead only to the sociology of sociology and the anthropology of anthropology. They are also a good example of how the discovery and exposition of new or rediscovered phenomena is already unachievable and indefensible without an explicit effort to form new interpretational strategies and with reflexive innovation of one’s theoretical and methodological perspective.

References


RECONSIDERING THE “DISCURSIVE TURN” IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND IMMIGRATION RESEARCH

Any Freitas, Philippe Lacour

Despite the strong criticisms it has met since its early stages, the “linguistic”1 or the “discursive” turn, as it would be better called,2 represents one of the most relevant theoretical developments of the 20th century. Initiated within some philosophical circles as a reconsideration of the nature and role of language and its relationship with philosophy, the discursive turn has progressively made its way into the cultural sciences (social sciences and humanities).3 In this paper, we have a twofold goal. We wish, in the first place, to explore the epistemological and methodological aspects of the reception of the “discursive turn” in the cultural sciences, focusing on migration research production especially in the field of political sciences to illustrate our arguments. Our second goal is to provide a critical assessment of such a “turn”

1 In the philosophy of language, the roots of the “linguistic” turn could be traced back to the works of Wittgenstein (especially the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” of 1921) and Frege in the initial decades of the 20th century. It later became quite popular as an “intellectual movement” in the US by the late 1960s, in particular after the publishing of “The Linguistic Turn. Essays in Philosophical Method”, edited by Richard Rorty (1967). Many of the linguistic turn’s assumptions have been since then re-visited and strongly criticized.

2 Throughout this paper, we will be discussing what we prefer to call the discursive turn, for it is based on a more accurate philosophical conception of language than the “linguistic” turn.

3 Cultural Sciences are not considered here as a synonym for “cultural studies”. Rather, they designate the study of all human production, in the framework of a symbolic anthropology (after thinkers like Peirce, Saussure, or Cassirer). They therefore include both social sciences and humanities, in a broad sense, but exclude both formal sciences (logics, mathematics) and empirico-formal sciences (physics, biology…). On this distinction, see for instance G.-G. Granger, Science et réalité (2001).
towards discourse, pointing out its main implications for research-making in the humanities. Although we concentrate on one specific field, many of the arguments developed here about the effects of the discursive turn can be extended to most disciplines in the cultural sciences. From this perspective, the assessment of the particular area of political sciences’ migration research will provide us with an opportunity to discuss the impact and consequences of the discursive turn at a more general level, extending some of our arguments to the cultural sciences as a whole.

Our major argument is that the reappraisal of the role of language engendered by the discursive turn should be seen as an opportunity for researchers to establish standards of scientific production that are more consistent not only with the (social) nature of the objects they study, but also with the way their disciplines actually “reason”. In this manner, as we maintain, instead of borrowing models and methods from the natural sciences that cannot appropriately capture the particularities of social reality, researchers should assume the discursive nature of their areas of study, hence fully endorsing interpretation, narration and argumentation as the key logical dimensions guiding their research activity.

There are at least two reasons for paying particular attention to political sciences’ approaches to immigration studies. In the first place, the discipline has been one of the most affected by the positivistic temptations (Fischer 2003) the discursive turn has so deeply questioned. The introduction of discursive/linguistic variables in political analyses has marked an important turn not only in the way researchers conceive of political processes, but also in the methods used to approach them. Secondly, focusing primarily on this specific discipline helps us to slightly narrow down the scope of the paper, providing our arguments with more precision and accuracy.

Even though interest in discourse and language has considerably increased in the aftermath of the “discursive turn”, different areas in the cultural sciences are still greatly concerned with producing objective, neutral and generalizable findings, following blindly transposed standards from the “natural” (hard) sciences. The field of migration studies has been particularly marked by this kind of “scientistic” concern, progressively losing contact with the very reality they were supposed to assess in the first place. This tendency is quite strong in the political sciences, where migration research has from the start been marked by a concern with guiding political action and “good policy practices” in the field.

The proliferation of research aimed at establishing variables which are able to determine, across countries and at different points in time, the reasons (causes) that lead people to migrate is a good example of the kind of research dictated by “serious” scientific standards. Even if their initial purpose is valuable (that is, to contribute to a better understanding of the factors pushing people to migrate), the idea that one could objectively single out universal (and thus, de-contextualized) and timeless (that is, disconnected from the historical moment in which they take place) “causes” of migration seems quite difficult to defend in a realm in which context (political, social, cultural, economic) and time (present, past and future) matter most.

The growing acknowledgement among researchers that discourse (and more recently language) plays a crucial role not only in explaining, but in the very constitution of reality (i.e. social and political facts) has been particularly important in countering what Frank Fischer (2003) has called “empiricist” orientations. Such an innovative approach to social reality has engendered new epistemological and methodological perspectives, paving the way for the development of different research programmes, less concerned with causal explanations than with capturing social “meanings”.

Nonetheless, discourse-sensitive analyses are still in the minority in the cultural sciences as a whole, and in the political sciences in particular. Different factors have contributed to reinforce the predominance of positivistic/empiricist models of research production. In the first place, the reception of discourse-driven epistemological perspectives has been marked by strong scepticism within large sectors of the academic community. Accused of reducing everything to discourses – thus falling into an inescapable relativism – supporters of these approaches have been unable to respond to their critics and propose alternative ways of investigating “reality”. In fact, misunderstandings on both sides have led to a radicalization of positions, obstructing
the possibilities of meaningful dialogues. The progressive marginalization of discourse-oriented methodologies has, moreover, been furthered by its inability to deliver “useful” research, that is, to “predict” outcomes and provide stakeholders with policy orientations to “solve” social problems.

In the field of migration studies, even if historians, anthropologists and sociologists have been making valuable contributions, discourse-driven approaches remain relatively marginal within the academic and (even more) the political spheres. Research in the field, especially that developed from a political sciences approach, has been following the same “mainstream” epistemological orientation with a strong emphasis on providing objective policy solutions. The adoption of (supposedly) more rigorous methods is thus intended to provide scientific status to research results, which can be used to explain the causes of the migratory problem or point to possible solutions. At the bottom of this search for scientific rigour lies an enduring feeling of illegitimacy that still haunts many disciplines within the humanities. The present study is an attempt to explore the basis of this fundamental malaise, while proposing a different way to overcome it.

The article is structured in two parts. In the first one, we will shortly explore the gradual introduction of discourse-sensitive methods in the cultural sciences, paying particular attention to migration studies. As pointed out earlier, research production in the field will be used to illustrate some of our arguments, especially concerning the persistence of positivistic models of research production responding to policy-driven demands. In the second part of the paper we will suggest that the discursive turn should be conceived in reality as a positive development for social sciences. Among other things, the renewed interest in language has brought the humanities closer to the true “nature” of reasoning in their disciplines, which, as we will suggest, is inherently discursive. By identifying and asserting the standards of “scientific” research that are proper to their disciplines, we hope to incite researchers to become more aware of the real criteria to be fulfilled to legitimate their research activities.4

4 This paper echoes some of the arguments introduced by Szaló (2009) in this volume, especially his reflections about the “reflexive” and “discursive” nature of some of the key epistemological assumptions of transnational migration theories. Indeed, Szaló’s arguments about the relevance of reflexive sociology to the opening of more value-sensitive theories and methods are quite coherent with our defence of a discursive rationality of social and political sciences.

Part I – Words Matter: the Discursive Turn in the Cultural Sciences

The first part of this article shortly explores four interconnected points. In the first (1), we sketch the development in the last three decades of so-called “mainstream” research in the cultural sciences, focusing on the production of immigration studies to illustrate our argument. We will then (2) look at how interest in discourse and language has emerged, giving rise to different epistemological and methodological perspectives. Thirdly (3), we will outline how discourses and discourse-sensitive methods have been conceptualized in the cultural sciences. We will close this part (4) with a brief sketch of the main implications of the discursive turn for research-making, highlighting some implications in the field of migration research.

1 – Development of Mainstream Research: “Empiricism” and Beyond?

Although migratory movements within and across continents are inherent to the very development of human societies, as historians (Noiriel 1988, 2007) keep reminding us, the origins of immigration studies can be linked to the emergence of immigration as a social fact in a considerable number of Western, wealthy countries. Even if migration was not unusual in most of these societies, the rise of immigrants coming from developing countries during the past three decades has had a considerable impact in turning immigration into a socially (and politically) relevant issue. Given their apparent (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious) differences and growing concentration (later called “ghettoisation”) in urban areas of the largest Western cities,
immigrants could no longer be ignored or regarded as simple “guests” who would eventually go away. Problematization of the phenomenon often goes hand in hand with the greater visibility it receives in the public sphere, either by the incorporation of the issue in political declarations, media coverage or mobilizations of civil society.  

The visibility of immigration in the public sphere and its consequent politicization also seem to have a considerable impact on both research agendas and financing. The case of Roma migration studied by Ružička in this book is, for instance, a telling example of how researchers seem to respond to the expectations and demands of the general public, the media and policymakers (Ružička in this volume, 2009). The establishment of an independent field of research by the late 1970s, identified under the general label of “migration studies”, was in some sense a response to growing demands not only for a better understanding of the phenomenon, but also for a more efficient way of coping with its social and political consequences. Gathering students from different disciplines (from sociology, political sciences and history, through geography, economy and law), the field’s origin was thus marked by a certain orientation towards the identification of factors that could at the same time explain migration, as well as point out the possible policy solutions to solve the challenges it posed.

The perceptible and unexpected rise of migratory movements from developing to developed countries during the 1980s (intensified throughout the 1990s) has definitively placed migration into the realm of social “problems” – a way of framing the issue that has considerably narrowed down policy and theoretical thinking. Changes in the character of the migrant population over the same period (more numerous, diversified, determined to settle and also concentrated in urban areas of their host countries), together with the lack of institutional and policy integration mechanisms, have only made more apparent the difficulties to be faced. Stakeholders’ worries about the consequences of migration and the paths to be followed in the future were emphasised by diffused social demands for a solution to the problem.

Scholars working in the field of migration have been largely inspired by this socio-political environment, reflecting on the questions (and demands) arising from public debates of the period. Migration studies have thereby followed what Frank Fischer (2003) called the empiricist, rationalistic and technocratic models. Informed by a “rational model of decision-making” (Fischer 2003: 4) – a direct consequence of the influence of economics and its “positivist scientific methodologies” – a great number of scholars, chiefly within the political sciences, have become overly concerned with producing rigorous quantitative analysis, able to clearly separate “facts” from “values”, and produce generalizable findings, supposedly valid independently of their immediate historical context.

Such positivist/empiricist models have proved better suited to fulfilling the expectations of policy and decision-makers, who expect social scientists to provide clear and objective answers to solve social problems. Social sciences have hence to respond to the same “utility” challenges as natural ones: to predict outcomes whenever possible and offer definitive solutions to identified public concerns. Understanding the role of less objective variables (such as culture, ideology, identity) in the development of social processes or the very definition of social categories appears, from this angle, less valuable for the establishment of policy-guidelines.

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6 A recent issue of the French journal “Agone” (“L’Invention de l’immigration”, No. 40, 2008) has addressed precisely the emergence of immigration as a social problem to both researchers and policy-makers.

7 This is of course not exclusive to migration studies. Researchers in other disciplines of the cultural and natural sciences seem to have the same political and public opinion constraints when defining the research agenda of their departments, journals, centres; particularly when applying for grants and other forms of financing.

8 The case of different Western European countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK provides a good illustration of this trend.

9 Given their ontological and epistemological premises, these “mainstream” studies have a tendency to evaluate social reality and actors in quite instrumental terms. Actors are, in this light, often conceived as strategically orientated individuals whose actions are oriented towards solving problems, pursuing their goals and optimizing their interests. Their actions are consequently evaluated in terms of their efficiency or effectiveness, that is, their capacity of fulfilling these – defined ex ante and thus fixed – goals and interests.
The capturing of objective reality, the individualization of causal variables, the privileging of quantitative analysis, the capacity of predicting future social outcomes, as well as the concern with replication and falsification have become some of the most relevant legitimacy standards of research production\(^{10}\) shared by many social scientists in the field. This trend is however not exclusive to the field of migration studies, but in reality a characteristic shared by a great number of areas within the cultural sciences, especially in disciplines such as political sciences, international relations, economy and law.\(^{11}\) Within the most prominent academic circles of those disciplines, good research has become virtually a synonym of the use of these “scientific” methods, a trend that has somewhat oriented scholars towards producing quite homogeneous studies.

The tendency to study migration almost as a “new” trend (or an “outcome” of globalization) and not a long-lived phenomenon is in fact one remarkable outcome of this way of approaching research. Research production has thus focused essentially on the “causes” of migration (that is, what variables “pushed” people to leave their countries, as well as what factors “attracted” them towards certain regions/states), as well as the different mechanisms states could (or should) use to “control” and “regulate” migratory flows. The very possibility of controlling migration (as well as states’ actual capacity of achieving effective control) was later added as a subject of study on its own (Freeman 1994; Cornelius, Martin, Hollifield 1994). By the same token, uncontrolled migration and the growing erosion of states’ sovereignty have equally come to the centre stage of academic (and political) debates (Joppke 1998; Massey 2004).

\(^{10}\) By legitimacy standards we mean those criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to legitimate the “scientific quality” of scholars and their production.

\(^{11}\) The most flagrant exception to the dominance of empiricism is to be found in history. In fact, historians, used to “thinking” of their objects of study as “events” that need necessarily to be described/narrated though language, have often been more sensitive to the more symbolic aspects of the aspects they address (see Passeron 2006).

**2 – (Re-)Discovering Discourse**

Despite their considerable analytical capabilities, the course of historical developments has eventually brought to light the shortcomings of rationalistic methods when applied to the “real world”. Quantitative tools have proved unable to appropriately capture the context of events, as well as other less “quantifiable” dimensions of social facts and events – like “culture”, ideology, actors’ interests, intentions, and so forth (Fischer 2003; Granger, 1983, 2001; Geertz 1973, 1983; deLeon 1988). More importantly, the expected predictive power of these approaches has fallen short of accomplishing its aim, which was to provide bureaucrats and elected representatives with concrete directions of how to solve public problems. Much of the analysts’ incapacity of anticipating social and political events actually results from the fact that these events are not simply concrete manifestations of relatively fixed processes, but also the result of socio-political interpretations of the actors involved in them. Social events thus involve a process of meaning formulation and reproduction that can hardly be objectively captured.

Growing awareness about the symbolic dimension of reality has progressively led social analysts to bring value-sensitive tools into their research activities as a way to answer the limitations of empiricist research. In point of fact, works calling for an epistemological and methodological critique of social analysis can be dated back to the 1960s. From Weber to the neo-institutionalists in the 1990s, through Foucault’s post-structuralism, postmodernism and critical theory, there have been numerous ways to “introduce” discourse into the cultural sciences. Even if these different perspectives do not form a unified “school of thought”, they all share the same discursive, interpretive, narrative and argumentative-based approach to social and political reality.

Although in the initial phase some of these studies tended to keep a rather strict separation between normative and empirical dimensions, they later evolved towards a position in which both could be harmonized and taken together. Indeed, if scholars’ attention was at first mostly turned to solving “agent/structure” problems, they have gradually been led to address rather complex issues, such as the way that representing the world “through
language” could actually shape the issues governments, society but also analysts themselves have to deal with. Among different epistemological orientations that have developed in the aftermath of the discursive turn, social constructionism and the so-called “discourse analysis” have received considerable attention from researchers interested in immigration as a social and political fact (Ter Wal 2000).

The so-called social constructionism (or constructivism) regroups in reality different approaches which have in common an “attitude” towards social reality rather than a “method” to study it. In that sense, social constructionism is not a school of thought, an epistemological principle nor a “method”, but a way of exposing the underlying assumptions determining empirical observations. Berger and Luckmann (1966) were one of the first to draw attention to this alternative way of theoretically reconsidering social problems; an epistemological move that has found a considerable echo in different disciplines across the cultural sciences. In a nutshell, instead of viewing social problems as “products of identifiable, objective social conditions”, constructionist perspectives propose to approach them as “the product of activities of political and social groups”, that is, the result of “a sequence of events that develop on the basis of collective social definitions” (Fischer 2003: 54).

Historically, discourse analysis can be better described as the combination of three different national traditions (Angermüller 2007, 2005). The French one has been greatly influenced by structuralism (Althusser, Foucault, Lacan) and its critiques (pragmatic turn), being represented by scholars like Michel Pêcheux, Dominique Maingueneau12 and more recently Jean-Michel Adam.13 The Anglo-Saxon tradition finds its inspiration in the speech-acts theory of Austin and Searle, which developed into a rule-based (Brown and Yule 1998) or an ethno-meth-odological approach in the USA (Garfinkel 1967, 2002; Goffman, 1959), and into contextualised studies of the “Grounded Theory” in the UK (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The third national variation is marked by German studies on the hermeneutic movement in history14 and humanities (Jauss 1982a, 1982b),15 as well as a theory of discursivity (Habermas and the universal pragmatic rules of communication).16 Rearticulating this triple origin, current trends have focused on the representation modes of contemporary societies (the post-structuralist Essex school and the British Cultural Studies),17 or on social ideologies,18 notably racial constructions (Wodak and Reisigl 2001), sometimes using “frame analysis” perspectives.19

3 – What Are Discourses and How Do They Work in Social Research?

Growing awareness of the role played by discourses in social and political explanations does not imply, however, that the very concept of discourse is clearly defined and understood in the same way by all scholars. There are not only multiple views of what discourse stands for but also different ways of conceiving how a symbolic, discourse-driven method should work in practice. In the next paragraphs, we will provide a short summary

12 For a fairly recent state of the art in France, see Maingueneau and Charauudeau (2002). For a more thorough history of the French tradition of Discourse Analysis, see Mazière (2005).
13 Originally specialized in textual linguistics, Jean-Michel Adam recently attempted to reach a “common ground” with Discourse Analysis. See Adam (2005). Conversely, Dominique Maingueneau tried to apply Discourse Analysis to literary texts (Maingueneau 2004). This mutual convergence of Humanities and Linguistics was the main topic of a recent symposium held in Besançon, France (“Linguistique et littérature: Cluny, 40 ans après”)
14 For more details see Koselleck (2002); and his compelling achievement: Brunner, Conze and Koselleck 1974–2004.
15 Another hermeneutic trend pervades German philology, as in the works of Péter Szondi.
16 However, many “clinical” studies, especially in the form of a renewed comprehensive sociology of knowledge, attempted to avoid the Habermasian normative approach. See Knoblauch (2005); and Keller (2005).
17 The works of Torfing (1999) can be pointed out as a good representative of this school.
18 Scholars Teun Van Dijk (1993); Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton (2005); Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski (2007) have developed interesting works on ideology and the ideological dimensions of social analysis.
19 “Frame analysis” has become particularly well-known after Erving Goffman’s famous book Frame Analysis (Goffman 1974). On this see also Konerding (1993); Schoen and Rein (1994).
of how discourses and discourse-sensitive analysis have been tackled and conceptualized in the last decades, even though these perspectives are far from being universally accepted by all scholars.

Echoing Fairclough (1992, 2003) and Fischer (2003), *discourse* could be defined as an ensemble of ideas and concepts that not only “gives social meanings to social and physical relationships” (Fischer 2003: 90), but also mediates the transmission/ transformation of cultural tradition. This notion is consistent with what scholars have been identifying as the main task of discourse analysis, that is: to understand the ways discursive and social practices are linked and explore the dynamics existing between them. The discursive field, both at the macro and micro level (as clearly showed by the works of the Microstoria School), is characterized by what may be called, after Ricoeur, an *ongoing conflict of interpretations*. By framing relevant normative categories, the discursive dimension also demarcates the very terrain of struggle for social actors. Discourses have in fact a twofold dimension: they are limited by certain (institutional, social, etc) contexts, at the same time as they are capable of opening new paths to (social) action.20

Discourse, interpretative research is particularly concerned with *how public problems or social facts become “public” and “social” in the first place*. In fact, its simple “existence in the world” is not sufficient to confer the status of “public” to a given problem. To become “public”, a given issue needs to be integrated into dominant discourses, thereby reinforcing existent ideologies and/or furthering given interests. In the same way that some issues are represented as a problem, others may never be considered one. In reality, the mechanisms operating behind the social construction of public problems are similar to those that hinder their establishment as such. Powerful political actors not only “choose” on the basis of their ideological systems which social conditions, events and facts will be problematized, but can also strategically manoeuvre to block the problematization of other issues (Ingram and Schneider, 1993; Růžička 2009).

The ideological premise on which such “selection” rests is however often concealed, for it is embedded in existing discourses. For instance, for people who see immigrants as criminals, immigration policies based on control and public order concerns are not problematic, but legitimate. Fischer (2003) demonstrates, for instance, how elected officials use political language in order to create public problems that can be satisfied by “symbols of political actions”, without actually dealing with them. Bearing that in mind, the analysis of social facts like immigration is to a great extent a process of deconstruction of what initially appears to be a coherent concept in order to reveal how given representations are created, why some become dominant while others are left out, and finally how they are manipulated as part of political strategy.21

All in all, by underlining the importance of political language and, more importantly, the need to deconstruct dominant discourses, discourse-driven approaches aim to underscore what policy analysts’ main goal should be: to disclose the hidden mechanisms and question, with their investigations, the “taken for granted” issues that would otherwise remain unchallenged. It would be, however, mistaken to conclude that discursive views of society and politics imply that political arguments cannot be ultimately verified or falsified. If it is true that considering those

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20 This reading of the meanings and function of discourses and social practices is actually quite a similar position to Gérard Noiriel’s (1988, 2007) research programme, itself deeply inspired by Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s works directly discussed by the author.

21 Another aspect related to the manipulation of meanings in public discourses is the role played by ambiguity, imprecision and vagueness particularly in policy and legal language. Ambiguous, unclear and/or vague propositions often indicate imperfect political agreements in which different views needed to be articulated in one cohesive text. In this light, ambiguity and vagueness have important political functions. By blurring or hiding problematic implications of controversial decisions, they might facilitate cooperation and compromise among groups with different preferences and interests; they can also hide the absence of consensus sensitive issues normally engender; or even prevent the formation of clearer notions in the name of particular interests. On this see particularly Fischer (2003: 60–63). Current debates on the determination of the concept of “environmental refugee” in international treaties are one good illustration of how imprecision and vagueness can indeed hide the absence of agreement and the lack of political will among relevant actors. See for instance Bates (2002).
arguments in the light of the ideological interests they help to further impedes falsification in the Popperian sense, it does not hinder the possibility of verification, even if in a weaker sense. It is true, therefore, that public action and political support are not only shaped by observable variables, but also by all that can be assumed, supposed, or constructed (ideas, beliefs, etc.).

4 - Implications of the Discursive Turn for Migration Research

Among the most relevant implications of the discursive turn for the cultural sciences one could point out the growing awareness it has generated among social researchers not only about the subjective foundations of reality, but also the considerable role played by natural language in constituting (instead of simply reflecting) social facts. The practical repercussions of this discursive awakening in research have been numerous. In the first place, social scientists have become more sceptical about their capability of producing “objective”, “value-free” and predictive theories, which has consequently led to a more critical approach to the supposedly “neutral” positivist methodology.

At the same time, researchers have also been led to acknowledge their own responsibility in reinforcing or producing power relations through their activities. Scholars are not immune to political pressures, financial constraints or ideological disputes in defining their research agenda, editorial guidelines or department orientation. As stressed earlier (section 1), research focus on certain issues or particular dynamics is often a response to demands that are not purely scientific, strictly speaking. In the field of immigration studies, for instance, Ružička’s (2009) claims about research on Roma migration are quite revealing. As the author shows, only the more “visible” dimensions of Roma migration (that is, aspects that are fully recognized by the media, policymakers and public opinion as “problems”) are actually transformed into subjects of study, while the more “invisible” ones remain overlooked despite their social and political relevance. The discursive turn has thus emphasised the need to investigate more carefully the actors, interests and ideological grounds legitimating research activities, as well as researchers’ choices.

Discourse-sensitive approaches have moreover called researchers’ attention to the constitutive capacity of language. In this manner, students have become more attentive to the fact that the way of discursively representing and categorizing a given group or social fact (like illegal migrants, migration problem, and so forth) has in fact quite concrete effects in the “real” world. In a nutshell, the words used in the categorization of a “target population” considerably shape the political stance, policy tools and rationale that will be used in the management of the situation. If immigrants are negatively categorized as “bad people” or “undeserving” it becomes much more difficult for elected representatives and stakeholders to legitimate policies aimed at either providing immigrants with access to public services and goods or even helping them escape their difficult situation.

Interest in the way political language works, more specifically in the way words chosen by political leaders (but also by the media) consistently shape migration politics and migrants’ representation, has opened up totally different possibilities in the field. Researchers have thus become more interested in studying not only the causes of migration or dynamics of migratory movements, but also issues of self-other perception, mutual recognition and group identity, either through the study of discursive “frames” or discourse analysis (Ter Wal 2000; Martín Rojo and Van Dijk 1997; Van der Valk 2003; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004). Likewise, since the early 1990s, there has been a considerable

22 Both Habermas’ pragmatic and argumentative conception of truth and Jean-Claude Passeron’s idea of a “natural reasoning” converge about this point. See Passeron (2006). On the epistemological relevance of verification beyond Popper’s plea for falsification, see Granger (1992).

23 A good illustration of how a discourse approach can be applied to the study of the social construction of “target populations” can be found in the work of Ingram and Schneider (1993). In a nutshell, the authors highlight how the way “target groups” are represented in the public sphere largely determines whether they will ultimately receive public services/benefits, or will conversely be deprived. Conversely, policies based on a given representation of a target group send powerful messages which also shape the self-representation and consequently claim-making ability of concerned groups.
rise in the number of studies and publications addressing issues such as the impact of immigration on the host societies (and more recently on their countries of origin); immigrants’ strategies for coping with multiple ties and forms of (cultural, formal/juridical, religious, linguistic) “belonging”; their different types of social and political mobilization, transnational migration ties and so forth (Penninx, Martiniello, Vertovec 2004; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Favell and Geddes 1999; Szaló 2009; Basch et al. 1994; Vertovec 2001; Brettell and Hollifield 2000; Brettell 2007). These approaches have also highlighted the importance of addressing integration from a more subject-oriented perspective, calling attention to the rather interpretative dimension of integration instead of simply measuring “objective” criteria.

All in all, the introduction of discursive-oriented perspectives in the cultural sciences in general, and in migration studies in particular, has created more room for the study of symbolic and interpretative dimensions of social phenomena. Despite the considerable ground this orientation has gained in the two past decades, it is far from being predominant or leading research in the field. Because discourse-sensitive studies fail to meet scientific “utility” standards (section 1), that is, to provide policy orientation or objective “problem solving” directives, they have tended to be restricted to academic circles, reaching political and social spheres only with difficulty.

In fact, the productions which are the most influential (on politics and policy) in the field of migration studies are those that follow a certain empiricist/rationalist logic. There are indeed a number of migration researchers who have participated in policy-making processes at different levels, either by providing reports, data or policy orientation – like Patrick Weil in France, Giuliana Zincone in Italy, and many others. If sometimes scholars’ political/policy engagement has helped to engender social debate and promote alternative orientations, it has also been used to legitimate rather questionable policy solutions or politico-ideological standards. As stressed by Růžička (2009), the “marriage” between the scholarly and the political might not always be enlightening, particularly when it is used to obscure important dimensions of social phenomena. Using social sciences to orient policy-making or guide stakeholders during their decision-making processes is not necessarily a negative thing. Cultural sciences can indeed be “useful” in many ways, particularly in bringing to light overlooked dimensions of social facts. Our major criticism here is against applying to the cultural sciences “usefulness” standards that are unrelated to their ultimate goal, which is to provide “food for thought”, engender debate and reflexive thinking.

This tendency has indeed been stronger among political scientists than sociologists, anthropologists or historians. Indeed, political science, along with law and economics, has been much more permeable to the idea that “scientific” production in the human sciences should follow the same epistemological and methodological orientations as “natural” sciences. The same phenomenon has happened in other disciplines and different fields as a consequence of a widely shared belief that only natural sciences’ epistemology and methods could produce valuable and legitimate scientific knowledge. This “intelligent mistake” has, however, been based on the misleading assumption that human sciences’ rationality was in fact “weak” or “less rigorous”, justifying then the importation of methodological and epistemological tools from the natural (“hard”) sciences. In the second and final part of this paper we will criticize precisely this assumption by proposing an alternative way of conceiving rationality in the social and political sciences.

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24 In this paper, references to authors and studies are by no means exhaustive, but intended either to illustrate our argument or to point out some examples of research orientation being developed.

25 The literature on integration is so vast that any attempt to point out a few references would be partial, if not misleading. Since the early 1990s, the issue has been widely investigated, giving rise to different books and periodicals, such as the “Journal of International Migration and Integration” launched in 2000. Integration is probably one of the dimensions of migration studies in which the link between research and policy-making is better developed. In fact, in different European countries (like France, Italy, Spain and Germany, among others) researchers have been requested to either participate in policymaking or to set policy programs in action in the field.
Part II – Discursive Rationality

More than simply proposing alternative epistemological and methodological stances, the discursive turn has actually opened up a new way of conceiving rationality not only in the field of political sciences migration research, but in the cultural sciences as a whole. This alternative “cultural” rationality shall here be called discursive rationality given its inner dimensions, namely interpretation (A), argumentation (B), and narration (C) (Lacour 2006a). In the following paragraphs, we will briefly present and explore each of these dimensions, pointing out moreover the implications of this way of approaching practical reasoning in cultural sciences research.

A – Interpretation

Social meanings are approached through reflection and interpretive analysis. Interpretation is indeed the most commonly used “tool” of social and political scientists in their analytical activities, for they are normally interested in inquiring not only into “facts” but also motives, intentions and purposes which are inscribed in the actions of actors. Indeed, one of the key aspects in social and political analysis is the study of the normative structures (e.g. “frames”) that define social problems, including the ways the different actors understand them and relate to each other – again, language plays a crucial role in the construction of such frames.

Social and political analysts should therefore use the Geertzian method of “thick description”, a reflexive, conceptual and critical reformulation of the actor’s symbolic frame of action (Geertz 1973, 1983). In so doing, researchers are able to identify the norms and values underlying actors’ motivations, and thereby provide a more thorough analysis of social action. This approach was epitomized in Geertz’s analysis of the Balinese cockfight, for instance (Geertz 1973). By the same token, the analyst can also bestow citizens with a more critical view of public policies and to a certain extent also of the democratic system. Interpretation is thus given the role of reflexively and critically bridging the gap between quantitative (empirical) and qualitative (normative) approaches to political actions – a goal also claimed by Geertz (1983, 2000).

Reiterating Jean-Claude Passeron’s reflections on hermeneutics (Passeron 2006), the question is not whether there is interpretation – it is always present – but rather how much interpretation is involved in a particular analysis, as well as the determination of techniques to rule out certain interpretations and reach scientific validity (defined as intersubjective credibility). Praising the use of analogies, Passeron points out the necessity of determining exactly when useful metaphors (“game”, “theatre”, “text”) fall short of accounting for social phenomena (Passeron 2001).

B – Narration

The narrative dimension is inherent to knowledge production in the cultural sciences. It should therefore not be considered as an add-on but as having a constitutive cognitive dimension (Revel 1995). Research in the cultural field actually implies a great number of tasks in which the narrative quality of language comes into play, such as describing, reporting, relating, detailing, enumerating facts, events and behaviours. Narration has two major aspects, as Ricoeur (1983–5) pointed out: reference to reality and creative power of meaning through a poetic synthesis of events, actions, intentions, etc. The combination of both implies specific – but not overwhelming – epistemic difficulties concerning the “true” or “fictitious” value of such discourses (Ricoeur 1985, Cohn 1999, Lacour 2006b). Indeed, analysts re-appropriate “reality” and elaborate “scientific” knowledge by “telling the story” of a given state of affairs (say, the dynamics of transnational migration, the elaboration of immigration policies, the actors and processes involved in immigrants’ social and political mobilization, and so forth), as well as the way actors construct and attribute meaning to them.

A question that necessarily arises is whether the narrative dimension as such could be considered a new form of rationality.

26 We shall return to the debate about qualitative and quantitative methods before closing this presentation.
This is precisely the claim of Walter Fisher (1987), who speaks of “narrative rationality”, involving a principle of narrative probability (that is, coherence and cohesion of the story) and fidelity (accurate assertions about social reality). Leaving aside its normative core (there must be a priori criteria differentiating good and bad stories), it remains doubtful whether narrativity itself could be the new form of rationality, even though it might be one of its dimensions, alongside argumentation for instance. This seems all the more relevant since there is a logical difference between narrative and argument. This is however not the place to go further into implications of Walter Fisher’s thesis. We should only bear in mind that narrativity is one dimension of human sciences’ rationality, along with argumentation and interpretation, and does not constitute an autonomous form of rationality.

C – Argumentation

Besides interpretation and narration, knowledge production in the cultural sciences is also strongly connected to argumentation, that is, the ability to relocate or articulate ideas in order to reach conclusions through logical reasoning. In different ways it is the use of argumentation that provides social and political analyses with a “scientific” status while preserving the same qualities of everyday language (Passeron 2006). Our main argument here is indeed quite close to the thesis defended by Fischer (2003) in his book on discursive policy analysis, that is, that the discursive, argumentative-based approach makes scientific language closer to ordinary language (Passeron would say “natural” language), yet remaining different from it.

Inspired by the ordinary philosophy of language, the informal logic of good reasons and Habermas’ insistence on argumentation as a major dimension of a renewed practical form of reason, Fischer characterizes the “argumentative turn” of policy analysis as consistent with his global discursive approach to public action. Its aim is to improve policy argumentation by elucidating contentious questions (pros and cons, ideological background, limitation of evidence, etc.), thus increasing communicative competencies. The author proposes a model of policy deliberation based on four interrelated discourses: questions ranging from efficiency to the impact on a way of life, through the situational context and the societal system are the components of a comprehensive policy judgment (a “good” reason must satisfy all four discursive phases of the methodological examination). For Fischer, this model is better suited to understanding the structure of policy argument than the empirical approaches. This “discursive relationship” explains the possible articulation between political sciences and deliberative governance, the scientist and the citizen, without referring to continuity or any relation of “application” as in a utilitarianism or technocratic perspective.

Some of Fischer’s thoughts about the place of argumentative tools in policy analysis can indeed be extended to other fields within the cultural sciences. The main value of argumentation is its capacity to provide research activity not only with better communicative capabilities, but also with more legitimate, scientific and rational standards. From this perspective, the discursive turn can also be pointed out as having engendered a real “rhetorical turn”, as long as rhetoric is defined in a problematized (question-driven or debate-oriented) way and embraces argumentation (Meyer 2008).

Conclusion

In closing this paper, we would like to address a further implication of the discursive turn, looking particularly at the still lively debate on the role and uses of qualitative and quantitative methods in cultural sciences. The linguistic turn, with its alternative considerations about language, has engendered a revision of this old debate, proposing different (philosophical and epistemological) ways of not only approaching the strict opposition between qualitative and quantitative methods, but also of overcoming it. While some authors (like Passeron) have claimed that reasoning in these disciplines implies a mixture of both aspects, others like Fischer underline rather the presence of the interpretive dimension in both methodological approaches. By focusing on this epistemic characteristic, these authors intend to avoid an
exclusive alternative that is too often uncritically reproduced. However clever, this solution might seem unconvincing to readers who contest this rigid separation, for it does not tackle the real epistemological difficulty concerning the very relevance of the opposition.

Indeed, this epistemological issue has been sophisticatedly addressed by French philosopher Gilles-Gaston Granger. Highly critical of the strict quantitative/qualitative division – so widely shared that it seems almost intrinsic to cultural sciences – Granger has underlined that the shift is in reality secondary in relation to a more fundamental divide between undefined (“quelconque”) and specific. Granger has indeed shown that formalization cannot be reduced to quantification, quantity being a particular (measurable) case of mathematical (formal) thinking. He also insisted on the capacity of formal thought to structurally capture some qualities of the phenomena. Formalization can thus rigorously “think” about quantities and qualities, provided these are “unspecified” (Granger 1983).

Still, one must not conclude from this that formal thought has any kind of self-sufficiency in the cultural sciences, but rather that the classic qualitative-quantitative opposition should be reformulated in terms of the formal vs discursive. The formal can be defined, according to Granger, as a theory of general and virtual objectivity, deprived of any indexical device – hence its natural tendency to decontextualization. On the contrary, the discursive, with its various dimensions (reflexivity, interpretation, argumentation, narration), tends to capture the specific and particular aspects of the actual, historical world. Therefore, one should perhaps consider the symbolically grounded opposition of the formal and the discursive as transcendental, i.e. the twofold condition of possibility of the knowledge of man. This could better explain the general shift to discursive rationality which we support and which concerns in fact not only immigration research, but all human and social fields and disciplines. In point of fact, such a shift does not imply that formalization is irrelevant for the social sciences, but rather that it represents moments within a more general discursive rationality. One begins to think with natural concepts and descriptions of actual phenomena before one can objectify them through an appropriate formalization; in turn, the application of formal concepts to the singularities of the historical world requires discursive mediations.

Finally, it is worth emphasising that “empiricist” and “rationalist” epistemological and methodological demarches – to use once again Fischer’s expression – are not necessarily “wrong” or “bad”. Rigour, precision and seriousness are indeed welcomed (and needed) in the cultural sciences, as much as in the natural ones. Our point here is not that cultural sciences cannot (or should not) aim at precision and accuracy, but rather that the ways of legitimating research in these areas cannot be readily transposed from those normally employed in the natural sciences. The great particularity of the “sciences of man” is precisely the fact that their object is par excellence symbolically laden, which can hardly be fully grasped by the methods used for objects of a different nature and quality.

In a few words, approaches overtly concerned with formalizing, quantifying and measuring may appear more “rigorous” and be legitimated as “scientific”, but they often fail to acknowledge that social facts, such as immigration, are symbolic entities as well, which must also be interpreted in relation to the situation, social system and ideological framework in which they are established. For social facts are at the same time both symbolic and substantive, they require a great deal of interpretation, argumentation and narration in order to be accurately captured. In this light, along with the Weberian hermeneutic tradition, notions of cause and effect do not disappear; they simply do not take precedence over the interpretative dimension that actually guides the analysis. By the same token, formalization, as argued above, is

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27 Such as markers like “I”, “here”, “now” or “this”.

28 What could also be called the “clinical” dimension of cultural sciences – see Lacour (2006a).
just a *moment* within a much broader, complex and symbolically driven analysis.

References


RESEARCHING AND POLITICIZING MIGRATION: 
THE CASE OF ROMA/GYPSIES
IN POSTSOCIALIST CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

Michal Růžička

In 1998, Castles and Miller predicted that one of the five major trends in migration in the following twenty years would be the growing politicization of migration (Castles and Miller 1998: 9). In my paper I would like to push that assertion further: not just migration but also research on migration will become politicized. One of the main aims of this paper is to show how research on contemporary Roma migration has already become political in the sense that it reflects and responds to the dominant society’s social and political concerns and fears. In this paper I will assert that such politicization narrows the research agenda and thus limits the understanding of the variety and plurality of forms of Roma migration and the variety of experience of Roma migrants.

I will first try to grasp how Roma/Gypsies,¹ and Roma/Gypsy migrations in particular, have been represented in the imagination of Western sedentary societies. Then I will trace how scholarly accounts of Roma/Gypsies support the general public’s conception of the “nature” of Roma/Gypsies as essentially spatially unbound and constantly space-transcending. Specifically, I will analyze scholarly accounts on Roma migration and show how these accounts actively contribute to the perception of Roma/Gypsies as notorious nomads, who basically have no place in sedentary societies. I will suggest a causal interrelation between (1) the particular images of Roma/Gypsies as a group possessing non-spatial identity and (2) the exclusive tendencies

¹ I use the term “Roma/Gypsy” throughout the paper to overcome a discrepancy between the politically correct term “Roma” and the term “Gypsy” or “Cigán(i)” in Slovak, which my informants use to refer to themselves. For discussion, see Jakoubek (2008).
and forces that such images may (co)generate in dominant sedentary societies.

David Mayall claims that the ways in which dominant societies perceive minority groups is the product of particular “politics of identity”; “the representation of Gypsies has relied on generalizations about character and identity which are then applied to all the group” (2004: 276). Scholars necessarily contribute to such politics of identity by producing various such kinds of generalizations. One of the objectives of the paper is to explore how academic research reflects and shapes the ways in which dominant society perceives Roma/Gypsies.

Representations of Roma “Vagrants” in Sedentary Societies

Roma/Gypsies occupy a unique place in European history and in the European symbolic imagination. In the imagination of Western societies, Roma/Gypsies are strongly represented as permanent nomads or migrants whose spatial position and identity is volatile and inconstant. Not only does migration form “a repetitive pattern throughout Romani history” (Matras 2000: 34), it forms a repetitive pattern in the attempts of dominant societies to conceptualize Roma/Gypsies.

Studying Roma/Gypsy migration is a repetitive pattern, and almost a symbol of Romani studies and gypsiology. Roma/Gypsies and space transcendence have together formed a specific category in the imagination of Western societies, where the “nomadic” or spatially volatile identity of Roma/Gypsies has the power to symbolically threaten the identities of settled and spatially based Western sedentary societies. There is no better support for such a statement than a quotation from Edmund Husserl, who in his seminal Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1937), tried to grasp the essence of Europe with the following argument:

“We pose the question: How is the spiritual shape of Europe to be characterized? Thus we refer to Europe not as it is understood geographically, as on map, as if thereby the group of people who live together in this territory would define European humanity. In the spiritual sense the English Dominions, the United States etc., clearly belong to Europe, whereas the Eskimos or Indians presented as curiosities at fairs, or the Gypsies, who constantly wander about Europe, do not.” (Husserl 1970: 273)

Regardless of how hard he tried to reestablish European identity as being free of any territorial base, Husserl nonetheless exhibited rather strong contempt for the Gypsies, who in his view lack any firm spatial or territorial grounding. Later I will argue that structurally similar ideas and images shape the politics of social exclusion as well as the politics of Roma/Gypsy migration research.

It would be unfair to blame Husserl alone for excluding Roma/Gypsies from European settled societies. I believe that Husserl was only openly expressing commonly shared popular assumptions about the nature of Roma/Gypsies against the backdrop of spatially based conception of European societies and their identities. Having a spatially unbound identity may be a dangerous predicament when a politically dominant and more powerful group, whose identity is bound by space, feels threatened by spatial or territorial volatility and inconstancy. Such a predicament may contribute to the emergence of tendencies towards exclusion and action against the assumed threat.

The symbolism of space and place played a crucial role in the era of the national revivals in the 18th and 19th centuries and in the process of the geographical demarcation of nation states and national identities. The idea of a national identity emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a product of these national revival movements. Gellner characterizes nationalism as a social and political ideology that demands congruence between political and national units (Gellner 1983: 5), while “the political” means “territorial” or “state”. In agreement with Gellner, Calhoun notes that boundaries of population and territory rank among the most important features of nationalist rhetoric (Calhoun 1997: 4).

The idea of an autonomous state always embraces the idea of a spatially and politically delimited territory. My argument here
is that the affective feelings of belonging to a particular place play a significant role for people whose identities are interlocked with national identity. The nation has traditionally – partly as a result of German Romanticism – been understood as the “possessor of a unique and peculiar land” (Smith 2003: 131). National identity goes hand in hand with the idea of the state as a “sacred homeland” (Smith 2003: 131) on which out-group members should not trespass. Defending the interests of one’s nation or community can be thus translated as defending one’s space. Spatial exclusion and segregation of “Others” can then be understood as manifestations of such defensive strategies. MacLaughlin finds a causal interconnection between (1) modernist ideologies of progress, (2) political ideologies of nationalism, and (3) the exclusion of traveling, i.e. unsettled groups (MacLaughlin 1999).

Craig Calhoun has highlighted the important role that cartography has played in the process of creating modern nations and national identities (Calhoun 1997: 12–18). Anthony D. Smith pointed out that not only map-making, but also census-taking played a crucial role in the process of constituting nations and national identities (Smith 2003: 131). The fundamental function of cartography and census taking lies in their effects: they help governments to imagine (Anderson 1991: 6) and control the nation’s territory, and thus to control its nationals. If the general practice of control is one of the pivotal ideas and defining practices of modernity (Foucault 1977), then spatial control is one of the most important means of social control in modern societies (Sibley 1995).

The question here is “how does the spatial identity of sedentary European societies interfere with the spatially unbound identity of Gypsies”? By “having a spatially unbound identity” here I mean “being perceived as having non-spatial identity” by the dominant societies. Roma/Gypsies – those who travel or those who are settled – all bear the stigma of vagrants, nomads, migrants, trespassers, and so on, thus the stigma of someone who has no relationship to any particular place or space. Sedentary societies, whose identity is more or less spatially based, may feel threatened when encountering someone whose nature is perceived as permanently space-transcending. Such feelings may range from feelings of discomfort to feelings of fear. People who are constant “space-transcenders” are basically untrustworthy, because they can always abandon their spatially anchored commitments and obligations, forgetting or rejecting them simply by leaving them behind and moving somewhere else.

I believe that the symbolic clash between spatially based and space transcending identities contributes to the creation of a socio-political climate that both generates and approves the application of various exclusionary forces and actions against those who have a fundamentally opposite spatial identity. I believe that this is the case of the relation between Roma/Gypsies and the surrounding dominant sedentary society.

Nowadays, the spatial boundaries of European nation states are gradually being dissolved by the processes of Europeanization. Nevertheless, we are not witnessing any subsidence of the socio-spatial exclusion of Roma/Gypsies; rather the contrary seems to be the case. Analysts of contemporary societies tend to understand the growing urge to socially and spatially exclude “Others” as a psycho-social reaction to the growing feelings of economic, social and psychological insecurity in late modernity (Bauman 1998; Young 1999). It is therefore no surprise that late modern society has mobilized the nomad as a figure of threat and disruption to the "good life" (Cresswell 1997: 369). Once again, the nomad has become the scapegoat, an icon with the power to jeopardize the symbolic order of sedentary societies.

Spatial Exclusion and the Spatial Control of European Roma/Gypsies

The notion of space is a crucial one, as space is one of the key instruments of the social exclusion of Roma/Gypsies in contemporary societies. The general image of Roma/Gypsies as notorious nomads who pose a threat to the social and symbolic order of settled societies provides the underlying rationale for applying exclusionary force and taking action against Roma/Gypsies. I understand the spatial segregation of Roma/Gypsies to be...
a mechanism of social control over the socio-cultural status quo exercised by the dominant society (Růžička 2006).

The very idea of social control as the control of space is inherent to modernity, explained by Foucault in his analysis of Panopticon as an embodiment of control under modernity (1977). The role of spacial policies and spacial practices has been stressed as one of the key instruments for understanding the exclusion of Roma/Gypsies from European societies (Bancroft 2005). David Sibley, in his book on the exclusion of British Gypsies, understands spatial policies and practices as the most important tools for the social control of spatially unbound populations (Sibley 1981). In his other book on socio-spatial exclusion (1995), Sibley analyses the spatial policies and practices of the dominant society as symbolic rituals of purification, when undesired and unwanted individuals and groups are displaced out of sight and out of touch.

Lee (2000) showed how anti-Roma immigration policies in Canada – i.e. policies that imposed strictures on spatial mobility – were shaped by symbolic structures of entrenched racism and stereotypes about Gypsies, most particularly by stereotypes arising out of the “nomadic myth” (see also Guy 2003).

The Representation of Roma as “Invaders” in Public and Political Discourse

In the 1990s forces and action directed at the exclusion of the Roma/Gypsies, reinforced by symbolic structures of xenophobia and ethno-racial stereotypes, re-emerged to reach an unprecedented level. Reacting to new forms of Roma migrations, sedentary European societies became uneasy about Gypsies who – again and freely – began to wander about Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, many Roma/Gypsies in Eastern Europe found themselves to be especially vulnerable to the changes brought about by the market transition and by the state’s abandonment of its role as a guarantor of full employment. Situated at the lower end of the educational ladder and possessing little symbolic and political capital, Roma/Gypsies were struck especially hard by unemployment. When unemployment became a long-term problem, often accompanied and exacerbated by discrimination, many Roma chose to flee the conditions they were in and which they perceived as hopeless and took advantage of the opportunity to seek asylum in the countries of Western Europe.

Solid scholarly accounts have been published on the exaggerated media-hype surrounding Roma asylum-seeking migration in Western Europe after 1989 and on the policies the migration motivated in response (Barany 2002; Clark and Campbell 2000; Guy 2003; Homoláč 2006; Kaye 2001; Lee 2000; Matras 2000; Sobotka 2003). As the main aim of this paper is neither an analysis nor a re-analysis of media and political reactions to Roma asylum-seekers, I will limit myself to a very brief sketch.

“In the early 1990s, a new spectre haunted Western Europe…” – not a spectre of communism any more, but – “fears of an influx from the East” (Castles and Miller 1998: 104). It was in the early 1990’s when “tens of thousands” (Barany 2002: 242) of Roma left Eastern Europe to seek a better future in the countries of Western Europe. Such movements soon aroused interest and gave birth to concerns and explicit condemnation by politicians, media and general public (Homoláč 2006). Cases of Roma migration came to be known as a “Gypsy invasion” in the media of the destination countries (Kaye 2001: 61; Lee 2000). The great interest in the “Gypsy invasion” expressed by the public and by political elites was countered by some scholars claiming that the cases were an overblown canard and that given the actual number of migrants the issue did not warrant the attention it was receiving (Matras 2000; Guy 2003). Cases of Roma migration nevertheless produced political action and policy responses basically designed to prevent more Roma/Gypsies from entering the given country. In some target countries visa requirements for citizens of source countries were introduced, as in the case of Slovakia (see Table 1).
Table 1: Coincidence between Roma migration and the political response – i.e. the reintroduction of visa requirements for citizens of Slovakia. Based on the data and information from (Barany 2002: 244–246 and Weinerová 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Time of migration</th>
<th>Visa for Slovakia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The media-hype around cases of Roma/Gypsy migration resulted in changes not only at the level of international relations and policies, but also at the level of the academic research agenda. Information and data on recent Roma migration became a commodity in demand.

The Representation of Roma as “Migrants” in the Social Sciences

One of the key arguments of this paper is that the Roma/Gypsies have been conceptualized in most social scientific accounts mainly in terms of space-transcending practices. The social sciences share with the political and folk imagination the assumptions about the inherently space-transcending identity of Roma/Gypsies. Castles and Miller (1998) are model examples of migration scholars who – perhaps not surprisingly – see, understand and define Roma/Gypsies in terms of migration: “The gypsies, also called the Rom or the Tzigane, are descendants of a people who emigrated from the area of present-day India…” (Castles and Miller 1998: 51). Such an approach is by no means an exception but rather the rule, and it has significant symbolic consequences.

It cements and petrifies the image of Roma/Gypsies as constant nomads, as a group that does not reside in a particular space but continuously *transcends* it. Ian Hancock, one of the foremost scholars on Roma/Gypsies, has stated that the Gypsies are “immigrants everywhere” except for India (Hancock 2000: 9). He ascribes a permanent nomadic status to Roma/Gypsies without giving them any chance to escape the consequences of such a status.

The vast majority of texts concerned with the issue of Roma/Gypsies and their identity assert the view that Roma/Gypsy identity is inherently nomadic and non-European. They promote the idea that the Roma/Gypsies left India sometime in the past and have been carrying that experience up to the present (Fraser 1992; Hancock 2002; Kendrick 2004). Scholars writing in the fields of history and linguistics thus often actively support the perception of Roma/Gypsies as permanently displaced “notorious nomads”, who have no exact or fixed location in space. In accounts of the Roma/Gypsies, their culture is often explained as a relic from the Indian-exodus epoch (e.g. Hübschmannová 1999). A reader only rarely comes across explanations of Czech culture in terms of the experience of past Slavic nomadic tribes cruising the Russian steppes thousand years ago. History is an important part of the politics of identity, but it plays only a very limited role in the everyday lives of non-literate societies, such as most of the socially excluded Roma/Gypsy communities in Central Europe. During my research in Roma/Gypsy communities, I never came across a single case where history older than several decades was a topic of conversation. Moreover, my informants do not derive their identity from nomadic traditions at all and do not perceive themselves as nomads.

The opening sentence in Fraser’s 1992 book on the Gypsies reads: “This is the story of a wandering people…” (Fraser 1992: 1, italics added by M.R.). Another author (Clébert 1967) begins his book with the statement: “…there are today some five to six million Gypsies wandering about the world” (Clébert 1967: 15, italics added by M.R.). These are only two of the most striking examples of the practice of representing contemporary Roma/Gypsies as constant migrants and *actual* nomads. The nomadic nature of Roma/Gypsies is cemented by Clébert’s assertion that “the Gypsy is primarily and above all else a nomad. His dispersion throughout
the world is due less to historical or political necessities than to his own culture” (Clébert 1967: 246).

Roma/Gypsies do not maintain a nomadic way of life in the present-day Czech Republic and Slovakia. Most of the Roma/Gypsy groups in Central Europe have been settled for several hundred years. The 1893 census showed that only 2 percent of Gypsies living in Slovakia at that time maintained a nomadic lifestyle (Guy 1975: 216). As Hűbschmannová assured us, the “Slovak and Hungarian Roms started to sedentarize as early as in the seventeenth century” (Hűbschmannová 1998: 233). Those who kept traveling in Czechoslovakia were prohibited from traveling by law, with the introduction of Act No. 74/1958 on the permanent settlement of nomads (see Jurová 1996: 479, 505–513). Based upon historical evidence it can be assumed that Act No. 74/1958 was aimed mainly at controlling the 6000 Olach Roms that were still traveling at that time (Guy 1975: 214). Fraser's and Clébert’s definition of Roma/Gypsies as actual nomads is therefore imprecise, applicable only to certain wandering communities, and should not be regarded as a valid statement on Roma/Gypsies in general. Drawing on historical facts, Will Guy concludes that “it is absurd to need to discuss 'Romani nomadism' any further, but official and popular beliefs about Roma as incorrigible nomads linger on, despite historical evidence to the contrary” (Guy 1975: 216). In other words, Roma/Gypsies may, or equally may not – like any other group of people – pursue a nomadic way of life. Generalizing statements deeming that nomadism is an expression of the inherent nature of the Roma/Gypsies are misleading and only contribute to the perception of the Roma/Gypsies as people whose spatial status is unstable.

**Researching Forms of Roma Migration**

Two distinct epistemologies can be detected in the literature on Roma/Gypsies and their migration: diachronic and synchronic. Diachronic approaches in gypsiology explain the present by looking into the past. Owing to the lack of written sources, scholars who study the history of Roma/Gypsies study contemporary language and almost inevitably trace Gypsy roots back to what we today call India. The history of Gypsies is then seen as a history of migration, as a long and winding journey fringed by constant exclusion from sedentary societies (Clébert 2007; Fraser 1992; Hancock 2002; Hűbschmannová 1999; Kendrick 2004; Liégeois 2007). From the diachronic perspective migration is therefore seen as an integral part of the history and of the identity of Roma/Gypsies. This kind of underlying bias can perhaps be best illustrated by the following statement: “To understand properly the nature of contemporary Gypsy migrations, we must first look at how these are connected to Gypsy nomadic traditions” (Marushiakova et al. 2004: 135). This is a rather surprising statement, because elsewhere in the very same volume of papers Will Guy calls into question such primordialist background assumptions about the alleged “nomadic nature” and “nomadic identity” of Gypsies and calls such statements “unfounded” (Guy 2004: 173). To conclude: While “nomadism” has been the predominant diachronic explanation of Roma/Gypsy “nature” and migration, other scholars explicitly dismiss such a mode of explanation as indefensible (Guy 1975; Guy 2004; Matras 2000).

Most of the scholars who study contemporary forms of Roma migration using synchronic epistemology tend to see migration events as generated by unfavorable economic and/or political conditions. Such scholars tend to study “work migration” and “asylum migration” as typical forms of current Roma migration par excellence. For example, Uherek sees Roma migration in the 1990s as “a way of solving the economic problems” (Uherek 2004: 91). Also Imrich Vašečka sees migration generally as a tool for “problem-solving”: “The decision to migrate involves solving current and future problems in the given social environment by departing from them” (I. Vašečka 2003: 457). Weinerová states that the migratory motives of contemporary Slovak Roma are “generally mixed” – socio-economic and political – to escape from discrimination, and from serious inter-personal conflict (Weinerová 2004: 114). Vašečka and Vašečka (2003) mainly regard the modern Roma migration as a result of disillusionment and the degradation of the socio-economic status of the “Romani

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3 The 1966 census of Roms stated that there were 221,526 Roma living in Czechoslovakia at that time (Guy 1975: 214).
socialist-style middle class” (Vašečka and Vašečka 2003: 37), which are again basically economic motives. Prónai in his article on Gypsy migration in Hungary (2004) states that the motivation for migration among the Hungarian Gypsies has been economic, but often with some political considerations as well (Prónai 2004: 126). Matras’ conclusions about the overall motives and causes of recent Roma migrations are in accord with those of the above-mentioned authors, as he sees Roma migrations to be motivated by reasons of economic or personal security (Matras 2000: 37–38). Later in the paper I will add my own, alternative findings from observation and research to the body of knowledge from synchronic studies on Roma migration.

**Methodology: its Strengths and Limits**

When I was reading my way through academic accounts of Roma migration, I found that the majority shared two distinctive features: (1) a narrow methodological framework and (2) a narrow orientation of the research focus. With regards to methodology, existing academic accounts on Roma migrations are based mainly on:

(1) analyzing or re-analyzing existing data (Barany 2002; Clark and Campbell 2000; Guy 2003; Homoláč 2006; Lee 2000; Matras 2000; Sobotka 2003), and

(2) analyzing data gathered by conducting interviews with migrants who have already migrated (Uherek 2007; Vašečka and Vašečka 2003; Weinerová 2004).

Weinerová’s article on Slovak Roma migration (2004) is based mainly upon conducting interviews with Roma asylum seekers and with the staff of residential centers for asylum seekers (Weinerová 2004: 101). The methodology of conducting interviews, however carefully applied, as many social scientists in point of fact do, may not be able to capture possible differences between the actual process and the motives for migration on the one hand, and the informants’ ex-post rationalizations in the presence of an interviewer on the other. The methodology of conducting interviews without direct observation inevitably leaves us without tools for understanding the actual process, experience or dynamics between acts of migration and the socio-cultural orders of both the emitting and receiving societies. This disadvantage may be overcome with the ethnographic approach of direct observation or even participation, but such methodology may nonetheless be extremely difficult to apply. In my own research I was drawn into researching migration accidentally, as space-transcending practices became suddenly important for the lives of my informants. What I also found striking was that my informants, as I recall, themselves never used the term “migration”, and I suspect that they considered my questions on “migration” as weird.

Concerning methodology, I found no research on Roma migration that was ethnographic research in the strict sense of the term. One partial exception is the research conducted by Janků (2007) among successful Roma/Gypsy emigrants. Although Janků’s “ethnography of Roma migration” (Janků 2007: 8) should be regarded more as an “ethnography of ex-migrants”, it is a good analysis of the social conditions of Czech Roma emigrants to Canada. To my knowledge there is no existing written research from a long-term perspective or iterative ethnographic research on the actual processes or acts of Roma migration that does not focus just on what the participants retrospectively decide to reveal to us about their original motives, feelings, fears, and experience.

The methodological framework of existing research on Roma/Gypsy migration has left it with a narrow focus. Accounts of recent Roma migration have mainly focused on *westward* Roma migration – on forms of migration from Eastern Europe to the countries of Western Europe.⁴

⁴ O’Reilly defines ethnography as an “iterative-inductive research” and a “family of methods, involving direct and sustained contact with human agents, within the context of their daily lives, watching what happens, listening to what is said…” (O’Reilly 2005: 3). Hammersley and Atkinson see ethnography as a cognate term to participant observation (1983: 2). According to them, “the ethnographer participates… in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said…” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983: 2).

⁵ Partial exceptions are Uherek (2007) and Weinerová (2004) who also mention the existence of migration flows between the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
I believe that this research orientation is a direct response to current political and social demands and requests as westward Roma migration has been addressed extensively in the mass media and by politicians and the general public and has generally been portrayed as a political, social and economic problem. Therefore, it could be said that most of the existing research on Roma migrations focuses on the hot political issue of what can be called “visible migration”. By visible migration I mean the kind of migration that is noticed, monitored by and thus “visible” to the official agents of social control. Cross-border work migration and asylum migration are good examples of visible migration. On the other hand, migration that is not visible is literally “invisible”, causing no political trouble or social unease because it operates within and along social networks that are hidden from the public gaze.

The fact that most of the existing accounts on Roma/Gypsy migration focus on politically visible migration leads me to conclude that the current academic research agenda is in fact directly shaped by the political agenda and thus by the worries of the recipient societies. Academic research thus becomes a tool for dealing with the dominant societies’ fear of “Others”.

The marriage between a political “problem” and an academic research agenda may deliver some serious consequences. Other forms of Roma migration in contemporary Central Europe may as a result of this “marriage” be neglected or even completely ignored. Another consequence is the possible distortion of our understanding of the structure and dynamics of social life in Roma/Gypsy social networks under the conditions of social exclusion. Socially excluded Roma/Gypsy “communities” have been the targets of various kinds of policies of inclusion in recent years. But have these policies been grounded in solid knowledge of the structure and dynamics of socio-cultural life inside these “communities”? And is the current research agenda on Roma/Gypsy migration able to provide this kind of grounded knowledge or understanding?

“Invisible” and “Forced” Roma/Gypsy Migration

Economically motivated migration or migration for political reasons or asylum can be regarded as examples “forced migration”, which is usually a response to various dimensions of economic, political and social exclusion and discrimination. By identifying Roma migration with forced migration, scholars tend to see – as I documented above – Roma migrants as mainly trying to satisfy economic and political needs. Some have even explicitly spoken of “survival migrations” (Uherek 2007: 769). Other authors even see the whole history of the Gypsies as a history of “forced migration” – a history of “exodus” (Kendrick 2004; Clébert 1967: 46).

A migration is forced when it is determined by exogenous forces, that is, forces that originate outside individual or collective intentionality. Forced migration is most usually induced by external economic or political causes that have the power to affect the very physical existence and well-being of individual actors and social groups. When migration is caused by discrimination and economic hardship, it can be regarded as forced migration. A migration is voluntary if it is not the result of exogenous forces but rather of endogenous motives and reasons. Culture is a powerful generator of endogenous motives for individual but also collective action. Migration for the fulfillment of social or cultural obligations is voluntary migration. To sum up, the main difference between forced and voluntary migration lies in the difference between exogenous causes imposed by the external world and endogenous motives or reasons that can be influenced by a person’s culture.

Most of the existing research on Roma/Gypsy migration focuses not only on visible but also on forced migration. In my own research I focus on invisible and voluntary forms of Roma/Gypsy migration that play an extremely important role in the social life of post-Czechoslovakian Roma/Gypsies.
Researching Apolitical Forms of Invisible and Voluntary Roma Migration

While exact data are not available, it is estimated that about two-thirds of the circa 450,000 Roma/Gypsies dwelling in Slovakia reside in “Gypsy settlements”. Unfortunately, there are only very few scholarly studies on Gypsy settlements (but see Budilová and Jakoubek 2005; Jakoubek 2004; Scheffel 2005 on a failed development project in a Gypsy settlement; or Lacková 1999 for a biographical sketch).

Gypsy settlements are permanent rural residential areas socio-spatially segregated from the dominant non-Roma population, often located several kilometers away from the nearest non-Roma village on which the settlement inhabitants are usually economically dependent. Gypsy settlements often suffer from infrastructural underdevelopment and are often found to be without paved roads and with no access to electricity, gas or sometimes even clean drinking water.

I have been conducting iterative ethnographic research in two Gypsy settlements in Eastern Slovakia since 2002 and 2004 respectively. Only later did I extend my research into Roma/Gypsy social networks in Czech urban areas. It is important to note that almost all Gypsies living in the Czech Republic today moved from Slovak Gypsy settlements after World War II. Sponsored by the post-war Czechoslovak government, many Roma/Gypsies from eastern Slovakia moved to newly industrialized Czech cities in response to a demand for labour to fill unqualified jobs (see Pavelčíková 2004).

While excluded from social networks of the dominant society, the Roma/Gypsies had to create and maintain their own social networks. These networks were kin-based, so that an individual’s personal social network strongly reflects and often correlates with her/his kin network. As a result of the post-WWII migration of Slovakian Roma/Gypsies in the Czech part of the country (Bohemia and Moravia), existing social networks became geographically extended to connect places separated sometimes by as much as several hundred kilometers.

Alongside the obvious financial cost of migrating between Czech cities and Slovak settlements that often makes such practices unattainable, there was also a political barrier to Czech-Slovak migration between 1993 and 2007. Only after joining Schengen in 2007 were the citizens of the Czech Republic and Slovakia able to move within the Schengen region without undergoing passport checks when crossing formal borders. While there are no longer any formal obstacles to the full utilization of transnational social networks anymore, the economic barriers have remained.

During my research, I observed attempts to utilize the existing transnational Czech-Slovak networks to satisfy cultural needs or – more concretely – on several occasions to find a suitable marriage partner. What follows is a narrative account of several social occurrences that I observed during my fieldwork in Gypsy settlements in Slovakia and in Czech cities from the summer of 2006 onwards.

As suggested above, owing to the specific post-war development in Czechoslovakia, many Roma/Gypsy extended families – or kin social networks – were split and are not separated by hundreds of kilometers. Some of the networks have been maintained and utilized for forty years, with people, things and ideas migrating back and forth between nodes in the network. Other social networks became dormant because the costs of exploiting them would exceed the possible benefits to be gained from

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6 According to Kalibová (1993), there are about 8–15 million Gypsies living around the world and 5–6 million in Europe. According to her population prognosis from 1993, there was estimated to be about 495,000 Roma/Gypsies living in the Czech Republic and Slovakia combined by 2005 (Kalibová 1993: 256). Liégeois estimates the numbers of Roma/Gypsies at 200,000–250,000 for the Czech Republic and 400,000–450,000 for Slovakia (Liégeois 2007: 31).

7 I have spent in total several months living with, or staying with my informants in the two Roma settlements. Usually, I would spend several weeks in the settlements each year, summer and winter. During my ethnographic research visits, I have applied mostly the method of direct observation. As a necessary methodological supplement, I would also conduct semi-structured and unstructured interviews, always depending on what at that time interested me, or what was the object of my research visit.

8 One of the social networks I have been researching contains nodes separated by more than 600 kilometers.
maintaining them. One Czech-Slovak Roma network was dormant for nearly thirty years until it was awoken by an activity from a Gypsy settlement. Social networks originally founded in socio-spatially excluded Gypsy settlements accommodate basic societal needs:

1. Satisfying economic needs: social networks can form a base for economic action, cooperation and various economic strategies, ranging from sharing economic capital and offering economic solidarity (Steiner 2004) to the formation of work groups, both in the formal and informal sectors of the economy (Poduška and Hajská 2006).

2. Satisfying social needs: social networks form a livable social space, where stigmatized people do not have to face constant discrimination, exclusion and disdain.

3. Satisfying cultural needs: satisfying cultural needs covers the reproduction of the society. Socio-cultural reproduction includes such pragmatic tasks as finding a suitable and culturally appropriate marriage partner. Due to the extreme social exclusion from the dominant society, access to the larger marriage market has been severely limited for the inhabitants of Roma/Gypsy settlements.9

Ferko, a young man in his early twenties had been looking for a marriage partner acceptable to his parents and his larger family. Ferko was born and raised in a small Gypsy settlement of less than 200 inhabitants. The marriage market available to him was restricted to his own settlement, or at most included other settlements connected by existing kin networks.10 Men from Gypsy settlements often try to find a suitable partner outside the physical space of Gypsy settlements, preferably in Czech cities.11

This kind of predicament goes hand in hand with a specific institution that I observed in Roma social networks. For the lack of another term I will call it a “pre-conjugal visit”. A young man of marrying age usually visits more distant parts of his own social network – albeit always kin-related – to seek a suitable partner.12 The young man, either alone, or in the company of his kin coevals, visits a relative in a Gypsy settlement or in a Czech city. Such visits usually last from a couple of weeks to several months, and sometimes the young man settles permanently in the new location. I observed several such pre-conjugal visits, which were always presented as “ordinary visits” or “just a visit.” Evidence from the genealogy and social history of the respective kin groups nevertheless reveals that such “ordinary visits” had many times resulted into marriages.

After he had made several unsuccessful “pre-conjugal visits” to kin Gypsy settlements in Slovakia, Ferko left his maternal settlement and visited his uncle in the Czech Republic, whom he had seen only a few times before in his life. In fact – as Ferko’s family revealed to me only later – he was following the very same strategy and pattern by which his male relatives in Slovakian settlement had found their own wives.

After Ferko’s first initial visit – the first after so many years – other people from his kin network suddenly started to migrate back and forth between that settlement and the kin-network residence in a Czech city. Siblings and cousins started to visit each other and started to utilize the social capital embedded in their re-discovered networks. Thanks to Ferko’s original adventure, leaving home to visit relatives, a network long dormant has been revived.

Ferko initially contacted his distant kin-network for socio-cultural reasons, and but doing so he triggered a series of successive

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9 I have observed only a few cases of ethnic inter-marriages. In the cases of a marriage between a Roma and a non-Roma, the non-Roma tends to have a low socio-economic status within the structures of the dominant society. The number of ethnic intermarriages is significantly higher in urban areas than in rural settlements.

10 The social space of Gypsy settlements in eastern Slovakia is strictly socially, but not necessarily spatially, divided by social and symbolic boundaries that at the same time delimit respective and mutually exclusive kin groups (Budilová and Jakoubek 2005; Jakoubek 2004). The mutual exclusiveness of different kin groups is enforced by the cultural practice of endogamy – inhabitants of Gypsy settlements prefer to marry inside their own kin groups or family lines. Such cultural norms further limit the list of prospective marriage partners.

11 They see this as a liberating opportunity for both horizontal and vertical mobility, as there is a system of stratification between Roma/Gypsy rural and urban places, wherein residing in urban centres always signifies a higher social status (Vašečka and Vašečka 2003: 32).

12 Women almost never take active part in the institution of pre-conjugal visits.
visits that eventually led to the establishment of a specific form of migration flows that I will call “networking migration”. In general, networking migration serves the following functions:

1. The utilization of resources embedded in social networks by maintaining and re-establishing existing social networks, and
2. Securing social and cultural continuity of a social structure or a kin formation.

Uherek insists that the causes of post-1989 Roma migrations “were almost always economic” (Uherek 2004: 72) and that the familiar networks constituted merely the infrastructural basis for Roma migration. I observed several cases where men from a Slovak Gypsy settlement who had come to visit relatives in a Czech city literally ended up stuck there and were unable to return home. They simply ran out of cash. To buy a bus ticket home, they had either to borrow money from their relatives or simply to earn it somehow. Economic activities are thus often necessary supplements to migratory practices in Czech-Slovak social spaces, but they are not always the original motive for migration.

In the networking migration flows I observed, participation in formal and informal economies has been an integral, but not a constitutive element. Similarly, economic activities may be an integral part of pre-conjugal visits, but they are not the foundation of this cultural institution.

Migration or any act of space transcendence is a costly act – the more so, the poorer the actors are. Such a predicament produces an actual need to work, but networking migration cannot be reduced merely to work migration. The difference between networking migration and economic forms of forced migration lies in their relative motives and expected outcomes, no matter whether or not working is an integral part of them.

Conclusions

Contemporary research on Roma migration, however unwittingly, serves as an academic extension of the concerns and fears that arise in a given dominant society after a “Gypsy invasion”, further reinforced by the symbolically rich image of “Gypsy nomads” who, with no spatial bounds, pose a symbolic threat to the sedentary socio-cultural order.

David Mayall (2004) poses the extremely important – but rarely adequately answered – question: “Who are the Gypsies?” At the end of his book, Mayall concludes that “they are and have been whoever people wanted them to be. They have been foreigners, nomads…” (Mayall 2004: 276). The underlying message of Mayall’s statements is that the identity of Gypsies as a muted group is shaped by the discourse of the given dominant society.

The goal of the present paper was to point out how the “politics of Roma/Gypsy migration research” possibly contributes to the way in which Roma/Gypsies are perceived – and accordingly responded to – by dominant societies. Research on Roma/Gypsy migration is far from being a politically neutral undertaking; it is a form of micro-politics that shapes the ways in which the Roma/Gypsies are perceived by the given dominant society. The reassertion and dissemination of images of Roma/Gypsies as notorious “space-transcenders” who are allegedly nomadic by nature forms the underlying rationale for taking action aimed at them as they may be perceived as posing a symbolic threat to the sedentary world-view.

In the paper I also tried to point out that the political agenda – the political disputes that have surrounded the “flood” of Roma asylum-seekers into Western countries in the past 15 years – has influenced and shaped the academic research agenda. Research on Roma migration, while focusing on a political issue that is hot and “where the money flows”, failed to notice that there are forms of Roma migration other than those prompted by external motives of economic and political exclusion and discrimination. I tried to show that there are forms of Roma migration flows that do not necessarily move from East to West and cannot be explained in political or economic terms. I tried to sketch the existence of invisible and voluntary forms of migration that are

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13 The cost of a return train ticket from a Slovak settlement to a Czech city was circa 40 Euro in the spring of 2008; 40 Euro is about the average amount of money 4–6 member family in a Slovak settlement spends on food a month. Also, most of these people are unemployed. In other words, 40 Euro is a lot of money for them.
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RETHINKING THE CONCEPT OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION OF MIGRANTS: WAYS OF BELONGING AND NON-BELONGING IN TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELDS

Radka Klvaňová

The terms inclusion and exclusion are today a common part of both the academic and political discourses of migration, dominated by the language of integration (Phillips and Saharso 2008). These normative concepts, just like other concepts related to social cohesion, are often used with the implicit assumption of the bounded society of a nation state like some kind of monolithic closed container (container society, see Giddens 1987). Migration between states is a process which contributes to the problematisation of established social boundaries and to the questioning of the unity and homogeneity of a bounded society. But migration is also repeatedly used by political figures to strengthen this unity and homogeneity by nationalist rhetoric and by emphasising the otherness of migrants. The transnational perspective points to the diversity of the social worlds occupied by migrants, which cross over nation-state borders, and to the multiplicity of migrants' belongings. It thus raises the question of reconceptualising the process of inclusion/exclusion of migrant individuals and groups.

In this article I deal with certain ways of defining the inclusion/exclusion of migrants from a transnational perspective. The aim of this text is both to summarise the critical debate which has developed around the concept of integration under the impact of the transnational paradigm and also to discuss certain sociological questions linked to the theme of migrant inclusion, which the transnational perspective opens up. Here

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I outline a possible conceptual framework for the analysis of inclusion/exclusion of migrants from a transnational perspective, in which I start from Jeffrey Alexander’s (Alexander 2006) theory of civil inclusion and the concept of intersectionality (see for example Anthias 2001; Brah 1996; Davis 2008). I link these theoretical ideas of inclusion and exclusion to the concepts of the transnational social field and simultaneity (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). I show that the various positionalities of migrants in different civic spheres in the transnational social field either permit or preclude their inclusion. Therefore, in my opinion, it is important to analyse the ways in which these positionalities are constituted and transformed during the migration process within transnational social fields.

I pursue such a conceptualization of inclusion/exclusion which emphasises the perspective of social actors and their subjective perception of inclusion, without overlooking their involvement in networks of social relations and meanings formed at the cultural and political level. I view the inclusion/exclusion of migrants as a process – I am more interested in the actions which lead to the establishment of a final state than in the state itself. The concept of a process permits an analysis of the ways in which migrating men and women are included and excluded at various levels in various social contexts which are or were relevant to their lives. Concepts of inclusion/exclusion taken in this way refer to the mobility perspective which permits analysis of changes in identities not as deviant but as normal phenomena (Lenz et al. 2002). To the question of where migrants belong or do not belong we should add the important questions of how migrants belong or do not belong to various communities and in what ways these belongings are formed. In rethinking the concept of migrant inclusion/exclusion, I wish to point to the incomplete dialectical nature of the process of change in the location of migrants in various social contexts in the transnational social fields, which is constantly under negotiation in social interactions.

Transnational Social Fields: Spaces for the Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants

In the social sciences the boundaries of society as a space where social activity takes place are often viewed primarily as the borders of the nation state (Beck and Sznaider 2006). Social activity which crosses its borders is thus regarded as exceptional, which contributes to the perception of migration and migrants as being outside the social order established within these borders. Among other things the transnational perspective crystallised the critique of the combining of the concepts of society and the nation state and the subsequent definition of the boundaries of social life as the boundaries of the nation state. Within migration studies it thus brought into being the concept of spatiality and the question of the relationship between physical and social space.

Spatiality, as one of the important dimensions of social relationships which both influences and regulates the behaviour of social actors and is also actively formed by them, was long neglected in twentieth century sociology but is now becoming an important element in many social science analyses (Musil 2006). Many authors describe the tendency of the social sciences to accept the nation state and its society as a natural form of social and political arrangement and thus as a natural unit for analysis as methodological nationalism (e.g. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Favell 2005; Pries 1999; Beck and Sznaider 2006). They also point out that the so-called container model of society, characterized particularly by its structural functionalism, tended to view migration as the one-way shift of a social actor from one relatively enclosed and homogeneous social unit (the country of origin) to another such space (destination country). Social relationships and belongings which cross over such social spaces are thus logically overlooked by the container model, in contrast to the relational concept of society (see Bourdieu 1998; Giddens 1982), and this complicates the understanding of the reality of contemporary migration processes. According to Pries, international migration should be analysed and interpreted in light of the changing relationship between geographical and social spaces (Pries 1999: 18). Under the influence of globalisation and
Migration there is a growing disconnection of social and geographical spaces, where the social space is expanding into more geographical spaces, and thus transnational social spaces (Pries 1999; Faist 2004) or transnational social fields arise (Mahler 1998; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

Migration theories based on an assumption of a “natural unity of place, culture and identity” are unable to “see” transnational social fields and therefore are unable to accommodate them theoretically (Szaló 2007: 115). A conceptualisation of a social space based on the transnational paradigm permits a poly-centered view (Ley 2004: 155) of people’s lives, which are linked to various geographical and social spaces. Michael P. Smith writes that a transnational field permits one to think globally and act locally, to think transnationally and act multi-locally, that is to think and act simultaneously on multiple scales (Smith 1994). The behaviour of social actors is located in a multi-layered transnational social field which crosses over geographical, cultural and political boundaries and includes both people in transit and also those who have remained in one place. Transnational social fields are created through migrants’ social worlds, which are spread out over both closer and more distant localities which exceed the boundaries of nation states. Within these localities migrants are physically, virtually or symbolically present and these places represent at the same time an important context for their actions. Transnational social fields are created on many levels: from global political and economic institutions with a wide range of influence to the local social networks of individual actors and their families. The boundaries of transnational social fields are variable, bounded by the opportunities and constraints of the specific localities in which transnational practices are rooted (Smith and Guarnizzo 1998: 12).

According to some authors, a global perspective has the tendency to underestimate the significance of the nation state in current social processes and anchors them in a decentralised global space which is disconnected from specific nation-state territories. In contrast, transnational discourses emphasise the continuing importance of national state boundaries, state policies and national identities in current social processes (Smith 2001: 3; see also Ong 1999). For social actors, nation states are in fact an important practical category which structures their conception of the world and their social behaviour. In addition, states, through their policies towards both migrants and other states and also international players, significantly assist or hinder the creation and maintenance of the transnational activities and identities of migrants (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 5). The transnational perspective, in contrast to the global perspective, takes into account the multiplicity of centres to which the practices and identities of migrants relate (Smith 2001; Kearney 1995).

Some authors point out a seeming paradox that the processes of globalisation and growing migration go hand in hand with a strengthening of nationalism in both countries of origin and host countries (Sackmann, Peters, Faist 2003; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Westwood and Phizacklea 2000). “In receiving nation-states, movements aimed at recuperating and reifying a mythical national identity are expanding as a way to eliminate the penetration of alien ‘others’. States of origin, on the other hand, are re-essentialising their national identity and extending it to their nationals abroad as a way to maintain their loyalty and the flow of resources ‘back home’ “ (Smith and Guarnizo 1998: 10). Communities of migrants thus form deterritorialised nation states, each of which “includes as citizens those who live physically dispersed within the boundaries of many other states, but who remain socially, politically, culturally, and often economically part of the nation state of their ancestors.” (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994: 8, see also Kearney 1995).

\(^2\) In this article I prefer the term “transnational social field” to the term transnational social space, which is in all probability used more in the political theory of transnationalism (e.g. Faistand Ozveren 2004). However, in the theoretical review, I follow the terms used by the referenced authors.

\(^3\) Levitt and Glick Schiller define a social field as “a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1009).
Critical Remarks on the Concept of the “Integration” of Migrants

The concepts of inclusion and exclusion and integration are in their widest interpretation framed by various mutually interlinked socio-political and academic discourses related to social inequalities. The concept of social inclusion refers mainly to the process of accommodating otherness, which creates and legitimates social inequalities of a material and symbolic nature. This is a process of negotiation between candidates for social inclusion, that is, between those who are in some way recognised as “Others” and those who are fully-fledged members of the community in question (Janků 2003).

The concept of social inclusion/exclusion works with the idea of a definite, to a large extent homogeneous, society on the one hand, and groups which are different and separate from it on the other hand. Its application to the analysis of the migrants’ situation raises the question of the specificity of the migrants’ position in relation to the social units from which they are excluded or into which they are integrated. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 309–310) give four reasons which have contributed to the establishment of migrants as special objects of public policy and scientific research. According to the authors migrating people present a challenge to the basic assumptions of the project nation-building – political sovereignty, cultural and social unity, and territorial confinement. The post-war social sciences, under the influence of the ideology of the nation state and the functionalist paradigm, contributed to the representation of migrants as a potential threat to the security of a bounded society and to the problematic perception of migrants as culturally distinct subjects located on the margins of society and forming an exception to the norm of sedentariness within the boundaries of the nation state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 311).

This view of migrants is also reflected in theoretical concepts of their integration. The paradigm of the nation state is reproduced not only by the media and by politicians, but also by those who develop measures aimed at integrating migrants – through financing social research tied to recommendations aimed at creating an integrated social whole, and also by social scientists who in their research use statistics organised along the lines of a nationalised definition of populations (Favell 2005).

In the following section I wish to point out some assumptions behind theoretical concepts dealing with the inclusion of migrants, which form certain representations of the process of migration and the inclusion/exclusion of migrants and complicates an understanding of various aspects of these processes. The critique from the position of transnational migration theories is aimed mainly at the normative assumptions about the “‘normal’ and ‘pre-migration’ existence of host countries as homogeneous, integrated and stable units” (Szaló 2007: 150). In addition to so-called host societies, further localities are drawn into transnational social fields, and transnational theories thus at the same time problematise the perspective of the host society, which dominates theories of migrant inclusion. After a short reflection on the assumptions behind these concepts and the ways in which these cultural hegemonies restrict and distort our view of contemporary migration, I will attempt in the next part of the text to outline possible alternative views of the inclusion of migrants, inspired by the transnational perspective.

Favell notes that the concept by far the most commonly used in European sociology to describe relations between immigrants and their host country is that of integration. This reflects the European tradition of nation building as coping with cultural diversity (2005: 45). In addition, the concept of integration is closely linked to the paradigm of the nation state, which views it as the main organisational unit of society, as has been previously described. The idea of migrant integration is thus established by a political system which, in contrast to other social spheres, divides the world into territorially bounded spatial segments (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 4). The concept of integration leads to the idea of the full inclusion of individuals as an ideal

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4 In this paper, I prefer the term inclusion to the widely used terms integration or incorporation, although this term is not without problematic connotations. The terms incorporation and integration probably refer mostly to the functionalist notion of an ideal society as a homogeneous bounded whole or “body” with all the problematic aspects which this concept of society brings about – see the following text. For a more detailed discussion on terminology see Favell (2005).
condition, which can be achieved by a move from exclusion to inclusion. This view reflects state thinking on inclusion, since states integrate individuals as whole persons on the principle of mutual exclusiveness (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 4). Nation states expect loyalty from an individual to one social unit, expressed through the institution of citizenship. This defines included citizens on the one hand and the excluded others, that is, non-citizens or foreigners, on the other (Brubaker 1992). This dual concept contains the implicit normative assumption of the homogeneity of the so-called host society and pre-defines migrants as those who have to be integrated while retaining the relative immutability of the host society. Thus integration in this interpretation is perceived primarily as a problem of migrants.  

It seems that this type of interpretation of inclusion, whose traces can still be found in current research on migrant integration, not only does not reflect the changing nature of migration and migrants’ experiences, which the anthropologists Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Christina Szanton Blanc were the first to point out in their book Nations Unbound (1994). According to Christian Joppke, the concept of inclusion and exclusion has also been changed in a fundamental way by modern nation states, which have “become infected by the universalist logic that reigns in differentiated spheres of modern society” (Joppke 2005: 54). Not only did various non-state social spheres cease to be restrained by the boundaries of nation states under the influence of globalisation, but also the nature of membership of a nation state changed as a consequence of the regime of universal human rights. Nowadays, it is possible to belong simultaneously to various nation states. The provision of rights which were traditionally secured by the institution of citizenship has to a large extent been transferred to the international level, particularly thanks to conventions on protecting human rights or the rights of migrant workers and transnational political formations such as the European Union (Soysal 1994).

Liberal nation states do not formally apply particularist criteria for belonging, and the single legitimate form of exclusion has become exclusion on the basis of individual, and not group, criteria (Joppke 2005). This formal shift from the particularism of the nation state towards the universalism of human rights is fundamental for rethinking the inclusion of migrants – especially the permeability of real and symbolic borders and the conceivability of some forms of inclusion. Nevertheless, Lydia Morris (2003) for example points out that the specific form of the justification and application of rights is usually the result of historically established political negotiation at the very level of the nation state. It is often group, and not individual, characteristics which enter implicitly into negotiations for the inclusion of migrants within the system of civic stratification (Morris 2003) and at the symbolic level also into the formation of migrants’ sense of belonging. The formal rejection of ethnic criteria of belonging in liberal states does not mean that these categories have disappeared from social practice in other social spheres, where on the contrary they often tend to gain in significance (Joppke 2006).

A concept of migrant integration based on a functionalist interpretation of society also comes up against the fluid reality of the modern world. The image of society as a territorially anchored organism predetermines the views of migration and displacement as a deviation from the sedentary norm (Malkki 1995: 508; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 310). Thus the concept of integration is based on the idea of permanent settlement, or permanent immigration. A person who moves more or less frequently between two or more localities or moves from place to place during his or her life does not fit in with this idea of integration. The transnational perspective tries to problematise the static view of migration as a “simple move between two sedentarities” (Tarrius in Morokvasic 2004: 20). At the same time it refuses to view integration as a process leading to the rupture of
links to the “original” community and as an exclusive orientation towards the host community (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994). As Morokvasic shows in her aptly titled work “Settled in Mobility” (Morokvasic 2004), a person can be “settled” not only in a certain territory, but also while on the move.

The static interpretation of integration is formed under the influence of the perspective of the host societies, which dominates migration research. However, the transnational perspective also brings to social scientists’ attention other localities, particularly the so-called sending societies. By contrast, mobility in these can be an absolutely normal everyday occurrence, even to the extent that it becomes normative as part of rites of passage (Cohen 2004) or a standard life strategy, the absence of which can be a sign of failure.6 From the point of view of a sociological interpretation of migration it is important that neither the settled nor the mobile lifestyle be perceived as the norm7 (see for example Szaló 2006), even if it has become so in the everyday life of the social actors.

Attempts to redefine the concept of integration, which became the subject of long-term critique (e.g. Joppke and Morawska 2003; Brubaker 2003; Favell 2005), resulted in more comprehensive views of migrant inclusion. The authors speak of various dimensions (Barša 1999; Penninx 2004; Tollarová 2006 et al.) and spheres of integration (Engbersen 2003), but the functionalist view of society as a body made up of functionally differentiated territorially bounded systems still dominates; it is these that newly arrived migrants disturb (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Joppke and Morawska 2003). This kind of view of migrant inclusion overlooks the fact that these individuals are usually part of various societies and social systems which cross over the borders of nation states. Just as many economic and social systems are not currently bound by nation-state borders, neither must the lifeworld of migrants necessarily be bounded by various states or “container” societies; it can be lived and imagined within the framework of various social spheres or worlds simultaneously, across the space of nation states, in transnational social fields (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

Of course, this does not mean that the categories of practice established by the nation state do not have real relevance in the everyday life of migrants and for their self-presentation. On the contrary, these categories give social actors a sense of the social order and are used by them to provide basic orientation within society. The lives of migrants are not entirely detached from specific nation states, for they continue to have a significant impact – limiting and empowering – on their behaviour and identities (Smith 2001). The critique from the standpoint of transnational migration theories is however particularly directed at the fact that their understanding and use by social actors should be reflected by social scientists and be made into a subject of study in its own right, rather than treated as a given. The transnational perspective thus emphasises the perspective of social actors who are affected by the change in their inclusion, that is, migrants and their families, and studies how the categories created by the nation state or alternatives to them become part of the negotiation of migrants’ belonging to various social collectivities.

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6 For example, this situation is often described by working migrants from Transcarpathian Ukraine. This region is characterised by a long history of temporary working migration on the part of its inhabitants, who pay no particular attention to the migratory nature of the day-to-day lives of their own families and their fellow countrymen. Similarly, a norm of mobility is beginning to penetrate the lives of young people, for example through various student and young persons’ exchange programmes in the European Union.

7 Graeme Hugo (2007) points out how the paradigm of permanent immigration is transmitted into migration statistics, which gather data on permanent moves predominantly. The paradigm of permanent immigration is reproduced through these data, which inhibit an understanding of the increasingly varied forms of migration.
migrant” as a structural impossibility and propose that from the standpoint of a decentralised view of modern society it is possible to perceive the inclusion of migrants as actors of many specific and mutually interconnected fields and systems. “Immigrants, much like everyone else, are always excluded and included at the same time, excluded as whole persons, and included as sector players or agents with specific assets and habitual disposition within specific fields or systems (…) immigrants are conceptually assimilated to other individuals and groupings with similar positions…” (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 3). Such an interpretation of migrant inclusion raises questions of multiple inclusions and exclusions as part of various social systems with varying degrees of territorialisation: some are firmly anchored locally, some cross the borders of nation states, others are deterritorialised, created by social networks. From the point of view of social actors, the transnational perspective focuses attention on how migrating persons participate simultaneously in various social systems within a transnational social field, particularly in their original and new homes.

In her article “Keeping Feet in Both Worlds” (2003) Peggy Levitt presents the case of a young man from the small town of Bodeli in India who moves with his family to the United States. His lifeworld extends over his place of origin and his new home. He is included in the mainstream of American economic life, but is not interested in participating in cultural and religious institutions there. In parallel, through business and ritual activities, he takes part in the economic and religious life of his original community in Bodeli. After three years living in America he combines a strategy of selective assimilation and transnationalism, which permits him social mobility in both his original and new homes (Levitt 2003: 191).

The transnational perspective adds complexity to the concepts of inclusion/exclusion thanks to the key idea of simultaneity (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Classical theories of migration and migrant integration view their inclusion into their new home and their transnational links as mutually exclusive, contradictory forms of social participation and belonging. The transnational perspective casts doubt on the “either/or” logic of nationalism and replaces it with a “both/and” logic (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 14), which focuses on the simultaneity of immigrants’ inclusion. The transnational perspective and differentiated interpretation of inclusion draw attention away from the question of whether they are included or excluded, and towards the question of how.

A young migrant woman from Ukraine who has been working for nearly ten years in Prague and at the same time travels several times a year back to her original home, describes her life divided between “here” and “there” thus: “… at home you’ve got everything, here you have almost nothing, here it’s work and then home, at home you have everything, so at home you are just living, while here you are just working.” While life in Prague is described from the standpoint of production, life in the Ukrainian town from which she comes is represented in her account as a point of consumption, a place where life can be lived to the full and her desires realised. But this of course would not be possible without work in Prague (FEMAGE, 2006).

Through their migration, transnational migrants are integrated into various social systems (e.g. the economy, family, neighbourhood, the consumer world) in transnational social fields which mutually complement each other in their lives. Their lifeworld is spread over various more or less distant localities, because their original homes do not allow them to meet their aims and expectations in full (Fouron 2003). Through their mobility, by means of which they organise their lives in such a way that they rely on social systems extending beyond nation-state borders, they call into doubt the nation-state concept of unique citizenship.

In a 2005 study, Ruba Salih describes the complementary transnational lives of female Moroccan migrants in Italy. For these women the orientation towards both new and original homes represents a way of optimising their resources and
creating their social identities. Within their lives equally important symbolic and material resources from both localities mutually complement one another (Salih 2001).

The differentiated inclusion of Joppke and Morawska refers to the concept of inclusion as behavioural participation in various social spheres. There is however a question as to how far migrant inclusion into various communities can be reduced to their participation in various social systems within transnational social fields. A further important dimension of inclusion is the level of belonging, which Jeffrey Alexander considers to be fundamental in his concept of the inclusion of out-groups (Alexander 1988).

The term inclusion has always been linked in sociology with the modern idea of a universal humanity, represented by the ideal of a civic community (Alexander 2007). Alexander defines the civic sphere as a sphere of solidarity in which a certain form of universalising community is culturally defined and institutionally enforced (2006: 31). In spite of the modern requirement for universal equality legitimising claims for inclusion, it is strongly stratified on the basis of various particularist characteristics, which permeate the civic sphere from other, non-civic spheres. It is precisely here that the contradictory nature of a supposedly universal civic society manifests itself; it is in reality fragmented or divided by social differences on the basis of ethnicity, “race”, religion, gender and class (Alexander 2006: 9). It is precisely the civic sphere in which the inclusion/exclusion of various peripheral groups is negotiated through their symbolic representations, which Alexander brands as civic and non-civic codes. Solidarity is always formed in relation to “Others” and articulated through terming the “Others” uncivil (ibid: 50). The boundaries of the core group are negotiated in a wide variety of environments and discourses and tested in everyday life both by those who are within and by those outside the given community. The definition of membership thus includes specific ideas about which varieties of identity category (ethnicity, “race”, religion, gender, class, etc.), and behaviours associated with them, define those who belong to a given community.

Alexander defines inclusion as a change in the solidarity status of out-groups, while emphasising the phenomenological level of inclusion as a subjective sense of belonging, and not “just” behavioural participation (Alexander 1988). Participation in the various social institutions of a specific society does not necessarily bring inclusion into the civic sphere. This opens up the question of how a sense of belonging to various civic communities alters in connection with changes in migrants’ participation in various social systems within transnational social fields.

Joppke and Morawska’s structural interpretation of migrant inclusion as behavioural participation does indeed deconstruct the permeation of the political project of migrant integration into sociological research, but it does not provide an effective analytical framework for studying the unequal positions of migrants and non-migrants encountered in everyday life, particularly as a consequence of the continuing political organisation of populations into nation states. The thesis of post-national citizenship (Soysal 1994) does indeed point out the changing nature of civic inclusion in a globalised world, but it is also important to follow how these movements change the boundaries of core solidarities. Changes connected with the changing volume and nature of migration interfere with the modern concept of membership of a nation state based on exclusive ties of loyalty and solidarity. In an attempt at self-preservation some nation states react to these trends by redefining membership, which however, as noted by many authors, does not lead to denationalisation, but remains part of the project of building the nation state (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994, Westwood and Phizacklea 2000, Sackmann, Peters, Faist 2003).

The ideal, typical transnational subject fits the definition of membership both “there” and “here”, that is in both or more localities of migrant activity. Migrants who wish to express their sense of belonging to both their original and new homes must thus choose various action strategies by which to normalise their

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8 The use of the term “differentiated inclusion” for the analytical concept of inclusion of Joppke and Morawska should not be confused with the political model of “differential exclusion” linked in Europe with the policies of some states in towards guest workers (see for example Castles and Davidson 2000).
behaviour “here” and “there”. From the viewpoint of a transnational subject this multiple belonging demands the ability to “switch” between habitus or performances of cultural codes signaling belonging to both communities. From the point of view of defining membership in core groups it is key that these definitions are not in fundamental opposition to each other. In reality it is in fact possible to observe various ways of belonging or non-belonging to differently bounded core or out-groups, both “here” and “there”, that is, in both the new and original homes of migrants, and various ways in which these belongings are negotiated and challenged. Which civic community migrating people integrate into, rather than being a normative assumption (i.e. nation state), is rather an empirical question, which can reveal various levels of belonging to different civic communities in transnational social fields. We ask what kind of inclusion migrants aspire to – where they wish to integrate or not to integrate – and also where they are included, or where inclusion is denied to them by various institutional practices.

Changes in Migrant Belongings: Ways of Belonging and Non-Belonging in Transnational Social Fields

The criteria for belonging are a subject of negotiation between various power groups – gender, class and ethnic (Lenz et al. 2002). Migrants occupy various social positions within social relations through which belonging is negotiated. These positions encompass both the self-identification of migrants and also their identification by others (Brubaker 2004). In this context, Floya Anthias (2002) writes about positionality, including both the social position of the individual within the social structure and also the social positioning referring to actions and meanings through which various identifications are practiced and interpreted. Her concept of translocational positionality thus attempts to grasp the complex intersecting of various categories of identity in the process of negotiating inclusion/exclusion and also the situational nature of this negotiation. Thus different aspects of the positionality of social actors are emphasised or played down in different contexts (Anthias 2002). The concept of translocational positionality permits the analysis of the inclusion of migrants as subjects of multiple categorisation: as members of ethnic or religious groups, classes or gendered actors. Through the concept of translocational positionality, it is possible to grasp the process of the formation of the boundaries of similarity and difference and the process of construction of hierarchical positions at the same time (Anthias 2002).

Within transnational social fields migrants are variously positioned with respect to the communities which are relevant to their lives, and these positionalities bear varying potential for their inclusion. These communities are formed not only by nation states, but also by various transnational, regional and local communities of belonging. Through the migration process a change can occur in the status of belonging of migrants, both in the migrants’ original and new homes. The act of migration, or rather the process through which social actors are recognised as migrants, influences their civic capacities (Alexander 2006) and the possibilities for their inclusion in respect of both (or more) communities. In each of the contexts different aspects of their positionality can be emphasised; these are formed in the mutual interaction of both contexts – their new and original homes – or other fields. Belongings to both new and original homes are thus simultaneously formed and transformed as conditions of membership are constantly redefined under the influence of migration and transnationalisation processes; these conditions define who can belong to a given community, and under what conditions, and who cannot.

In the following section I illustrate these conceptual frameworks with empirical examples from my own research and from other available data. These are based on biographical accounts

9 The quotations are derived from qualitative interviews (mainly biographical narratives) with first generation migrants from three countries of the former Soviet Union – Belarus, Russia and Ukraine – who have lived long-term in two Czech cities – Prague and Brno. These interviews were conducted between 2006 and 2008 in Brno and Prague by the author as a part of the research project “Inclusion/exclusion of migrants in a transnational perspective” in the Institute for Research on Social Reproduction and Integration and by other researchers as a part of the international research project FEMAGE. The informants were selected through the snowball sampling
from male and female migrants whose lives cross over nation-state borders in various ways, specifically those of the Czech Republic, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. The examples given below are intended to document some forms of negotiating migrants’ belonging and non-belonging at various levels of social and transnational fields. Thus, they do not claim to be representative or to generalise knowledge in respect of the migrant group under study and their inclusion/exclusion process.

The formation of migrants’ sense of belonging or non-belonging to different communities occurs in a wide variety of everyday situations. Migrants’ biographical accounts emphasise certain situations in which migrants locate themselves and are located in the social and transnational space and allow us to see how belonging and non-belonging are negotiated. As Anthias (2002) points out, these accounts and identifications are at the same time always contextual, revealing various tensions and ambiguities which accompany the formation of a sense of belonging. From the viewpoint of the concept of translocational positionality it is important, among other things, to take into account the given social and political context and the context of the research interviews taking place between the researcher, seen as the “representative” of the Czech core group, and the research partners, seen as “members” of out-groups, when reading and interpreting extracts from migrants’ accounts. Migrants’ accounts reveal various tensions between belonging and non-belonging to different solidarity communities. This tension is particularly revealed during certain types of event, such as “returning home”, which often leads migrants to reflect on the nature of their relationship to their new and original homes. Return visits to their original homes represent important situations in which migrants become aware of the change in their sense of belonging (Strauss 1997: 95–96, Long and Oxfeld 2004). A female migrant who has lived in Brno for eleven years talks about her regular trips to her original home in a small town in southern Belarus, usually undertaken once a year with her husband and daughter:

I: I don’t know, I wouldn’t want to return to Belarus, at least not yet, I don’t know what’s going to happen, not just yet. And that president of ours, there is no freedom there, I don’t know. And the people, when we come as free people, and we tell some kind of joke, they say: “Quiet! You can’t say such things out loud.” And why? (…) So, I don’t know, I come here like it is coming home. And I go there to Belarus on visits. (…)

RK: And how do you feel there, when you go there on visits?

I: Well, I don’t know. I don’t feel – I don’t feel good there. Because our friends who stayed there, who didn’t want to come with us, and who we invited to come with us, they just found all sorts of excuses, try it out first and we’ll see, and then they didn’t come. And now they simply envy us, they won’t reach our standard [of living] even in ten years, then it’s bad, they put us down, say bad things about us. (Ivana, 35 years old, November 2008)

Her reply illustrates the change in belonging which is typical for migrants, whose migration project changes from a temporary one to a permanent one and for whom “going home” turns into visiting. The sense of not belonging to the original home is revealed in various everyday interactions with those who stayed. Migrants most often describe it as changes in thinking, behaviour, physicality and appearance, such as in the way they walk or dress, which indicate a change of habitus which separates them from their original community. Ivana emphasises the change in class position within the original community and a different concept of (freedom of) action in public, which brings the feeling that she no longer quite belongs to her original home and at the same time creates a feeling of belonging to her new home. Another female migrant from Transcarpathian Ukraine describes how departing from the patriarchal gender norms which apply in her original home signals her otherness when she visits:

When I go home just in jeans then people find it odd, because a well-presented woman is the norm in Ukraine. My girlfriends laugh at me when I tell them what I think. They
say, “You're typically Czech!”. Because I think differently. In Ukraine women are supposed to look after the men (…) When I meet a Ukrainian woman of my age, she doesn't consider me to be a [good] woman (Jana, 30 years old, June 2008).

In their interaction with those who remained in their original homes, the changes in the behaviour of migrants are emphasised; they are, as it were, infected by the social order of the migrants’ new localities. Jana’s changes in behaviour are interpreted as “becoming Czech”, which in the logic of the nationalistic symbolic order means “betraying” the original culture and thus not belonging to an ethnicised civic community which among other things sets out what it means to be a normal, or proper, woman. In addition, from the standpoint of narrative strategies one can interpret such migrant stories as confirmation of their sense of belonging to their new home and the creation of an “identity of integration” (Klvačová 2006a).

In contrast to this is Věra’s story; for her, returning to her original home in Kiev, even after ten years spent mainly in Brno, means rather a confirmation of belonging to her original home and non-belonging to her new home. The process of formation of belonging in her account is linked on the one hand to a change in social status, and on the other to different social norms concerning social relationships. The loss of the prestige associated with her husband’s work in a Ukrainian state enterprise and the everyday support of friends and neighbours, and their rediscovery on trips to her original home – these were some of the events which were involved in negotiating belonging to her original home and not belonging to her new home. Moreover, in Věra’s account the age of herself and her husband at the time of moving to Brno with their two adolescent children is emphasised.

V: …it was difficult because they simply left everything behind. My husband had a good job, before he was, it was still a state firm, in fact it was still the Soviet Union, so he was working in a state enterprise and was director of a transport company, delivering all over Ukraine. So when he came here, it was a shock for him at first (for several years after arriving her husband was employed as a construction worker – R.K.) And do you know what it means for us adults to leave our friends behind? … here you have a different lifestyle and values, for us friendship…. I could easily with my neighbour, we had children the same age, when one was ill, then my daughter would catch it as well, so we didn't go each of us on sick leave and she would give me – trust me with – her child when it had a fever (…) or when we come home, then I just know that my neighbours will know that we have been travelling in the train for 36 hours, a long way, and will have a meal ready for us, so that we only have to open the door and they'll bring everything in (…) we've been here a long time now, almost ten years, and it's the same (…) I have never come across that here, ever. Here I really made an effort, we live in one apartment block, seven or eight flats altogether, and we say hello, get together… I invited my neighbour over for coffee, made a cake, and pyrohy, well, I just invited her for coffee, and she brought her own cup of coffee with her. (Věra, 44 years old, FEMAGE, 2006)

The ways of non-belonging to one's original home indicated in Jana and Ivana’s cases do not at the same time mean that migrants entirely lose their sense of belonging to the original community of solidarity and identify fully with their new home. At another point in her account Ivana expresses her sense of belonging to an imagined Belorussian community through the metaphor of being a sports fan. Her words also reflect the assumption of immutability and the given nature of her own ethnocultural identity, which binds her to her original civic community.

T: And have your feelings about Belarus changed at all?

M: Well, no, not really. I don't know. Well, whenever we're watching the television and there's ice hockey or football and Belarus are playing, say, Belarus – Czech Republic, then we support Belarus. I guess that won't change (laughs). (…) So my little girl always says, “Tell me, mummy, who's playing today?” I say, “Russia – Czech Republic.” She says: “I hope the Russians win.” So I say, “Why?” “Because Czechs are so big-headed (…)
They say, “So Anna (the daughter) what about that football, what about that ice hockey?” I hope the Russians win.” She takes it as a child would, of course, but it is true, when our lads are playing, then our lads are the Belorussians. And if the Czech Republic and Slovakia are playing, then we’re on the Czech side, we’ll support the Czechs. (Ivana, 35 years old, November 2008)

The last part of her narration points not only to double belonging to both her original and new homes but also to situational hierarchization of these solidarities.

Jan, a migrant from Transcarpathian Ukraine, gives his account of how each trip back to his original home makes him aware of his estrangement, because his view of the world has changed and his interactions with friends stir up unpleasant feelings. He describes himself as somewhere “between”, in a transnational space between his original and new homes. The feeling of belonging “neither here nor there” which is often described by transnational theories (cf. Al-Ali 2002: 113; Fouron 2003) is based on an assumption of full inclusion, according to which a person should fully belong to one home. However Jan’s account casts doubt on the possibility of achieving this.

Here (in Czechia) it will always be the same… There will never be the feeling of home, even if I lived here, say, for several years, something will always be out of reach, something small, but it won’t be complete. Then again, in Ukraine, say in Chust, I’m no longer at home, I’m like a stranger there, nobody understands me, my philosophy or views on things or something, have changed. They’re so different, you can’t even talk normally to them (laughs). So I really don’t know where I belong. (Jan, 40 years old, August 2007)

If we go back to the extract from Ivana’s account of being a sports fan, we can see a further level of formation of belonging which is characteristic of a significant number of migrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union. In public discourse representations of these migrants use the category of “Russians”, which the majority of Russian-speaking migrants living in the Czech Republic encounter, mainly those from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Analysis of migrants’ accounts from these three countries shows that this reference framework, which we could designate as transnational, is shared by many migrants, while in various contexts they either identify with it or distance themselves from it. Věra’s account illustrates the meanings acquired by the “Russians” category in the Czech and Ukrainian (post-Soviet) context, and what kinds of tensions accompany the negotiation of ethnicised identities, whose boundaries are unclear. In this extract Věra describes her wide-ranging experience of the verbal abuse of her son, perpetrated in the Czech Republic by teachers and pupils pointing out historical events from the period of Soviet imperialism. These experiences are widely shared by migrants from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (cf. Klvačová 2006b).

… How can someone blame my son for that…? Now my son says to them, “You know what, I’m Ukrainian. The Soviet Union, alright, you’re angry about 1968, but that was the Warsaw Pact. That was NATO on one side and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other, so they were all in it. I don’t know who was in charge, whether it was Russia, I’m from Ukraine, we were under the Russians for a very long time.” (…) and I would say to him: “You have to be patient”. Because there are nationalists among us as well, Ukrainian language only, they wrote Russians Out and Ivan Go Home on the walls, but I say we are Ukraine and Russia, half the people in Ukraine are Russians, because we are all tied together there, by marriage or people going to work there… I have cousins in northern Russia, and my father’s brother lives in Kaliningrad, which is also in Russia, he lives there with his whole family, even if he’s Ukrainian, it’s all the same, so he took out Russian citizenship, but then again, the whole family has been living there for so long, so what am I to say…? How could I treat them badly, when my own family is spread out all over the world? (Věra, 44 years old, FEMAGE, 2006)

On the one hand, Věra distances herself from the Russian identity, which is highly stigmatised in the Czech context, but
on the other hand she points out that setting bounds on belonging is complicated, and is reluctant to unambiguously incline to a firmly defined ethnocultural imagined community.

A further transnational level of belonging which appears relevant when negotiating the inclusion of migrants in the earlier defined context is the imagined solidarity community designated “Slavism”. In the Czech context “Slavism” has high inclusive potential for migrants from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine; it draws this potential from ideas of the “cultural proximity”, “similar mentality”, or “affinity” of these imagined communities. This transnational ethnocultural imagined community provides migrants with an expression of double belonging, both to their original and to their new home. The discourse of “Slavism” defines the boundaries of similarity or sameness, which at the same time define who does not belong to this imagined community – migrants from non-Slavic countries.

The migrants’ belongings are formed through classifying “Others” who are located in transnational social fields which include both the original and new homes of migrants, and sometimes other places as well (Szaló 2007: 105). In a world organised on the principle of nation states, ethnicity or belonging to a nation state remains one of the key criteria for inclusion/exclusion, in spite of significant mobility and hybridisation. It is mainly the ethnocultural identity of migrants which is emphasised in host societies, under the influence of the ideology of nationalism. In the examples given above I have pointed out the various tensions which accompany the negotiation of migrants’ belonging in the symbolic order of nationalism which presumes exclusive ties of solidarity.

**Conclusion**

In this article I have been concerned with reflection on the process of migrants’ inclusion/exclusion from a transnational perspective. Transnational theories cast doubt on the idea of the mutually exclusive inclusion of migrants, who nowadays often belong by some means to two or more communities in transnational social fields. Therefore an important empirical question when researching migrants’ inclusion/exclusion is the study of the levels within transnational social fields at which migrants are included. Posed in this way, the question permits us to come to terms with the problem of the hidden assumption of the inclusion of migrants in the bounded community of the host nation state, and can reveal the diverse levels of belonging to different civic communities in transnational social fields.

In the multi-level theoretical concept of migrants’ inclusion/exclusion I have focused mainly on the phenomenological level of belonging to various imagined communities in transnational social fields. I propose conceptualizing changes in migrants’ inclusion as different ways of belonging and non-belonging to their original and new homes, which are formed in various contexts and are variable in both time and space and depending on the type of social interactions. I have also pointed out the unfinished dialectical nature of the process of the change of location of migrating individuals in various social and transnational fields which are constantly being negotiated. Reflection on the various means of solidarity and non-belonging indicates the various tensions and ambiguities which accompany the formation of belonging. When negotiating migrants’ belonging or non-belonging various categories of differentiation such as ethnicity, gender, social class or religion are made situationally more or less relevant in the civic sphere; these define the varying potential for inclusion in different civic communities. The everyday interaction of migrants and non-migrants gives significance to different categories of differentiation established by those who belong to a given community and by those who do not entirely belong to it. The variously defined differences are ascribed to the social order of the community of those “Others”, among whom the migrants move.

In the process of migration not only is there a redefinition of the migrating subject as a member of a particular category, nor does the definition of membership within certain represented communities remain static; it changes under the influence of contemporary social processes, in particular under the influence of globalisation and the growing dynamic of worldwide mobility. However it is not only the legal formal boundaries of citizenship that change, but also the symbolic boundaries of membership of
a wide range of imagined communities. The ideas and stories of what it means to belong to a particular social field, and what it means not to belong, are changing. "Here also are included stories and ideas on internal differences and hierarchies, as well as on the injustices, rights and obligations of individuals or groups within the habitat in question." (Szaló 2007: 109). These symbolic boundaries of belonging and non-belonging are manifested in the social position of migrants in a wide range of social fields. Various forms of non-belonging are experienced by migrants in the everyday situations – in the labour market, in government offices, and on visits to their original homes – in which they negotiate their unequal social position vis-à-vis fully-fledged members of the core community. The theme of social inequality in connection with the dynamic of migrants’ inclusion/exclusion from a transnational perspective is another of the key dimensions which deserves closer attention in the future.

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**BETWEEN AND BEYOND: DIASPORIC MEDIA SPACES AND TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES**

Václav Štětka

The relationship between migration, diasporas, cultural identity and transnational media has recently become the subject of a rapidly growing number of theoretical as well as empirical studies.¹ One of the probably less often used but nonetheless convincing illustrations of the relevance and practical workings of this relationship can be provided by looking at one of the oldest annual television events in the world – the Eurovision Song Contest. Launched by the European Broadcasting Union in 1956 as the Grand Prix of European Song, the contest has evolved into a major international television spectacle, with over four dozen countries participating and over a hundred million people following the event live in front of their TV sets. However, in spite of these impressive numbers, the contest has been coming under growing criticism, targeted mainly at its voting system, which allows what has become known as “bloc-voting”, or the sending of votes for representatives of neighboring and/or culturally proximate countries.² Every year, the results confirm

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¹ This stream of research has been pursued since the early 1990s (i.e. Naficy 1993; Gillespie 1995); however, more systematic attention to the role of the media in processes of transnational migration has been paid by researchers particularly from 2000 on. Apart from journal articles, the outcomes of the most up-to-date research have been published in various edited volumes; see for example Karim 2003; Thussu 2007; Bailey, Georgiou, Harindranath 2007.

² The performances of the contestants are evaluated by the television audience in each of the countries which take part in the event that year (which means they are members of the European Broadcasting Union and they decided to broadcast the ESC); however, the audience in a particular country cannot vote for their own national musical representative. These “national results” (based on the sum of votes sent mainly by SMS during the live broadcast) are then ranked and transformed into points, with the “winner” in each country...
the existence of these voting patterns, which do not reflect the actual musical tastes of the audience but rather follow the historical-political bonds or ethno-cultural similarities between the particular states (see Yair and Maman 1996; Wolther 2006), and which – with the growing number of competing countries – seem to be increasingly favoring participants from Eastern or South Eastern Europe. Looking at the results of the last two ESCs (2007 and 2008), it is clear that most of the points for the four most successful contestants in each of these years (representing Serbia, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Turkey and Armenia) came from countries with a significant presence of minorities with ethnic roots in the country which was awarded the first place – either because these countries used to be part of the same multinational empire (as in the case of audiences from ex-Yugoslav countries voting for Serbia, or audiences from ex-USSR countries voting for Russia), or because of large diasporic communities which have been established in the host countries in the course of history, be it for political or economic reasons (as is clearly visible in the case of Turkey, voted in 2007 as number one in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, or Greece, which in 2008 won the most points from British and German voters, among others). It would, of course, be difficult taking 12 points, the runner-up 10 points, the third one 8 points etc. The overall results of the ESC are then determined by a simple sum of points from every country (http://www.eurovision.tv).

1 In 2007, the ESC was won by the entry from Serbia, which received 12 points from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Switzerland and Macedonia. Ukraine took second place (voted as No. 1 in Andorra, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and Portugal). Russia claimed the third place (earning 12 points from Belarus, Armenia and Estonia) and Turkey the fourth one (with 12 points from Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK). In 2008, the ESC winners were from Russia and got 12 points from Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine. Ukraine, in second place, was only voted as No. 1 in Portugal, while Greece, in overall third place, was a winner with six national audiences (Albania, Cyprus, Germany, Romania, San Marino and the UK). The Armenian representatives, who finished as fourth in the overall ranking, were the most popular in eight countries – Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Russia (http://www.eurovision.tv).

In this paper, I want to take a closer look at the role of the media in processes of transnational migration, as well as in the construction and reconstruction of cultural identities among the members of diasporic communities. Drawing on previous research conducted in the field of transnational/diasporic media studies, and providing concrete empirical examples from various parts of the world, I will attempt to systematize and describe the main features of these diasporic media spaces as types of transnational social spaces or fields, concentrating mainly on to empirically prove the claim that it is the ethnic minorities or members of diasporas who decide the fate of the entire television contest, since there are no data publicly available about whom the actual votes came from, nor how many people actually voted. Nevertheless, the association between the voting results and the existence of strong ethnic minorities and diasporic communities in the respective countries seems to be too strong to be just a coincidence. Providing this assumption is correct, it is in my opinion a palpable example of an interesting paradox – an international contest, celebrating national cultures and symbolically representing principles of homogeneity, sovereignty and equality of nation states (the votes sent from San Marino count just as much as those sent from Russia), is to a great extent determined by transnational television audiences scattered across Europe, which, by the act of voting, demonstrate their identification with the national community they might still feel part of, even though they are physically separated from it, and with the country they might still perceive as their homeland. Overall, the example of the television audience's behavior in regard to the Eurovision Song Contest reminds us of the fact that Europe's cultural geography at the beginning of the 21st century is far more complex than the political map demarcating particular nation states, which problematizes both the nationalistic claim about the unity of culture and territory, as well as the thesis about the gradual vanishing of nation-bound sentiments and identities within the all-encompassing global postmodern culture.

4 According to Peggy Levitt, transnational social fields are characterized by the fact that people inhabiting them are “exposed to a set of social expectations, cultural values, and patterns of human interaction shaped by at least
the practices of media use shared by the members of diasporic communities at the dawn of the 21st century, as well as on how these practices might affect their cultural habits, identities and ways of inclusion into their new society.

Ethnoscapes, Diasporas and Mediated Imagination

The above outlined aims are positioned within an interdisciplinary research field, connecting (at least) two distinct branches of the social sciences – media/communication studies and migration studies. However, researchers from both camps have been increasingly pointing to a natural affiliation between these disciplines, and a consequent need for a closer collaboration of their representatives. As Ulf Hannerz puts it, “ Academically, media studies and migration studies tend to function as separate fields; yet in real life migration and mediatization run parallel, not to say that they are continuously intertwined” (Hannerz 1996: 101, quoted in Mandaville 2001: 180). It is not difficult to comprehend that from the point of view of migration studies, media use and consumption patterns among migrants can be perceived as types of (transnational) cultural practices, indicating their general cultural orientation (and its possible transformation) and helping to better illustrate the dynamics of their relationship towards both “home” and “host” societies. From the perspective of media studies, transnational migration and the subsequent creation of diasporic communities provide yet another challenge for the already disputed conception of a homogeneous, nation-bound public/audience, and calls for the acknowledgement of the importance of transnational communication flows in shaping the features of communication landscapes in the age of late modernity.

This kind of changing of research focus in studying contemporary communication processes does indeed correspond to a general conceptual shift from territorially-bounded places and communities to largely de-territorialized cultural and information flows, advocated by various social and cultural theorists (Lash and Urry 1994; Featherstone and Lash 1995; Appadurai 1996; Castells 1996). Probably the most frequently quoted theoretical account originating from this school of thought is Arjun Appadurai’s (1990, 1996) conceptualization of the “new global cultural economy”, characterized by a “disjunctive order” (standing in opposition to the “center-periphery” model of cultural exchange) and by the existence of several distinct but mutually interrelated dimensions of global cultural flows, namely ethnoscapes (created by global movement of tourists, immigrants, workers or refugees), technoscapes (concerning flows of industrial and information technologies), financescapes (flows of global capital), mediascapes (global production and distribution of information and media content) and ideoscapes (images and political ideologies circulating around the world). What is particularly important from this paper’s point of view is Appadurai’s emphasis on the connection between electronic media and mass migration as two of the most important “signs of the age” (Appadurai 1996: 4), interlinking ethnoscapes with mediascapes and stimulating various forms of transnational imagination, which is one of the crucial characteristics of what are called “diasporic media spaces” (Fazal and Tsagarousianou 2002) or, with a clear reference to Appadurai’s terminology, “diasporic mediascapes” (Karim 2003).

Before proceeding to the discussion of the characteristics of these kinds of mediascapes, and of the relationship between transnational (or even transcontinental) media and communication technologies and transnational migration, it will be useful to briefly define what is meant by the very term diaspora. Derived
from the Greek word *diasperein*, meaning “to disperse” or “to scatter”, *diaspora* historically “refers to a dispersion or scattering of people belonging to one nation or having a common culture beyond their land of origin” (Sinclair and Cunningham 2000: 19). For a long time, the term has been used predominantly in relation to the exodus of the Jews and their life in exile (Georgiou 2001). Building upon this model of an enforced exodus (which has, however, been experienced by many other nations, for example Greeks or Armenians), William Safran has summarized five characteristics of the *historical* meaning of a diasporic community: 1) the original community have been spread from their homeland to two or more countries; 2) they are bound from their disparate geographical locations by a common vision, memory or myth about their homelands; 3) they have a belief that they will never be accepted by their host societies and therefore develop their autonomous cultural and social needs; 4) they or their descendants will return to the homeland should the conditions prove favorable; 5) they should continue to maintain support for the homeland and therefore the communal consciousness and solidarity enables them to continue these activities (Safran 1991: 83–4). Similarly, for Koopmans and Statham the term diaspora: “denotes a particular kind of transnational community that originates in massive emigration and dispersal – forced or at least propelled by considerable distress – of a group from a homeland to two or more other countries” (Koopmans and Statham 2003: 201).

However, various researchers find that such a detailed conceptualization is too limiting and at the same time fails to fully grasp the transnational character of migration, which emphasizes the condition of inhabiting a space between two (or more) worlds or places (a “third space” in the words of Homi Bhabha – see Bhabha 1994), leading to the proliferation of hybrid cultures and identities. As Karim (2003: 2) points out, “all diasporas do not have homeland myths at the centre of their consciousness”, and are rather constantly negotiating their relationship towards both “home” and “host” countries. Therefore, more recently the definition of diaspora has been extended to signify a collectivity of people which includes not just refugees or immigrants who were forced to flee their home country and/or who are dream-
a “deterritorialised nation” or “transnation”, pointing to the decoupling of a particular geographical territory and a community of people connected through cultural and symbolical ties (Karim 2003).

As was already suggested, the diasporic imagination is predominantly a mediated one – enabled through and sustained by the means of communication media. Of course, throughout the history of migration, people have engaged in long-distance communication activities, to carry their memories from home with them and maintain real as well as symbolical ties with their homeland, first through letters, books, newspapers and photos, then – with the advent of electronic communication – by telegraph and telephone, and even later through film or videotapes (including home videos – see Kolar-Panov 2003). However, it was the introduction of satellite broadcasting which brought a truly revolutionary change in the practices of transnational imagination and which has significantly contributed to the pluralization and re-configuration of global cultural geographies. For satellite television (and the subsequent growth of transnational television industries in the late 20th century) has not just diminished nation states’ cultural and symbolical powers exercised through the control of national media systems (it is of course much more difficult to prevent somebody from beaming a TV signal at a certain territory via satellite than to simply cut off traditional terrestrial or cable broadcasting), but apart from that, transnational TV channels have provided members of diasporic communities with the opportunity to escape national communication spaces and re-connect with their lands and cultures of origin on an everyday basis – which is something none of the previously mentioned communication media could do. This is also why satellite television has been considered one of the crucial elements of contemporary diasporic culture, as Myria Georgiou puts it: “The immediacy of access to images and sounds that once would be unreachable, the mediation of the experience and the way both are appropriated allow diasporic media to become part of everyday culture, of emotional and communicational experience” (Georgiou 2003: 9).

**Diasporic Mediascapes and Theories of Global Communication**

The coupling of ethnoscapes and mediascapes, of which the emergence of transnational satellite channels and their consumption by diasporic audiences is probably the most prominent example (aside from the Internet), has been an important source for the critical re-thinking of the two competing interpretations of international communication flows – the cultural imperialism paradigm, assuming the hegemonic dominance of the U.S./Western media industries around the world and their colonizing effects on sovereign and culturally homogeneous nation states (i.e. Schiller 1971; Herman and McChesney 1997), and the free flow of information paradigm, viewing the new communication technologies as a means for the global spread of democracy, human rights and postmodern culture. However, witnessing the rapid growth of media and cultural industries in the non-Western countries, which started not just to saturate their own national markets but also to expand across their borders – both in terms of media content as well as ownership structures – media researchers have realized that neither the stubbornly state-centric nor the naïvely global perspective can provide an optimal framework for describing the reality of contemporary international communication, and that a more subtle and stratified approach is needed; one that would take into consideration the existence of transnational cultures and diasporic communities.

Several authors have tried to capture the growing complexity of international communication in a new typology of transborder media. Attempting to describe “the new cartography of global communication”, leading British scholar Daya Kishan Thussu (2007) for example distinguishes between “dominant” and “contra-” or “subaltern media flows”. The dominant flows are products of the largest media conglomerates, mainly of U.S. origin – like Time-Warner, Disney, Viacom, News Corp. etc. – and, with TV channels such as CNN, Discovery, MTV or ESPN, are targeted at rather cosmopolitan audiences across the world. On the other hand, the contra-(subaltern) flows mainly originate from non-Western media companies and are targeted at audiences from
various geo-cultural markets. Examples of these include the so-called Bollywood film industry, already the biggest in the world – producing more feature films than Hollywood every year, though for a fraction of the revenues – which is widely popular on the Indian subcontinent but also in the Middle East and elsewhere in countries with a significant presence of the Indian diaspora; Latin American television productions ("telenovelas"), the most successful representatives of which come from Brazilian TV Globo, Mexican Televisa or Venezuelan Venezion; Japanese animation (manga), which is being massively exported across the Far East (Iwabuchi 2007); or Korean, Hong Kong or Taiwanese film and TV production, which has been successfully challenging Hollywood's position in the region.

A similar typology, this time in relation to TV production and explicitly including diasporic audiences, has been offered by the Iranian-American media scholar Hamid Naficy (2003), who distinguishes between what he calls “centralized global broad-

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7 The theory of geo-cultural (or geo-linguistic) markets, developed in the mid 1990s independently by Straubhaar (1997) and Sinclair et al. (1996), states that media products which have the opportunity to cross borders are usually successful in markets where the audiences share certain cultural or linguistic characteristics similar to the audiences the products were originally designed for. This kind of “culturally proximate” content is generally preferred over one which is more culturally distant, containing signs, meanings or values which require some form of translation.

8 Bollywood is a nickname for the Hindi cinema industry. Based in the city of Mumbai (Bombay), it produces over 800 feature films per year, which since the 1980s have been exported to now over 100 countries across the world. (Govil 2007). The global movement of Bollywood films is also helped by the Indian-based transnational satellite television channel Zee TV, the leader on the South Asian satellite market, which reaches audiences of over 250 million worldwide and is establishing regional subsidiaries on other continents (Sinclair and Harrison 2004: 44).

9 Founded in 1965 with the assistance of the Time-Life company, TV Globo has evolved into one of the largest and richest television corporations in the world, selling its most famous product – telenovelas – to more than 110 countries in the world (Hesmondhalgh 2002). Mexico-based Televisa dominates the Spanish-speaking part of the Latin American television market, producing more program hours annually than all four national U.S. television networks (ABC, NBC, CBS and Fox) put together (Sinclair 1996).

10 The plenitude of transnational channels can perhaps best be demonstrated by the example of the contemporary U.S. satellite market. According to Albizu (2007), the almost 3800 English-language TV broadcasts available to the U.S. audiences are complemented by 448 Spanish-language ones, 74 Arabic, 64 Chinese, 61 French, 39 Portuguese, 24 Korean, 21 Farsi and about 140 other broadcasts available in over three dozen other languages. For the European context, see Georgiou (2003).
Early Adopters, Heavy Users: Common Patterns of Media Use in Diasporic Communities

First, I want to present some figures about patterns of media use among members of diasporic communities. The research on this subject, however sparse and scattered, indicates that not only can the development of new media technologies foster transnational cultural practices and stimulate the diasporic imagination, but, in return, diasporas themselves often stimulate the growth of new technologies and are among the first buyers and pioneers of their adoption. In her ethnographical research on young British Asians’ identity construction and media use, Mary Gillespie (1995) found out that in order to watch Bollywood films on videotapes, members of the first generation of Punjabi immigrants to Southall, where she conducted her fieldwork, “obtained VCRs as early as 1978, well before most households in Britain” (Gillespie 1995: 79). Elsewhere across the world, diasporas have been among the early adopters of satellite television, which they helped to introduce and/or increase the popularity of (Georgiou 2003). Summarizing national reports on the state of diasporic media in the EU, Myria Georgiou writes that “the density of satellite dishes and cable television subscription is higher in migrant households than in Austrian households … Similar findings are evident in countries with large migrant communities, like Germany, [and] Greece” (Georgiou 2003: 48). The same observation is reported from Scandinavian countries; for example, in Sweden ownership of satellite dishes is allegedly up to twice as frequent among ethnic minorities as among the majority population (Christiansen 2004).

This pattern is now repeated with the proliferation of the most recent technology – digital satellite broadcasting (DBS). As Karim (2003) notes, “among the earliest buyers of digital satellite dishes in Canada were Italian and German communities who wanted to receive television, radio and teletext news transmissions of Europlus, a Europe-based service which carries content from public broadcasters in Italy and Germany” (Karim 2003: 12). In the mid 1990s, when mainstream television stations had only begun examining the potential of DBS, Rome-based OrbitTV had already started digital broadcasting to Arab communities in Europe and the Middle East. Since then, various “direct-to-home (DTH) networks, such as SkyTV (UK), DirecTV (USA), ExpressVu or Star Choice (Canada) have made ethnic channels part of their offerings” (Karim 2003: 12–13).

Minorities seem to belong not only to the first adopters of new broadcasting technologies, but also to the heaviest users of television.11 According to Eckardt, whereas only 10 percent of the total German population watch television for more than four hours per day, the same is true for more than 73 percent of the Turkish minority living in Germany (Eckardt 1996: 461, quoted in Christiansen 2004: 197).12 Heather De Santis (2003) documents a similar tendency for Latinos in the USA, who also have higher viewership rates than Anglophones. Generally, immigrant populations seem to prefer broadcasting, and particularly news, in their own language and from their own homeland or geo-cultural region, if available (Karim 2003; Christiansen 2004). This preference, facilitated by rapidly decreasing costs of satellite dishes, is driven not just by the need to stay in touch with the land and culture of origin or the lack of language skills for understanding the host country’s media but, according to many accounts, also by a perceived exclusion from the mainstream media and/or misrepresentation of immigrants and their problems (Georgiou 2003). Christiansen (2004: 196) quotes a Danish study, according to which “ethnic minorities perceive themselves as excluded from the flow of national news in their society” and are constantly presented as “the Other”. Therefore, “the problem for diaspora populations in Denmark is not to achieve access to the news media, but to obtain news adapted to their special 11 It should be noted that class is usually an important factor determining media use, and audience rating figures across all Western countries show that lower classes tend to be the heaviest TV users. Since immigrants have on average lower socio-economic status as well, it is likely that ethnicity is in fact a secondary variable and the amount of TV watching is primarily determined by a class-based lifestyle.

12 Eckardt characterizes German ethnic minorities as strongly oriented toward television, in that only 2–9 percent (depending on nationality) of his respondents watch television less than one hour on a weekday (Eckardt, 1996: 458, quoted in Christiansen 2004: 197).
needs” (Christiansen 2004: 196). Nabil Echchaibi (2002) also talks about “outside pressure” that drives immigrants away from mainstream media and encourages them to satisfy their “hunger for news” and for other programs (Christiansen 2004: 192) in alternative types of media. According to Echchaibi (2002: 42), “in many cases, it is a reaction to marginalisation and exclusion in the host society”. Eckardt (1996: 461, quoted in Christiansen 2004: 197), with respect to the representation of Turks on German television channels, even talks about their “ghettoization”.

Critical attitudes towards the news presented in national media have particularly increased since the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent launching of the so-called “War on terrorism”. Many immigrants from the Arabic world and/or of Muslim background felt that Western media coverage of these events was biased in its support of the U.S.-led military campaigns, and reproduced negative stereotypes towards the global Muslim population (Hirji 2006), which led to searching for alternative news broadcasters with a different perspective. As a result of this dissatisfaction, and also because of providing exclusive news which no Western media had access to – like the war in Afghanistan or the (in)famous Bin Laden video-messages – the Qatar-based satellite news channel Al Jazeera quickly gained the status of the leading Arabic transnational channel and the main news source for the Muslim diaspora, reaching daily over 50 million viewers around the world (Georgiou 2003).

Similarly, a study of media use by British Pakistani women (Rizvi 2007) found that these women criticized the British media for their coverage of the terrorist attacks in the London Underground on July 7, 2002; the coverage was viewed as “biased”, “unreliable” and exaggerating the “Muslim threat”. In effect, the Western media, even though regarded by these women as more technologically advanced and providing more detailed coverage, were generally mistrusted, and additional information sources were sought, including the internet and interpersonal communication (Rizvi 2007: 329).

Preserving Tradition, Fuelling Nostalgia

As was already mentioned, one of the most debated issues in regard to the patterns of media usage by members of diasporic communities is the question of how the media affect their relationship towards both the “home” and “host” societies; in other words, what role the media play in processes of re-construction of immigrants’ symbolical ties with their homelands and cultures of origin (thereby preserving cultural tradition) and, on the other hand, in processes of their integration into the society they settled in (enabling cultural translation). This is by no means just an “academic” question; it is being raised, perhaps with even greater prominence, as part of the public and political debates on multiculturalism and states’ immigration policies, especially in countries with a high proportion of immigrants and significant presence of ethnic minorities. In line with the functionalist political theories of Karl W. Deutsch (1966), who stressed the unity of a country’s communication channels as one of the preconditions for successful national integration, various critics “have viewed diasporic media as indicators of immigrants’ and minorities’ unwillingness to integrate into their host society” (Hirji 2006: 127). This type of discourse has been particularly visible in Germany, where a certain kind of “moral panic” about the Turkish minority retreating into their own “private media worlds” or “cultural ghettos” has recently spread among the public, a fear that the proliferation of Turkish media will leave their users “dissociated from the social life of everyday [German] society” (Marenbach 1995, quoted in Aksoy and Robins 2000: 344) and even contribute to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. It is no surprise that these types of public fears have only intensified since 9/11, when “the loyalty of minority ethnic groups living in Western countries is becoming suspect and their transnational connections and relationships are coming under scrutiny” (Karim 2003: 15). This of course affects a large number of transnational and diasporic media, seen now more “as tools for recruitment or
conspiracy rather than means for entertaining and/or constructing identity” (Hirji 2006: 125). ¹⁴

It is certainly possible to find examples of diasporic media and their users’ practices that are primarily and openly oriented towards reminding immigrants of their ethnic and cultural roots, building emotional attachments to their homelands and preserving language, religion, habits and traditions, sometimes even in order to safeguard them from an “undesirable influence” from the cultural environment surrounding them. This seems to be a common strategy especially amongst members of the first generation of immigrants, who use homeland media as a means for the cultural education of their children. Such practices have been reported in the already mentioned study on the first generation of immigrant Pakistani women in Britain, many of whom stated that they wanted to encourage their children to engage with Urdu satellite channels in order for them to retain their language and, thereby, also Pakistani identity (Rizvi 2007: 331). Similarly, Ogunyemi (2007) describes the burgeoning number of African video shops in London, which are an important cultural resource for the children of the Black African diaspora in London. One of the most in-depth analyses of the role of diasporic video culture in the “reinvention of tradition” for the second generation of immigrants in a Western country, the above quoted Marie Gillespie’s research on patterns of media use and identity construction among teenage Punjabi girls in Southall (Gillespie 1995), revealed that Hindu families in particular often engage in watching religious or “mythological” films and soap operas, either on videotapes or on cable TV, ¹⁵ which “serve the purpose of language learning, and elders also use them to impart religious knowledge” and beliefs to their children (Gillespie 1995: 87).

A related phenomenon within diasporic mediascapes, although not necessarily related to socialization processes and the passing of cultural traditions from one generation to another, concerns idealization of the homeland, which is re-imagined through nostalgic celebration of its culture and history, often mythologized and/or focusing on traumatic events which are part of the collective memory of the diaspora. This is particularly common for exilic diasporas – those conforming to Safran’s previously quoted definition, which places emphasis on immigrants’ involuntary, often mass exodus from their home country and their “dream of return”. Examples of such practices can be found in the study on Vietnamese diasporic music video culture (Cunningham and Nguyen 2003), ¹⁶ in the research on the use of video messages from the homeland by the Macedonian diaspora in Australia (Kolar-Panov 2003) ¹⁷ or in Hamid Naficy’s study amongst the audiences, a television dramatization of Ramayan – one of the key epopes of Hindu literature as well as foundation myths of Indian society (see Mankekar 2002).

¹⁴ Probably the best known object of suspicion and animosity from the Western governments has been the above-mentioned satellite television channel Al Jazeera, but there have been other instances of governments’ attempts to impede transnational broadcasting perceived as a possible terrorist threat. As Karim (2003) notes, many European governments are hesitant to accept Kurdish satellite Med TV in their territory, as the station has been accused of being attached to a militant Kurdish party (for more information on this issue, see Hassanpour, 2003).

¹⁵ The genre of Hindu soap operas has its origins in the late 1980s when the state television station Doordarshan launched, with an explicit aim of strengthening an official (Hindu) version of Indian national identity

¹⁶ Cunningham and Nguyen (2003) describe the diasporic “videoscape” of the global Vietnamese community, maintained through Vietnamese-owned and operated companies based in southern California, which produce and export music videos (usually featuring live variety shows) all over the world. According to the authors, “most overseas Vietnamese households may own or rent some of this music video material” and a “significant proportion have developed comprehensive home libraries” (Cunningham and Nguyen 2003: 122). These videos are often explicitly devoted to the cultural goal of “heritage maintenance”, which consists primarily of the restoration and preservation of a traditional Vietnamese music style. However, nostalgic reminiscences of the pre-war period and the “heroic loss of Vietnam” are also frequently present, as is an overall emphasis on the anti-communist ideology present in the video production.

¹⁷ In her study conducted in the early 1990s, Dona Kolar-Panov examined the special significance of “ethnic videos” in maintaining imaginary links with the homeland and preserving Macedonian culture, language and identity for the members of the Aegean Macedonian diaspora in Australia. These videos take the form of historical dramas and/or miniseries (often dealing with the exodus from Greece after WWII), or videotaped performances of local folklore groups, but also so-called “video letters”, recorded either by the
of Middle Eastern diasporic television cultures in Los Angeles (Naficy 2003), which are flourishing in terms of the number of stations but which often tend “to fall into a conservative form of political and cultural radicalism – marked by a type of long-distance nationalism and chauvinism driven by longing, nostalgia, fetishisation of the homeland and a burning desire for return” (Naficy 2003: 57). Apart from that, much of this diasporic television displays some other problematic tendencies, such as overt commercialization and cultural/national homogenization, an example of which being the fact that Iranian TV programs do not give any space to Iranian Baha’is, Armenians, Jews or other ethnic or religious minorities residing in Iran; instead “the programs foreground a kind of essentialist Iranian-ness” (Naficy 2003: 61).

Integration, Hybrid Identity and the Banality of Transnational Imagination

Recognizing the importance of diasporic and transnational media for the preservation of the cultural traditions and identities of diasporic communities should not, however, lead to the conclusion that this role is the defining characteristic of diasporic mediascapes, nor should it evoke an impression that members of diasporas or ethnic minorities do not actively engage with media and communication flows from outside of their own community or homeland. Exactly this would be the interpretation of “cultural alarmists” fearing the negative influence of transnational and diasporic media on both the immigrants’ ability as well as their will to integrate (by which is usually meant to assimilate) into the host society, whose communication channels and spaces they allegedly avoid. However, existing studies do not support this hypothesis; on the contrary, what has been repeatedly found and stressed by researchers is the ability of immigrants to use multiple information resources and to routinely cross between various mediascapes. Even though, as was documented above, they might prefer to use media in their own language and/or from their homeland, if available, this does not mean they are completely resistant to other types of media, either national or global ones. Myria Georgiou and Robert Silverstone state clearly that “mixing and choosing between a huge variety of locally and globally produced media and media produced by members of the diaspora, the homeland media industry, but also media produced by major or minor media players in transnational cultural spaces, is a part of the banal everyday living of diaspora” (Georgiou and Silverstone 2006: 37). Reviewing studies conducted in Germany, Sweden and Denmark on this issue, Christiansen has concluded that “there is no necessary contradiction between consumption of transnational media and use of national media .... [E]thnic minorities do not limit their news sources to one medium, nor to a single television channel, radio station or newspaper; rather they spread themselves among several news providers” (Christiansen 2004: 196). Also, studies in Germany and the Netherlands have shown that the use of Turkish media does not exclude the possibility that users have a positive relationship to cultural and political integration (Hafez 2007).

Trying to capture the variety of the possible relationships between media use, level of individual integration and attitudes towards the home country, Kai Hafez (2007) has developed people themselves during their visit to the homeland (which is actually Greece) or by a professional agency. Frequently featuring snapshots from either daily life or special social occasions of their families, friends and acquaintances these video letters serve “as a link between people” and their watching turns into social ritual. According to the author, “for Macedonian communities in Australia, video technology did not mean bringing the cinema into their home, rather it meant bringing their roots, their heritage, their culture, squeezing their nostalgia into the format of a videocassette and letting it flow from the television screen any time they desired it” (Kolar-Panov 2003: 117–118).

In his previous study (Naficy 1993) Naficy focused on the largely Shah-supporting Iranian diasporic TV in Los Angeles, which was, according to him, overflowing with nostalgia and fetishisation of the homeland as it existed before the Islamic revolution.

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19 As Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska have argued, “whoever uses the word ‘integration,’ wishes to say what is allegedly not meant by it, ‘assimilation’” (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 4).
a typology based on the example of the Turkish immigrant community in Germany. This typology starts with a “cultural exile user”, who uses Turkish media only and does not attempt to integrate culturally into Germany; nevertheless his/her faith in the German political and economic system is greater than in the Turkish system. The second type is a “political exile user”, who consumes Turkish media while consciously identifying with the Turkish state and system. The third type is represented by a “diaspora user”, who also uses Turkish media only, primarily because of not being able to understand German very well, but is more integrated socially and does not adopt the “exile” perspective characteristic of the previous type. The fourth type is identified by Hafez as a “bicultural user”, who consumes both German and Turkish media while often being critical of both of them; and the fifth one as a “transcultural user” who chooses only specific German-Turkish media offerings. Finally, there is an “assimilation user”, consuming almost exclusively the media of the immigrant country (Hafez 2007: 133–135).

The last type, which Hafez associates primarily with young media users from the second or third immigrant generation who often know the culture of their homeland only indirectly, brings us to another important issue which problematizes the notion of transnational media as having a single, unitary role for diasporic communities and having a uniform influence on their members’ identities. Such a simplifying notion, drawing on the long outdated “hypodermic model” of media effects and the notion of a homogeneous audience, was already untenable from the perspective of the contemporary media effects research, which had largely abandoned these concepts by the mid-20th century; yet it seems to be surprisingly alive when it comes to making claims about the alleged danger of diasporic media for the cultural integration process.20 Bringing even more empirical ammunition against these long-outdated theories, various studies have pointed out that the preference for transnational media, enabling a re-connection with the homeland and its culture, is much more common for the first generation of immigrants than for their offspring, who have already been socialized within the social and cultural environment of the host country. Their cultural preferences, including media consumption, might be determined more by the preferences of their age group than by their family – which, at least in Western countries, usually means turning to the products of global popular culture. These patterns have been observed, for example, in the Latino diaspora in the USA (Latinos born in the USA watch either English-language programming or programming in both languages, whereas amongst foreign-born Latino respondents there are many more who tend to watch primarily or exclusively Spanish programming – De Santis 2003), by North African immigrants in France (Echchaibi 2001) or by Punjabi or Pakistani families in the UK (Gillespie 1995; Rizvi 2007).

However, just as the preference for home channels does not necessarily indicate hostility towards the host country, a more intense engagement with the host media culture among the younger generations of immigrants does not automatically mean they are on their way towards full assimilation. Between these two rather extreme positions (segregation and assimilation), or perhaps above them, there is a space opened for processes of cultural translation, negotiation of meaning, as well as “for collective conversations both within and beyond nation-states and the formation of hybrid identities” (Couldry and Dreher 2007: 84). Mary Gillespie’s ethnographic study (1995) demonstrates eloquently how these processes take place on the micro-level, in the everyday life of London Punjabi teenagers, second generation immigrants from India, who are rediscovering their ethnic identity through family viewing of Hindu religious television series and/or Bollywood films on videotapes, but, at the same time eagerly consume products of Western popular culture (particularly TV soap operas like Neighbours or Beverly Hills 90210) which often represent different, and sometimes conflicting, cultural values and lifestyle patterns. In Gillespie’s opinion, the coexistence of culturally diverse media should be interpreted in terms of opportunity rather than risk for the young British Asians, who – as she shows – are capable of using them as

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20 Analyzing this issue in Germany, Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins pointed out that “in the case of the Turks,… it seems that all kinds of old and discredited theories of media influence and effects are still suitable, and can still be strategically mobilized” (Aksoy and Robins 2000: 345).
a “cultural resource” for an active building of their own identities while maintaining multiple levels of cultural belonging. For Gillespie, such a situation “encourages young people to compare, contrast and criticize the cultural and social forms represented to them by their parents, by significant others present in their daily lives and by significant others on the screen. This is the kind of context in which the construction of new ethnic identities becomes both an inevitable consequence and a necessary task” (Gillespie 1995: 206).

Apart from studies exploring processes of integration and formation of hybrid identities through media consumption practices, a growing number of studies in the field of diasporic media production have also documented that it is indeed possible for diasporic media to avoid the nostalgic mode of representing the homeland as well as the unproblematic reproduction of cultural traditions, and actively search for alternative ways of cultural self-expression which escape the simple segregation/assimilation dichotomy. According to Nabil Echchaibi (2001), this is exactly the case of Beur FM, a commercial radio station run by and for the Beur minority in France.21 Founded in 1981 as Radio Beur in Marseilles and Paris as a result of growing dissatisfaction with the mainstream media misrepresentation of North African immigrants, as well as in response to the lack of channels satisfying the cultural tastes of younger generations (which differed from their parents’ culture), this station has quickly become popular among the Beur community, attracting listeners mainly by focusing on “Beur music” – a combination of urban rai,22 rap and hip-hop. Largely because of the often provocative (“immoral”) lyrics, this music has been portrayed “as a form of resistance to the Algerian state and Islamic values” and its popularity has been interpreted “as a sign of successful implantation of progressive values among North African youth” (Echchaibi 2001: 306). However, according to Echchaibi, this interpretation misses the fact that this music (particularly rai) is a form of resistance not just to conservative Islamic values (perceived by French society as an obstacle to integration) but also to a vision of a monolithic French society and identity, to the dominant discourses of assimilation and nationalism, and is highly critical of the state of the integration process. Nevertheless, according to the author, this should not be understood as an expression of segregation, but rather as an articulation of hybridity and difference, which the radio station and music provide a channel for; it is a hybridity going “beyond ethnic and French cultures in relation to global and local, diasporic and national context” (Echchaibi 2001: 307).

To complete this section, I would like to present yet another type of argument against the reductionist notion of transnational media consumption as a way of simply reaffirming ethnic identity and maintaining an emotional attachment to the homeland and its culture. This argument is contained in Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins’s (2003) analysis of transnational Turkish television and its diasporic audiences. Contrary to the predominant perception of satellite broadcasting as a means for supporting the long-distance cohesion of transnational imagined communities, the authors point out that the images which bring the ordinary, “banal reality of Turkish life” into the living rooms of Turkish migrants in London might actually work in a quite different way. Interviews with the migrants have revealed that watching television news from Turkey is often a frustrating and disillusioning experience for them; the “reality dimension” of television betrays any attempts to idealize the homeland and shakes the abstract nostalgia which the diasporic imagination usually relies upon. As the authors put it, “the ‘here and now’ reality of Turkish media culture disturbs the imagination of a ‘there and then’ Turkey – thereby working against the romance of diaspora-as-exile, against the tendency to false idealization of the ‘homeland’” (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 95). Transnational Turkish television is thereby revealed as “an agent of cultural de-mythologisation”, and the kind of transnational imaginary

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21 “Beur” is a term used for a member of the second generation of people of Arabic origin born or brought up in France, who define themselves as “neither fully French nor fully Arab”. Created as a neologism to “counter the negative connotations of arabe and musulman”, it is therefore a label which itself indicates a self-perceived hybrid identity of its bearers (Echchaibi 2001: 300).

22 Rai is a musical form originating in Algeria in the 1920s. Its urban version is close to pop music, however retaining the strong emphasis on performers’ self-expression through the lyrics (Echchaibi 2001: 305).
connection it promotes is described as “banal transnationalism” (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 95).23

Concluding Remarks

The above presented analysis of media uses and practices which form an important part of the daily lives of diasporic communities around the world demonstrates two mutually interrelated phenomena. First, the multitude and diversity of communication channels currently available to transnational migrants and ethnic minorities, addressing their communication needs and enabling them to stay in touch with their countries and cultures of origin; and second, the variety of ways in which these media are utilized as a symbolical resource for creating new cultural identities and establishing multiple forms of belonging. Both the multiplicity of communication flows and cultural values mediated through them, as well as the ability of the media users to select and construct different kinds of meanings from them, complicate the attempts to treat the diasporic and transnational media as an independent variable determining the level of identification with either “home” or “host” culture/society. The patterns of media use observed in the studies reviewed here largely confirm the opinion of transnational migration theorists who point to the necessity of abandoning the binary opposition between transnationalism and integration/assimilation, since in reality “…transnational involvements of immigrants and their children and their assimilation into the host society typically are concurrent” (Morawska 2003: 133); and the concrete manifestations of this “transnationalism-with-assimilation combination” are always dependent on a particular socio-historical context and a variety of external factors (Morawska 2003: 162–163). Studies examining transnational media flows and their importance for the lives and identities of immigrants also support the calls for changing the notion of diasporas and diasporic cultures as harmonious, homogeneous and/or simply as extensions of their homelands – nation states – which not only contains the danger of falling into the trap of fetishizing the diaspora and diasporic identity (concealing internal power relations and conflicting interests within the community), but which also supports a perspective “grounded essentially in the national mentality” (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 92). Such a perspective, which can be regarded as an example of what Ulrich Beck criticizes as “methodological nationalism” (see Beck 2002), clearly overlooks “the transgression of national boundaries and collectives” (Soysal 2003: 10–11; quoted in Koopmans and Statham 2003: 201) enabled by and facilitated through the transnational media which are “helping redefine and challenge the identity and boundaries of a diasporic community” (Echchaibi 2002: 40). In other words, diasporic media studies should try to move beyond the dichotomy of “home” and “host” cultures/societies as a “default” referential framework for the analysis of migrants’ cultural practices, and approach diasporic mediascapes as principally opened to a much broader spectrum of media and cultural flows, enabling the emergence of hybrid cultural forms, identities and ways of belonging which escape the narrowly defined borders of nation states and their communities. This call is even more urgent in the age of declining “national audience”, as the audience’s cultural preferences and tastes are being increasingly influenced by other-than-national media and cultural sources, and its once proclaimed unity is becoming ever more fragmented. Research in the field of diasporic mediascapes, even though still far from providing a comprehensive picture, therefore brings us closer to understanding the disjunctive order of the globalizing world which defines self-imaginations as an “everyday social project” (Appadurai 1996: 4). Beyond any doubt, the media – both the “old” and “mass” as well as the “new” and individualized ones – will be an ever more important part of this process.

23 The heightened reflexivity of their own culture and/or identity as a consequence of transnational satellite broadcasting is certainly not confined to just Turkish transnational television audiences. In a similar way, it has been mentioned in regard to the global audiences of Al Jazeera, broadcasting popular talk shows where prominent religious scholars and imams are forced to defend their ideas in the face of questioning from a critical audience, which enables the Muslim viewers to make up their own mind about matters which used to be presented in the form of a dogma (Mandaville 2003: 144).
References


The year 2010 is a significant one from a demographic perspective. It marks a significant watershed because in the world's high income countries the numbers of people in the workforce ages (15–64) will begin to decline. The World Bank (2006) projects that while there will be considerable intercountry variation as a whole high income economies will suffer a net decline of 25 million working age people by 2025. At the same time there will be an increase of 1 billion working age people in low income countries. The appreciation of this increasingly steep demographic gradient has been a growing recognition that it will add to what is already a significant migration from south to north countries (United Nations 2006). However there is a growing debate regarding the form that migration will or should take – permanent displacement or circulation. It is this issue which this paper takes up. It begins with a discussion on conceptualisations of circular migration. It then looks at the contemporary debate on circular migration and examines the arguments which have been put forward in support of and against the encouragement of circular migration. It then makes an assessment of the circular migration literature in an attempt to assess its potential role in the development in origin communities. In doing this it draws not only on that concerned with temporary international migration but a much more longstanding body of work on circular migration within countries. The first section draws out some policy implications of the findings. The argument presented is that circular migration does in fact have the potential to contribute positively to economic development in origin communities but that hitherto this impact has been diluted by poor governance within circular migration institutions and structures. It is suggested that there needs to be a judicious mix of carefully
derived and well managed permanent and circular migration alternatives available to south-north migrants if triple bottom line win-win-win outcomes are to be achieved for migrants, their destinations and their origins.

**Conceptualising Circular Migration**

Zelinsky (1971: 225–26) makes the distinction between conventional migration as “any permanent or semi-permanent change of residence” and circulation as “a great variety of movements, usually short term, repetitive or cyclical in nature, but all having the lack of any declared intention of a permanent or long lasting change in residence”. However, as with other dichotomies in migration (King 2002) there is a considerable blurring and overlap between permanent migration and circular migration. This overlap can take several forms, as can be illustrated in the Australian context where arrivals in the country are required to state their intentions as to whether they intend to stay in Australia permanently as a settler, on a long-term basis (for more than a year but intending to return to their home country) or short term (intending to stay less than a year). The blurring of permanent and circular is evident among immigrants who have settled permanently in Australia in the postwar period more than a fifth have subsequently left (Hugo 1994; Hugo, Rudd, Harris 2001), a fact that can be established since Australia collects data on emigration as well as immigration. It’s also currently visible in Australia (2007–2008), where 27.5 percent of the permanent additions to the population through migration are migrants who entered the country on a temporary visa but have applied for, and obtained, permanent residence or citizenship (DIAC 2008).

Despite this overlap, it is possible to identify circular migration as a distinct type of mobility which is characterised by a pattern of coming and going between a “home” place and a destination place. It is differentiated from commuting by the fact that the circular migrant needs to stay away from the home place for longer than a day. One internal migration study found the frequency of circulation is influenced by the distance between home and destination, the cost of travel, the nature of work at the destination and cultural factors (Hugo 1978). That study in Indonesia found that patterns of circular migration vary from weekly to absences of a number of weeks to annual or biannual returns when the workplace was a distant island of the Indonesian archipelago. For international migration the absences are likely to be greater but in cases where the home place is near a border the pattern of circulation can be more frequent. The latter is the case, for example, for migrant workers from Southern Thailand working in northern Malaysia (Klanarong 2003).

Another key distinction to be made is between circular migration and temporary migration. While the latter includes all forms of non-permanent movements, the former is the subset which involves return, repetitive and cyclic patterns with a continuing pattern of mobility between origin and destination. Newland, Agunias and Terrazor (2008: 45) have characterised the international version of circular migration as a “continuing, long term and fluid movement of people among countries that occupy what is now increasingly recognised as a single social space”.

While conceptually it is possible to make a clear distinction between permanent and circular migration it is not as clear-cut as it may seem at first glance. Hugo (1983, 87) has argued that an important concept when considering the difference between permanent and circular migration is that of commitment. He argues that all migrants can be located along the continuum depicted in Figure 1 according to the mix of the degree of commitment that they have to their origin and that to which they feel toward the destination. To take an extreme example, an unskilled labourer circular migrant A moves from Indonesia to Malaysia with the intention of earning sufficient money to buy a small business in his home community. He leaves his whole family behind in Indonesia, he retains his Indonesian citizenship and his intention is that once he has reached his target earnings he will return to Indonesia and stay there. His commitment is almost totally to his Indonesian origin. On the other hand, B in the diagram is also Indonesian but she has obtained her high school and university education in medicine in Adelaide, Australia. During her study she has met a fellow doctor who she has married and had children with. Her parents have died so she only has distant relatives in Indonesia. She is an Australian citizen and sees her future and
that of her family as being totally Australian. Her commitment to her Indonesian home which she left as a child is very limited.

**Figure 1:** The Commitment Continuum of Migration

![Commitment Continuum of Migration](image)

These are cases near the extremes of migrants being almost totally committed to their origin or to their destination. However, migrants can be located at any point along the continuum according to the relative mix of their commitments to the origin and their destination. Migrant C, for example, is an ethnic Chinese businessman who left Indonesia during the anti-Chinese riots of 1998 and took his family to Australia where he has set them up in Sydney. His children have gone to Australian schools and one has met and married an Australian partner. However, he has retained his business interests in Jakarta and circulates regularly between Australia and Jakarta. He has developed business interests in Australia but still retains his Indonesian enterprise and his parents and siblings still live in Jakarta. His commitment is equally divided between origin and destination.

Nationalism assumes that immigrants forsake their heritage and origins and shift from X to Y quickly. In reality, this is not common. Most movers retain a mix of commitment to origin while developing commitments to their destination. Indeed the concept of transnational families involves family members being physically distributed between origin and destination with a mix of commitments to the two. A key distinction between circular migrants and permanent migrants is that the former are located closer to X in Figure 1 while permanent migrants are closer to Y.

In most contexts it is possible to develop a number of indicators which could be used to measure the level of commitment to origin and destination for particular migrants. This could include, for example the location of family members. Leaving nuclear family members in the origin is a strong indication of maintaining a major commitment to the origin community while having extended family in the origin is also indicative of linkages, albeit less strong. Maintaining full citizenship (or even joint citizenship) at the origin is a clear reflection of a strong commitment while temporary resident status at the destination is indicative of a weaker association than with the origin. The location of property owned by the migrant is also reflective of their relative connections with origin and destination. This is especially the case for businesses, agricultural land and other fixed assets, but house ownership is also of relevance. The regularity and scale of remittances also is indicative of the strength of commitment to the origin community. Circular migrants tend to send more money home and more often since they usually are supporting the balance of their nuclear family that remains there. The balance of locations of bank accounts and investments also is an indicator of the degree of commitment to origin and destination. The ethnicity/ancestry of one's partner can be another indicator of extent of commitment to the origin community. It is likely that where both partners come from the origin country that the family's linkages home will be stronger than if one is a native of the destination. Language can also be a relevant marker. The extent to which the origin language is spoken at home in day-to-day family communication can reflect the strength of identification with the origin. Similarly the ability of the immigrant with respect to speaking the destination country language can also be an indicator of the extent of commitment to origin and destination. The extent of cultural maintenance can also be a gauge of the degree of commitment to the origin. This may be associated with active membership of migrant associations and organisations based in the destination country. Voting rights and behaviour may also reflect the relative degree of commitment to origin and destination.

When taken alone and in isolation, each of these elements may be fallible as a direct indicator of the relative degrees of commitment to the origin and destination. If they are considered together they should give a clear indication of the relative strength of the two associations. The aggregate measure obtained can locate them along the continuum presented in Figure 1. Most first generation movers will not be at either of the extreme poles of total commitment to origin or destination but will have a mix of commitment.
of linkages with both. Circular migrants will be more to the left of the diagram and permanent migrants to the right. Seen in this way there are clear overlaps between circular and permanent migration.

The study of circular migration is hampered by a lack of data relating to its scale, composition and impact. Standard demographic measurement of migration stocks and flows predominantly captures movement on the far right of Figure 1. Accordingly the scale of non-permanent movement is not appreciated and little evidence is available to policymakers to resolve policy dilemmas regarding it. Indeed, as transnationalism has replaced permanent settlement as the dominant paradigm in international migration research (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 2004) there is a growing disconnect between standard migration measurement and the actual nature of population mobility between countries. More than three decades ago Mitchell (1978: 6–7) pointed out, in relation to internal circular migration:

“...the topic (circular migration) has in my opinion remained remarkably intractable to thorough-going analysis. Part of this analytical recalcitrance derives from the great difficulties in collecting suitable data to carry out adequate theoretical formulations.”

This judgement is equally applicable to the contemporary situation with respect to international circular migration.

**Circular Migration and Development: The Debate**

While circular migration has a long history, it was the publication of the Global Commission on International Migration's Report (GCIM 2005: 31) which has focused attention on its developmental significance:

“The Commission concludes that the old paradigm of permanent migration settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration ... The Commission underlines the need to grasp the developmental opportunities that this important shift in migration patterns provides for countries of origin.”

There have been arguments made that circular migration is better able to deliver development dividends and poverty reduction impacts of south-north migration for low income origin countries than can permanent relocation. This is predominantly because such migrants are more committed to their home community than their permanent counterparts because they usually leave their nuclear family at home and because they reside part of the time at the origin. Accordingly, they are likely to remit a larger proportion of their income and are more likely to return to the home country and contribute to development.

Some countries in Asia have sought to encourage an upskilling of the temporary labour migrants leaving the country (e.g. Indonesia – Hugo 2008). The rationale here is that such workers will earn much more in destinations than their low-skill counterparts and therefore are more able to remit larger sums back to their origins. In addition, they are more likely to acquire training and experience at the destination which will enhance their skills than is the case with low-skilled labour migrants. This logic, however, does have flaws. For example high skill workers often remit smaller proportions of their income to origin communities partly because they tend to come from better off families (and communities) so that the level of need in the origin family will not be as great. Moreover, these migrants are often able to bring their immediate families with them to the destination so that they are not as obliged to send back money to immediate family. As a result, their level of commitment back to the home community may not be as great as it is for low-skilled migrants. Such migrant workers are more likely to come from cities and better-off parts of origin countries (since they have higher levels of education and training) than low-skill migrants who often come from poorer areas. The loss of the human capital of some of these higher skilled temporary labour migrants may have negative effects in origin areas. In the Pacific, for example, it is apparent that the emigration of nurses and teachers to countries like Australia and New Zealand under temporary visas has had negative impacts on health and education systems in the Pacific.
(Voigt-Graf 2008). Since temporary skilled workers often are given access to applying for permanent residence and even citizenship at the destination, they may not return to origin countries as much as low-skilled migrants.

On the other hand, there are aspects of higher skilled temporary labour migration which potentially could deliver development dividends at home. As mentioned earlier, they earn more at the destination so that the amount they can potentially remit is greater. They have the opportunity to enhance their skills and experience which can benefit the origin country when they return or while they are still away if they transmit new knowledge and ideas back to relevant groups in the home country. Unlike low-skill migrants, they are more likely to maintain non-family network links with colleagues, professional organisations, etc. which can be the conduits through which new ideas and ways of doing things can be introduced to the home area. They can enhance productive linkages for trade, investment, etc. between the origin and the destination. There are few barriers to the international movement of highly skilled workers but it may be that it is the circular mobility of low-skilled workers which can have the greatest impact in reducing poverty in origins.

The discussion on the preferability of circular migration to permanent settlement is usually cast in terms of the greater positive impact on origin communities. However, it is important that it be recognised that they also have some advantages from the perspective of receiving countries as well. First, in terms of meeting receiving countries’ labour market shortages, temporary migration permits greater labour market flexibility than permanent migration (Abella 2006). The particular labour demands that they meet may dry up. Singapore, for example, sees its low-skilled migrant workforce in this way and at times of economic downturn the numbers of workers can be easily reduced. Similarly when demand for labour is seasonal, as in agriculture, temporary labour has some real advantages.

Second, the influx of skilled workers on a temporary basis can allow a country to “buy time” to train sufficient numbers of its native workers to do these jobs. The migrant workers can even play a significant role in providing that training formally or through “on the job” training and skills transfer.

Third, from the perspective of ageing of destination country societies, temporary migration may be advantageous. Migrants are always young and on their arrival in the country they have a “younging effect” on the host population, although this is very small given their small numbers in relation to the total population. However, migrants age too. Hence if they remain in the country they will age with the host population and contribute to ageing. For example, in Australia the long history of sustained postwar migration has meant that in 2006 the percentage of the overseas-born aged 65+ was higher for the overseas-born (19.0 percent) than the Australia-born (11.1 percent). Moreover, the overseas-born population aged 65+ increased faster than their Australia-born counterparts over the 2001–2006 period (3 percent per annum compared with 1 percent). Hence a “revolving door” of migrant workers provides a constantly young workforce to the destination country without contributing to ageing of the workforce or population.

Fourth, as Abella (2006: 2) points out, “compared to permanent immigration, liberalising temporary admissions is politically easier to sell to electorates that have come to feel threatened by more immigration”.

Fifth, some countries have fears of social cohesion breaking down if immigrant communities settle permanently and there are difficulties of integration.

Hence if it can be established that circular labour migration can have beneficial effects for origin countries it can also often be a more acceptable migration option to destination communities as well.

These arguments have encouraged policymakers in high-income nations and in multilateral agencies to recommend circular labour migration. For example, the European Commission (2007: 4) has examined:

…how circular migration can be fostered as a tool that can both help address labour needs in EU Member States and maximise the benefits of migration for countries of origin, including by fostering skills transfers and mitigating the risks of brain drain.
Further, they have identified two main forms of circular migration which could be most relevant in the EU context – circular migration of third country nationals in the EU, giving the opportunity for settlers in the EU to work in their home country while retaining their EU resident status and circular migration of persons living in a third country outside of the EU.

In New Zealand in 2007, the government announced a Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme which seeks to bring agricultural workers from Pacific countries for periods of up to seven months to work on horticultural and viticultural holdings. As is pointed out by Ramasamy et al. (2008) while the scheme was designed to fill longstanding structural labour shortages it had an explicit objective of having positive developmental impacts in origin communities. In the first year over 5,000 workers were brought in, mainly from the Pacific nations of Vanuatu, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Samoa. The RSE program was developed cooperatively by the New Zealand Immigration, Labour and Development Assistance agencies in order to ensure that its developmental impact was maximised. The communities of origin are being studied longitudinally in order to assess the scale and nature of the developmental impact of the circular migration (McKenzie, Martinez, Winters 2008; Gibson, McKenzie, Rohorua 2008). In 2009, Australia introduced a similar pilot program.

Hence there has been a strong response to the GCIM’s (2005) plea to design circular migration programs which seek to have positive effects not only in filling labour shortages in the destination but also on development in origins and improving the lives of the migrant workers themselves. However, there has been a strong critical voice which has argued that there is a significant body of evidence that circular migration programs can have negative effects in origin areas and on the migrant workers themselves. These have in particular drawn attention to the experience of the guestworker program of Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (Castles and Kosack 1973; Castles 2006a, 2006b).

Vertovec (2006: 43) has summarised a number of concerns that need to be borne in mind in the rolling out of these new circular migration schemes. Prominent in these criticisms is that in practice such schemes lock migrants into dependent and exploitative relationships and offer little opportunity for upward mobility and training. Such programs often involve a loss of rights among the workers and they suffer lack of integration exposing them to exclusion. Others suggest that it encourages illegal “overstaying” and creates substantial compliance problems for destination authorities.

In Asia and the Pacific, the temporary labour migration of low-skilled workers has been heavily criticised as being a “new form of indentured labour”. Some NGOs in the region even equate it with trafficking because of the exploitation of migrants that often characterises this movement. The undoubted excessive rent taking, social costs of long separation from families, lack of opportunities for social mobility and lack of opportunity to transfer to permanent residency are also criticised. It is also seen to be associated with undocumented migration. These criticisms all can be sustained by looking at particular migrants in particular flows of temporary low-skilled labour migrants. However the question has to be asked as to whether the problems are intrinsic features of this type of migration or whether they are due to a failure to introduce fair and efficient governance of labour migration systems in the Asia-Pacific context. There is some evidence that it is the latter rather than the former.

In the region, the potential for this type of migration to have a developmental impact is considerable not only because of their large numbers but also because most retain a strong commitment to their home communities where they leave their families. Accordingly, they send back a higher proportion of their income in remittances than is the case for permanent settlers. Moreover, they intend to return to their homelands and this is enforced by the migration regimes in destination countries. It has been shown (Hugo 2001) that in many countries (e.g. Indonesia) this type of migrant worker is drawn from some of the poorest areas of the country (e.g. parts of Java, East and West Nusatenggara). In such areas remittances are the only substantial inflow of potential investment money from the outside.

Given this substantial potential for international contract labour migration to deliver financial resources to the grass roots in some of the poorest areas in the region, what are the barriers which are dampening these impacts? One of the main issues here relates to transaction costs. For many contract workers the
amounts that they have to pay to recruiters, to government officials, to travel providers, for documents, training, etc. are very high and well above what could be considered a reasonable charge for those services. There is too much unproductive rent taking in the burgeoning contract labour migration industry in the region and this is siphoning away money that migrants earn that otherwise would have gone toward development-related activity in home areas. Often migrants have to work several months on arrival at the destination just to pay off the debts incurred by the migration process. If they are duped by recruiters so that the job they were promised is not available or if they cannot complete their contract for some reason they and their families have a substantial (and rapidly increasing) debt. Exploitation of migrant workers in the recruitment and preparation for travel processes, en route, at the destination and on their return home is rife. It should be noted that in some countries it is the documented migrants who have higher transaction costs than undocumented migrants. Indeed, one of the reasons why migrants opt to take the undocumented route is to avoid the predations of gate keepers who extract money, both official and “unofficial”, at every stage of the migration process.

Migrant remittances are a key to labour migration having positive impacts on development and poverty reduction in origin areas. Yet these potential dividends can be reduced firstly by having to pay high rates to send the money home and by the lack of investment opportunities in the home area. It is apparent that despite a range of ingenious methods of sending money home, many systems overcharge migrants to remit money so that the proportion of earnings that eventually get back to the origin is smaller than it could be. In addition, Hugo (2004) found in Eastern Indonesia that the origin area of migrant workers to Malaysia had been so neglected by the central and provincial governments that it lacked the basic infrastructure which would be needed for the successful setting up of new enterprises by returned migrants. There were very few productive channels open to returnees to invest money in productive enterprises other than to purchase agricultural land or buy a passenger motor vehicle.

In short there is considerable evidence that in Asia and the Pacific that the potential for circular migration to deliver development dividends to origin areas is being compromised by the poor governance of these migration systems which prevails over much of the region. Examples of best practice in circular migration in the region exist but are few and far between. In particular the excessive costs of migration are diverting the earnings of the migrant workers which otherwise could have been directed to development-related expenditure in the origin area. Moreover, poor governance results in significant undocumented migration, lack of protection and exploitation of the migrant workers and destination communities developing anti-migrant attitudes and practices.

**Misconceptions of Circular Migration?**

It was indicated earlier that the body of empirical knowledge of the scale, composition and effects of international circular migration in Asia is limited. In such a context it is easy for stereotyping and misrepresentation of circular migration and its effects to occur. In fact, like other forms of migration, its causes and consequences are complex. There is a tendency for some to label circular migration as bad because of the experience in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s and subsequently in parts of Asia. Equally, however, a blind insistence that its impacts are always beneficial is misguided. It is important, however, to seek to break down some of the stereotypes which have been assigned to circular migration. Field experience with such migrants over decades has convinced this researcher that circular migration is a more complex and nuanced process and one in which there can be beneficial outcomes for migrants, although such outcomes are by no means assured. Some insights into the process can be gained from the considerable body of research relating to internal circular migration (Elkan 1967; Chapman 1979; Chapman and Prothero 1985; Bedford 1973; Hugo 1978, 1982). This literature provides a number of insights into this form of movement which may have relevance for international migration. There are a number of “myths” that have grown up around unskilled circular migration which some of the empirical evidence available suggests are at the very least contestable.
These include the following: “There is nothing so permanent as a temporary migrant”. Certainly many temporary migrants see their move as a part of a longer term strategy to remain permanently at the destination. Yet for many others circular migration is a preferred strategy. Certainly there are sacrifices of separation from family but the idea of earning in a high income/cost context and spending in a low income/cost context is appealing as is the idea of remaining in their cultural hearth area. Circular migration can become a continuing and structural feature of families and economies and it doesn’t have to lead to permanent settlement. Moreover if there is a regime which facilitates migrant workers returning relatively frequently to their families as opposed to constraints which in fact make this so difficult that migrants opt for a permanent settlement strategy at the destination this will encourage circular migration. Where origin and destination are relatively close together, improved transportation makes regular home visiting increasingly feasible as is the case with internal circular labour migration (Hugo 1975, 1978). It must not be assumed that circular migration represents the initial stage of permanent settlement, especially if there is a migration regime which facilitates circular movement. Circular migration can be a sustainable continuing mobility strategy. Indeed, there is evidence of the strategy being passed between generations.

- “Circular migrants lack agency.” Not all temporary labour migrants are victims of criminal syndicates, unscrupulous recruiters and grasping employers. Certainly there are many examples where exploitation is significant. Yet in fieldwork one is frequently impressed by the extent to which migrant workers are empowered and are highly skilled at using the existing circular migration regime to maximise the benefits for themselves and their families. Again, however, governance systems are of paramount significance. Migration is often selective of the most entrepreneurial and risk taking groups in a population. There is ample evidence that, given a fair system of governance, circular migrants are very capable of maximising the benefits they can derive from migration.

- “Circular migrants lack social mobility”. In many cases circular low-skill labour migrants have considerably enhanced their position in the destination. For example, upward mobility and enhanced training is commonplace among East Nusatenggara migrants to East Malaysia (Hugo 2001).

The key point is that low-skill circular labour migration can have positive outcomes for migrant workers and their origin communities. In fact it often does. However, the regime for this type of movement in some Asia-Pacific countries is characterised by poor governance, corruption and lack of coherence so that these outcomes are compromised. The question becomes whether dealing with these issues effectively can enhance the positive effects in origin areas.

Some Lessons Regarding Circular Migration and Development

With the increasing interest in circular migration by both migration and development agencies within government it is important that the institutions and programs that are put in place to facilitate this recognise that much of the experience of the past has resulted in less than optimal outcomes, especially for the migrants themselves. In the Asia-Pacific, such programs have varied greatly in their quality and all too often corruption, exploitation and mistreatment of workers has resulted. Moreover, the benefits delivered to origins have been diluted. It is important to learn from this experience not only so the new programs that are being rolled out are given the best possible chance to reduce poverty and facilitate development in origin areas but also for the much needed reform of many existing programs in the region. Can reform of the governance of temporary labour migration systems result in it becoming a significant contributor to development in origin countries? If so, what are the lessons of best practice in temporary labour migration systems in the region which would inform that reform? It is to these questions that we now turn.

Abella (2006: 53) has argued that while it is not possible to put forward best practices in circular migration that are applicable to

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1 For a more comprehensive treatment of lessons of best practice from Asian labour migration, see Hugo (forthcoming).
in all (or even most) countries and migration systems it is nevertheless possible to identify some of the elements which make for successful programs. In this section we will summarise some of these lessons. At the outset, however, we need to state that there is a fundamental need throughout the region to significantly improve governance of circular migration. As long as corruption, excessive rent taking, exploitation, denial of basic rights etc. are allowed to flourish, the developmental impact of circular migration will remain compromised. Hence what is required are overarching sound governance systems which protect the interests of destination communities while also providing migrants with appropriate access to work, protecting their rights, making it possible for them to remit as much as possible of their earnings home and to return home in order to achieve win-win-win results.

We will briefly consider here some of the lessons of best practice in circular migration programs in the Asia-Pacific region. However, a couple of initial comments are required. Firstly, we need to reiterate that there is no single recipe or blueprint that is applicable in all situations. Circular migration structures, institutions and programs should be a judicious mix of best practice lessons and considerations to the specific context. Our focus here is predominantly on low-skilled migration since for the most part skilled workers are in demand and have more bargaining power than their low-skilled counterparts (Ruhs and Martin 2008). The lessons of best practice need to be applied in both origins and destinations.

One of the necessary elements of best practice identified by Abella (2006: 53) relates to the proper management of labour demand in destination. Circular migration must be responding to real labour shortages and not used by employers to drive down the conditions of local workers. This is not an easy task but Abella (2006) argues that there needs to be robust forecasts of long term labour supply deficits in specific areas. These need to be combined with practical methods of including circular migration as one of the elements to respond to the current needs of industry.

Selection of workers so that they have not only the specific skills and training required of the work but also the personal attributes to be able to adjust to life at the destination is important. There must be total transparency in the selection criteria, process and costs. It is at the initial recruitment and selection stages in Asia and the Pacific that many of the problems of excessive transaction costs are incurred. Too often migrant workers and their families go into debt to meet the costs which are imposed, and this is a major barrier to the earnings of migration being invested in development related or poverty reduction activity. This is complicated by the fact that in several countries there are a plethora of agents, subagents, middlemen, travel providers and officials that are involved in the recruitment and preparation process and imposing charges – some legitimate, others not. An obvious goal is to reduce these transaction costs to a level commensurate with the services provided and there are a number of practices which can help achieve this – providing accurate and comprehensive pre-departure information and training, keeping processing efficient, effective management and regulation of agents, providing low cost loans to fund travel and involvement of employers in the selection process.

The success of temporary labour migration, while it can be strongly shaped by the recruitment and predeparture experience, hinges mostly on their experience in the workplace and society more generally at the destination. While the country of origin can influence this through developing MOUs (Memoranda of Understanding) on conditions of workers, setting up mechanisms like labour attachés and branches of national banks in destination countries, their power and influence is strictly limited by diplomatic practice and protocol. The employers and governments at destinations have a high level of influence in shaping the experience of migrant workers and there is a need for a conceptual leap among policymakers in most destinations to begin to factor in to their deliberations the possible effects of their policies and programs not only for their own communities, employers and countries but also those for the immigrant workers themselves and development impacts in origin communities. While governments lack jurisdiction in destination countries, NGOs (Non-Government Organisations) can often effectively bridge origin and destination countries by working closely with different, but related, NGOs established in the destination.

In considering best practice in relation to labour migrants’ experience in destination countries, we will examine the roles of
sending and receiving countries separately. However it is important to underline that best practice would involve a high level of cooperation between the governments of sending and receiving countries on these issues involving:

• An MOU which specifies the conditions under which labour migrants are accepted into a country, their minimum conditions, rights and obligations (and those of their employer) etc.
• A mechanism to allow regular discussions between the countries on migrant issues.
• A mechanism through which there can be timely and effective action decided upon to deal with pressing specific issues relating to migrant workers.
• An open channel of communication between governments in which there can be frank regular interchange and discussion of migrant worker issues.

Most fundamental to best practice in circular migration systems is full protection of migrant workers, basic rights and safety in origin, en route and destination countries. This involves all stakeholders involved in the process. Abella (2006) also identifies some other elements in the conditions of employment:

• Flexibility in determining periods of stay to allow for differences in the type of work to be performed and conditions in the labour market.
• Allowing for change of employers within certain limits.
• Avoiding creating conditions (i.e. imposing forced savings schemes, employment of cheap labour though trainee schemes) which will motivate migrants to opt for irregular status.

Remittances are the raison d'être of most circular migration. Best practice in both origin and destination countries involves educating migrant workers and potential migrant workers about all of the alternatives for sending money home and above all the making available of lower cost and more secure options. The sending country can support this by encouraging national and other banks from the home country establishing low cost channels for remittances and setting up establishments in the major destinations to facilitate sending money back. Particular notice should be taken of new low cost alternatives including cell-phone based remittances (World Bank 2006: 150). Familiarising migrant workers with remittance systems and involving them in them can be their first step toward “financial literacy” and involvement in the formal financial system which can be of help to them in the future (Terry and Wilson 2005).

One dimension of international temporary labour migration which is often overlooked is the social costs which are endured by the migrant and their family by extended separation (Hugo 2004). There may be a role for governments of sending countries in ameliorating the social costs on the family that remain behind. At present it is the extended family, community solidarity and NGOs that provide support; however, governments may also be able to play a role. Although sending governments can play a role in the protection and support of circular migrants in other countries, the migrant experience in destinations is influenced more by employers, governments and society in those destinations. Governments play a central role because they set the conditions under which migrant workers can enter their country and the rights, access to services and obligations which they have while in the country.

An important element in best practice of destination countries involves the setting up and administration of regulation of employers of circular migrants. Best practice here seems to involve granting special status to employers who have a good reputable history of abiding by regulations and fairness in dealing with migrants. This status involves less complex application for workers and reporting. However, for other employers inspection and full compliance with regulations is necessary. Moreover, employers that repeatedly fail to meet the requirements of regulations should be banned from employing circular migrants. Best practice involves adopting a system of labour inspections to meet the specific problems of migrant workers.

Return to the home country is a fundamental characteristic of circular migration and can be crucial in determining the extent of the developmental impact of that migration. The destination country is involved to the extent that it can facilitate the termination of work and travel to the homeland to be as secure and inexpensive as possible. In some contexts of Indonesians in Malaysia employers refuse to pay the full wages (some of which are often retained by the employer) or to return their passport.
without payment. The imposition of unauthorised charges on accommodation, transport etc. is also common at this stage. In cases where the migrant workers have been contributing to compulsory (or voluntary) pension schemes full portability is best practice. It has been known that criminals cluster in transport points and border crossing areas to prey on returning migrant workers so it is imperative to provide secure passage in such situations.

Nevertheless, it is predominantly the responsibility of the origin country and the community to provide the context in which the returning migrant worker can have maximum impact on local, regional and national development. As is the case with destination countries, facilitating the safe and free return to the home community is an important part of best practice. However, this is not always the case. In Indonesia, for example, legal labour migrants are compelled to return through infamous Terminal 3 at the Jakarta airport. Here they are subject to a number of imposts, official and unofficial (Silvey 2004). They are compelled to return to their home area using a sanctioned carrier at an inflated price. Such practices are to be deplored and best practice would instead facilitate a speedy and safe return to the home area.

Another element relates to the interpretation of the “temporariness” of circular migration. Most programs have a maximum time that a worker can work at the destination under a contract before returning home. Some allow one renewal of a contract without returning but most insist on return after the initial contract time expires. Thus regulations can have the effect of migrant workers “running away” from their employer and becoming undocumented because they fear that they will not have access to jobs in the destination in the future. It would seem to be best practice to facilitate return or repeat labour migrations. In the case of the New Zealand RSE Scheme it seems that the majority of the initial group of seasonal migrant workers will be, or have been, offered second year contracts. Clearly in that case, many employers see the continuity as beneficial because the workers have acquired the appropriate skills, attitudes to work, local knowledge etc. The idea of temporary labour being a more or less permanent strategy (at least for the key younger working ages) for many low-skilled Asia-Pacific migrants needs to be investigated. Potentially, at least, it would seem to have advantages for the migrant in that they have an assured source of income for longer than a couple of years. It also provides a greater opportunity for training than would be the case in a one-off labour migration. Also, the employer gains continuity and a greater degree of experience and skill which provides productivity dividends. And finally, the origin benefits, in that there is a greater flow of remittances and potentially a chance to improve the stock of human resources skills through extra training of migrants.

In addition it may have compliance implications because it reduces the number of runaways because the migrant worker can be assured of access to work in the destination over an extended period while remaining within the legal system.

Ruhs (2006: 30) has pointed out a temporary labour migrant program can never give an upfront guarantee or even raise the expectation that a worker admitted under the program will eventually and inevitably acquire the right to permanent residence in the destination. However this does not “preclude the possibility that the host country might facilitate a strictly limited and regulated transfer of migrants employed as TMPs into permanent residence based on a set of clear rules and criteria”. Clearly a sound migration policy should comprise a judicious mix of both permanent and temporary migration possibilities.

**Conclusion**

Circular migration is increasingly being seen by sending countries, receiving countries and multilateral migration and development agencies as a desirable mobility strategy. However policy development in this area is being carried out with little assistance from evidence of the nature, significance and effects of the phenomenon. Accordingly, Vertovec (2006: 44) rightly concludes his careful analysis of circular migration on a strong role of caution:

For sending countries, receiving countries and migrants themselves, mutual gains may indeed be had if circular migration policies become manifest. Moreover, as recent policy
documents suggest, circular migration policies might positively contribute to tackling challenges around economic development, labour shortages, public opinion, and illegal migration. Yet when considering anything – particularly an approach to global policy – that portends to be a kind of magic bullet, caution should certainly be taken. The “wins” of the win-win-win scenario may not be as mutual as imagined.

Yet this caution must be equally exercised by the opponents of circular migration as it should by the proponents. There is strong evidence that circular migration can have positive effects on development in the origin. However the fact is that these impacts do not occur as a matter of course. Indeed in many contexts they are not felt, or hardly at all. For development dividends and poverty reduction effects to be achieved and maximised in Asia and the Pacific, a major improvement in the governance of circular migration systems will be required. There is an urgent need for the reform of these systems and to achieve this will not be easy.

More or less effective circular migration systems exist in most OECD countries, but they apply largely to highly skilled workers. One of the features of their immigration systems over recent years has been the introduction of “skill friendly” visa and immigration regimes which facilitate the coming and going of skilled workers. However, few countries extend this to lower skilled workers. Yet the reality of emerging labour demands in ageing OECD workforces is for a mix of higher and lower skilled workers. The extent of such demands needs to be definitively established and migration regimes put in place which match those needs. Most contemporary high income societies with low fertility and ageing populations are likely to need immigration policies which enhance both permanent and temporary movement of both skilled and unskilled workers.

Circular migration is certainly not a development “silver bullet”. It is no substitute for sound economic policy, good governance and progressive human resource policies in origin countries. However, it can be a positive contribution to improving the lives of people in low-income nations and gaining a more nuanced and deeper understanding of how this occurs in an important research priority.

References


The political and cultural landscape of Europe is constantly undergoing changes. The speed with which they come into effect continues to increase, with the transformation itself leaving its mark on almost every aspect of the everyday life of the population of the united continent. The continued internal economic, social and political integration of the European Union is systematically abolishing the barriers that stand in the way of the free and unobstructed flow of human capital from one member state to the other. This leads many to conclude that any remaining cultural restrictions will share the same fate and finally cease to exist as well.

Meanwhile, migration research definitely distinguishes between internal and international migration. This approach was introduced not long after the publication of Ravenstein's seminal work in 1885. The end result is the formation of a clear dichotomy in the analysis of the migration process; separate and often divergent theories pertaining to both internal and international migration continue to emerge, the terminology and methodology of the analyses tend to differ somewhat, and varying determinants are judged crucial depending on the vantage point each theory assumes (Korcelli 1994). One case that attests to the validity of this rule is when political borders become a more significant obstacle to migration than the internal administrative borders that exist within each country, which is indeed true with the great majority of international borders. And yet, in the case of the European Union, this assumption is constantly losing ground, as a result of gradual changes in border regimes. Dividing the analysis of migration into the two aforementioned categories not only fails to bring anything new into the picture, but is also a road to nowhere in that it interferes with
any attempt to draw panoptical conclusions about the migration phenomenon (Skeldon 2006). Yet another inhibiting factor that prevents a coherent and comprehensive analysis is the tendency, quite commonly espoused in social sciences, to factor out and separately examine urbanization-related processes, which can also be considered an example of internal migration.

There are countless similar ostensible dichotomies to be found in the analysis of migrational processes. Graeme Hugo, in the study contained in this volume, expounds on the relative insignificance of the differences between long-term and short-term migration, but in spite of the proof he offers, their analysis has remained separate in most investigations to date. The same issues can also be raised concerning other typically binary constructs such as legal and illegal migration, immigration- and emigration-states, or the feeling of a national and patriotic connection to the country of origin or destination in question, which frequently becomes problematic in the case of the transnational identities of migrants trying to grasp the best of both worlds (Garapich 2006). The aim of this study is to provide an outline of the reasons, mostly but not only of a geographical nature, for which the internal and international migration that occurs within the European Union should be investigated and scrutinized jointly.

Joint Migration Analysis in Research to Date

Most of the early works on migration, including Ravenstein’s famous Laws of Migration (1885), treated migration trends as a coherent whole. In the search for universal motives and barriers to migration, international borders weren’t taken into account as determinants of migration. The turn of the century, however, brought with it an entirely new and authoritative conviction, one which remains in the forefront and in force even today and which unofficially enforces the split analysis of suburbanization processes, other forms of internal migration and international migration. The foundation of this approach was the assumption that the analysis of internal and external migration should not be carried out jointly due to their divergent nature, varying determining factors and implications.

Nonetheless, the 20th century was witness to numerous publications on migration, up to and including studies written by esteemed researchers, publications which contained a high degree of similarity in the analytical approach to the internal and international processes, some even going so far as to explicitly treat migrations as a unified body. Comparative empirical studies that weigh different types of migration against each other and attempt to determine the points at which they converge are in turn extremely hard to come by (Korcelli 1994).

Among the most representative works belonging to this category is Lee’s well-known dissertation (1966), in which it is argued that the age-old decision to move away from a standardized and unified approach to migratory flows is erroneous. In his study on the relationship between internal and external migrations (1994), Korcelli hypothesizes that one is a substitute for the other and that an increase in the volume of one is usually accompanied by an analogous decrease in that of the other. Similar observations, albeit somewhat as an offshoot of the main line of thought, have been offered by Korcelli, Gawryszewski and Potrykowska (1992) in a joint effort that analyzed varying internal migrations within the borders of Poland as opposed to their international equivalents. Skeldon (2006) in turn concludes that in spite of the conspicuous differences between the two classes of migration, only a joint approach is capable of explaining those international migratory currents which stem from internal migrations and, conversely, the domestic migrations whose roots lie in large-scale transnational movements. Gaag and Wissen (2001) note the clear correlation between the underlying causes of long-distance internal movements and those that involve crossing national borders. Willekens (1995) believes the two sets of coexisting migration theories do not differ by a margin great enough to render a joint, singular analysis of the totality of migrational phenomena impossible. This assumption allows us to infer that bridging the gap between the above-mentioned investigations is indeed both possible and feasible.

In one of his earlier dissertations (1983), Willekens observes that researchers tend to categorize migrations as they see fit, attributing limitations of time and space to a process which in reality constitutes a continuum. From the point of view of a migrant
and the factors that determine his transfer from one location to another, what is the difference between a 364- and 367-day stay outside his country of residence? After all, were we to follow the classification agreed upon by the United Nations and in full effect in some European countries (Bell 2003), the former would be considered a temporary migration, whereas the latter would be understood as permanent. In reality, however, we are dealing with two movements that are very much alike. The same arguments can be brought forth when discussing subjectively instituted spatial boundaries in classifying migration. Clark (1982) notes that migration is a continuous process and that its archetypal division into the external, internal and suburban branches is largely artificial. Simply entering or leaving the confines of a city, region or province while migrating doesn’t necessarily imply a significant change in the motivation underpinning the decision to migrate in the first place. According to Clark, emphasizing international migration in an analysis only makes sense if the movement in question takes place between uni-national, culturally homogeneous states because their political borders simultaneously demarcate the far reaches of their cultural areas. It is vital to stress the implications of this assumption: political boundaries constitute serious migrational barriers not due to their mere existence, but rather exclusively when they play the dual role of cultural boundaries as well. A clear exception to this proposal of Clark’s might be a situation in which border-crossing restrictions are introduced by the state.

Pryor’s body of work (e.g. 1985) can without a doubt be considered a shining example of those publications which explicitly and unambiguously reaffirm the need for joint migrational analysis. Pryor specifically insisted that transposing certain regularities in internal migration to the realm of international migration may yield priceless crops in the form of valuable and far-reaching conclusions and, in the long run, lay the foundations for a theory of higher consequence, one that would encompass a whole new range of wider phenomena. Jagielski (1974) plainly and firmly contends that taking separate approaches to the two types of migration in question is groundless and in fact has an adverse effect on the coherence of the analysis. The example cited by Jagielski is – *nomen omen* – the European Economic Commu-

**Barriers to Migration – Theoretical Standpoint**

Both internal and international migrations face a plethora of barriers. Though their existence is commonly accepted as fact, it is – paradoxically – often completely disregarded in the strictly theoretical sense. For instance, the classical macroeconomic theory of migration states that barriers to migration do not exist (Arango 2000, Janicki 2007). The neoclassical theory endorses the concept of the exclusive effect of labor markets on migration, though in one of its numerous interpretations, devised by Todaro (1976), one potential obstacle is the unlikelihood of finding employment in the prospective country of destination.

However, there exist plenty of theories that do not neglect the role of barriers to migration, including Lee's prominent theory of intervening obstacles (1966), whose very name implies the existence of barriers. The personal psychological limitations and dilemmas of the potential migrant are also frequently classified as such and often relate to the burden inherent in leaving one's home and taking up residence in a new, sometimes alien sociocultural environment (Fevre 1998). Meanwhile, geographical theories seek to identify migrational barriers in the territorial diversity of the geographical environment, with special emphasis placed on distance as one of the most significant examples thereof. In the basic version of Ravenstein's theory (1885), which itself is based on the concepts laid out by the science of social physics, space is the only limiting factor that hinders migration;
four out of the seven laws formulated on the basis of the theory include the word “distance”.

The models of migration whose goal it is to explain migratory flows within a given geographical area usually take barriers to migration into account. Distance, social, ethnocultural, psychological and administrative barriers are all among the most commonly cited examples. All but those belonging to the last category are frequently given the all-encompassing term “distance” due to the fact that studies on migration tend to have an ambiguous understanding of the concept. It may be physical distance, perceived as a straight line or, in some cases, as the cumulative cost and duration of the journey, which additionally acknowledges the existence of territorial obstacles such as the physicality of the terrain (Jagielski 1974, Mazurkiewicz 1986). Its impact on migration is then understood as a rise in transport-related expenses and greater difficulty in communication, that is to say, the spread of information. One can also speak of cultural distance, exemplified by cultural and linguistic discrepancies, as well as distance as the psychological toll of remoteness from one’s family and friends, not to mention social and other forms of distance (Sjaastad 1962, Greenwood 1975, Shaw 1975). The interpretation of the effect of distance on the volume of migration is nevertheless quite similar in all the cases cited above: the intensity of migratory currents is inversely proportional to the costs incurred by migration, or in other words, to the distance between the components of the system in question (Gober-Meyers 1978). This relation has been given the term “distance resistance” (Rykiel 1989). Were we to adhere to this line of thought, all the aforementioned barriers could be tagged as functional distance, understood as a level of indifference of particular elements in an analyzed system (cost, time, culture etc.) (see also Brown, Odland, Golledge 1970).

Quite obviously, national boundaries whose crossing requires the braving of several significant geophysical obstacles do exist. Surmounting these difficulties extends the duration of the given migration and can be seen as a migrational barrier that distinguishes international and internal displacements. The China-Nepal and Argentina-Chile frontiers serve as a good illustration of this situation, because of the almost impermeable physical barriers of the Himalayas and the Andes respectively. Nonetheless, one can only state with conviction that the mere existence of international borders that simultaneously act as natural barriers for migration warrants a separate analysis of internal and international movements if it is proven beyond doubt that the said natural barriers constitute international borders more often than they do internal administrative boundaries. The available works on the subject do not allow us to corroborate or defend such a thesis (see Rykiel 2006). For instance, in migration that takes place between the European Union member states, even the Alps, the highest mountain range of the European continent, are not considered a major migrational obstacle. One can also cite numerous examples of mountain ranges whose importance as barriers is not only negligible at best, but which themselves are an invigorating factor in international relations with neighboring nations. The Tatra Mountains on the Polish-Slovakian border are a classic example of such a formation (Klima 1999, Janicki 2001).

Social and ethnocultural barriers are most frequently the subject of analyses of urban migration within the borders of a single city. Differences in the social status and affluence or financial viability of individuals can turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle when dealing with migration focused on different neighborhoods in the same city, much more so than in the case of different municipalities. The range of real-estate and property leasing prices is often much more varied within one city than between several, especially if the said city is fairly large and populous. Ethnocultural differences constitute a barrier quite akin to the lack of uniformity in prices. Sprawling, densely-populated metropolises often contain relatively self-contained, shut-off ethnic ghettos whose boundaries hinder the inter-neighborhood movement of migrants, such as London with its separated centers of Indian, Afro-Caribbean and Bangladeshi populations (Nagle, 2000), or suburban quarters of Paris (Kotosz, 2007). Crossing these barriers is not easy, but if managed, it is likely to trigger a snowball effect. Numerous publications indicate that a change in the ethnic or racial composition of the surroundings can spark substantial displacements (Long and Hansen 1979). The appearance of affordable public or subsidized multi-family
residential housing intended for low-income tenants in the vicinity also tends to provoke a sharp slump in real-estate prices in the surrounding area, as well as a rapid outflow of residents (Office… 2002).

The psychological barriers associated with migration are mostly derived from having to radically alter one’s social environment and abandon both family and friends. An additional cost is no doubt incurred when choosing the desired destination (Massey et al. 1993, Arango 2000). To cite Wolpert, “alternatives which minimize uncertainty are preferred” (1965: 136). Hence, if the migrant has a selection of potential destinations to choose from, he or she will be sure to take into account his or her level of familiarity with said locations. Given that we are usually most familiar with our immediate surroundings, it is easier to direct one’s attention to that specific locality and disregard the rest.

All the barriers examined above relate to voluntary migration. By contrast, the migration of refugees is usually driven by the vicinity of asylum. For the vast majority of refugees, neighboring countries are their destinations, and only a fraction of them seek asylum in developed countries (UNHCR, 2006).

### National Borders as Barriers to Migration

The main argument used by those who support the idea of split internal-international migration analysis is the assumption that international borders significantly impede migration and are therefore a barrier to this process. Due to their administrative, institutional nature and the relative instability of and difficulties in enforcing the rules and laws that govern their crossing, particularly by foreign nationals but also, albeit to a lesser extent, by autochthonous inhabitants, migration analysts treat them as a binary variable – their emergence as a factor on a given migratory route somewhat automatically brings about a deviation in the method and process of analysis. That the migrant in question has to cross the state border is supposed to affect and alter both the underlying motives for migration and its determining factors, in addition to the attitude towards both migratory flows as a whole and the migrants themselves, individuals who are often treated quite unlike the regular population of the country of destination. Verifying this statement should allow us to formulate a conclusion regarding the rationality and viability of joint or separate migratory studies.

Additional arguments for maintaining the dichotomy of internal-international migration studies may be found in the research methodology of recent decades, taking the population of a given country, often simplistically named “a nation”, as the most obvious, “natural” unit of analysis. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) in their paper managed to discover temporal and spatial parallels between the building process of nation states and the creation and implementation of migration research policies founded on this methodological nationalism. This approach has resulted in collecting separate data on both types of migration (see Hugo’s paper contained in this volume), which further implies separate examination. A critique of methodological nationalism, to date central in geographical, sociological and anthropological research on migration, may be found in Szalo’s work contained in this volume.

Nonetheless, the national boundary can beyond any reasonable doubt constitute a solid barrier against migration. This is particularly noticeable in countries whose governments have adopted a selective and highly restrictive migratory policy. Based on the above, it should be natural to assume that international migratory flows will be significantly smaller than internal displacements that possess similar characteristics, specifically those that involve having to cover a comparable distance without encountering obstacles in the form of state borders. In other words, a separate approach to the two types of migration is rationalized if the national boundary precludes or sharply restrains the influx and outflow of migrants. Figure 1 gives a theoretical, graphic representation of the above deliberations in an ideographic way.
The complexity of the migratory process prevents us from being able to provide a conclusive and definitive answer to the question alluded to above without resorting to meticulous and entirely separate analyses of each of the most significant factors that determine migration. No doubt there are some that undergo gradual changes, independently of crossing national borders. Physical distance, and consequently the duration of the journey, as well as the lack of border control within the Schengen zone, is one representative example.

The issue of transportation costs is more ambiguous. The crossing of some state borders incurs greater financial costs, which stem from the differences in the price of public and private transportation or gas between neighboring states. On the other hand, the transport of migrants from the high-cost to the low-cost country understandably benefits them by lowering overall transport costs relative to internal migration within the confines of a state where transportation is expensive. This means that the greater the barrier to migration in one direction, the easier it becomes to migrate in the other. In the European Union’s case, the difference in transport costs between individual member states is in most cases (excluding the juxtaposition of EU-15 and EU-12 countries) relatively minor in comparison to other international structures that exist throughout the world. This in turn allows us to view transport costs as a factor that changes with distance gradually rather than abruptly.

Ambiguity also arises when contemplating the way international borders affect another very important migration-determining factor, namely the state of the labor market in the area in question. The degree of difficulty in finding a job following a move from one region to another as opposed to an international migration is almost impossible to estimate in an objective and unbiased fashion. Aside from the differing unemployment rates of the country of origin and of destination, factors such as laws regarding the employment of foreign nationals, the social and societal acceptance of foreigners and the resulting willingness of employers to hire incoming immigrants, as well as linguistic barriers and many other elements come into play here. Though most of these seem to favor separate internal-international migration analyses, the sociopolitical reality of the European Union is also fickle, dynamic and constantly fluctuating, prone to rapid changes. The attainability of work in a different EU member state than one’s own grows with time; conversely, the laws regarding permanent residence in the country of destination become more relaxed. The movements of retired migrants and those approaching retirement, movements generally stimulated by the freedom to claim benefits regardless of one’s place of residence, accurately illustrate the diminishing significance of national borders as a factor inhibiting migration.

The ethnocultural barrier is decidedly the most substantial of those mentioned, at least for the majority of migrants (excluding highly skilled professionals). Entering a new national reality usually involves a substantial shift in the cultural and linguistic landscape of the migrant’s surroundings, and the lack of knowledge of the customs, language and cultural intricacies of the potential target country is considered to be one of the greatest migrational barriers (Kupiszewski 2001). The difference between internal and
external migration in the framework of social and ethnocultural barriers is quite clear in that countries vary to a greater extent than regions of one country.

The European Union’s case seems to differ substantially from the generalized scenario outlined above. There are many situations in which international migration does not involve passage into a different linguistic or cultural zone, whilst internal movement does indeed. Crossing the Franco-Belgian, British-Irish, German-Austrian or Belgian-Dutch border signifies a transnational migration into a linguistically similar area. If we were to take into account the innumerable ethnic minorities that often abound around borders, the examples given earlier would be supplemented by the Swedish-Finnish, German-Belgian, Austro-Italian, Slovak-Hungarian and Franco-German borders at the very least. It is also worth noting that areas that exhibit similar tendencies exist outside the peripheral zones of the EU, the two clearest, though of course not the only examples being the border between Romania and Moldavia and between Ukraine and Russia.

Yet, a journey that begins in northern Belgium and ends in the state’s southernmost regions is only officially a case of internal migration, possessing as it does all the makings of transnational migration; this is because it involves entering a completely distinct linguistic and cultural area. This case can be argued in many more instances, including on the boundaries that separate England and Scotland, in northeastern Spain and in Switzerland, a country without formal EU membership where the boundaries of linguistic regions denote serious migratory obstacles (Kupiszewski et al. 2000). The borders between areas whose inhabitants share a common language are less clearly defined, but the differences in regional dialects or in local touches to the literary language allow easy identification of national migrants from outside the region they chose as their destination point. Whenever such a situation arises, it carries the threat of spurring the “Us vs. Them” syndrome and a feeling of exclusion, alienation and rejection within the migrants’ new surroundings (Durrell 1995; see also R. Klvanova’s dissertation relating to J. Alexander’s papers, in this volume). This effect was observed with particular intensity in the newly-reunited Germany of 1990, which was in part a side effect of the high expectations associated with the fusing of the two estranged German states, expectations that went mostly unfulfilled. Germany is among the most diverse European nations in terms of the wealth of its accents and regional dialects (e.g. the Austro-Bavarian and Low Saxon varieties). Other countries that boast an eclectic array of highly varied regional dialects or local varieties of the leading language include Great Britain (Scottish Gaelic, Irish), the Netherlands (Flemish, Limburgish, Frisian), Italy and, to a lesser degree, France (Professor R. Szul, private conversation).

The examples mentioned above suggest the possible relative insignificance of the differences between internal and international migration in the specified areas. Nevertheless, even in the European Union’s case, the great majority of international borders constitute ethnocultural barriers, hence the need to point to those as the most significant of all the barriers analyzed in this study until now. This fact does not seem to rule out the possibility of jointly analyzing the migrational dichotomy that forms the basis of this work. As time passes, the barrier becomes progressively more blurred due to the increased mobility of the population of the EU member states.

That said, it would be interesting to note the relationship between and possible interchangeability of the political barrier, one which implies a certain ethnocultural differentiation between the residents living on both sides of it, and the previously mentioned barrier of physical distance. Would covering a great distance inside a given country be connected with a greater psychological burden on the migrant than covering a small distance internationally, or the other way around? Would a Frenchman residing in Strasbourg suffer lower psychological costs by moving to the nearby German state of Rhineland-Palatinate or to faraway Brittany, distant but still French? Would a Polish citizen from Zgorzelec find it easier to make the migrational transition by heading to the twin city of Görlitz or to Warsaw? Everything seems to suggest that the physical proximity of friends and family can play a more vital role than living in the same country but at a great distance from each other. The national border as a barrier is upstaged here by the physical distance barrier. Proof of this statement can be found in the existence of numerous border
regions with greater transnational population exchange with a province outside the country than with its own neighboring regions, two prominent cases in point being the northeastern regions of France and southeastern Great Britain (Rees et al. 1999). In view of all the above, the debated separate study of internal and international migration in the European Union becomes progressively more unwarranted.

**National Policy vs. Intensity of International Migration**

All of the aforementioned migratory barriers are, despite occupying a commanding position in empirical analyses, reduced to relative insignificance when compared to administrative barriers, which have also been designated institutional barriers in some studies. Their existence and degree of influence depends primarily on the political system. Totalitarian regimes go to great lengths to limit the outflow of their population to a minimum by constantly and tightly monitoring both emigration and immigration, restricting access to the permits needed to leave the country. Highly developed democratic states possess a complex system of laws and policies that act as a form of migration control or buffer, the prime example being common visa law (Karras and Chiswick 1999).

Assuming that a country’s national policy supersedes other variables in the freedom of international migration of both its own citizens and foreigners alike, economic, social and psychological barriers are secondary in relation to administrative and political limitations; the former only come into effect and begin to play a significant role once the latter are reduced and/or eliminated. The opposite is also true: newly created administrative restrictions, often grounded in politics, reduce the significance of socioeconomic barriers to nil, an almost textbook example of which was the radical change in Western European population flows following the 1973–1974 global oil crisis (Serrano Martinez 1998). The resulting transformation of the state border into an impermeable barrier to migration may be illustrated in a simple, graphic way in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. The state border as an impermeable barrier to migration.](image)

Source: Own work

Nevertheless, the very existence of institutional barriers is often ignored outright in studies on migrations, as politicizing the decision to further restrict or relax migration policy rules out the inclusion of this barrier as a predictable variable in any form of migration theory or model (Kupiszewski 2002). Migratory specifications are so volatile and change with such speed that even an authoritative and up-to-date comparison of border policy in the different countries of the European Union is next to impossible to carry out (Morris 2008). Furthermore, the state can exert an indirect influence on its migration levels without resorting to alterations in its migratory policy through modifying its policies regarding the granting of unemployment benefit to immigrants, for example.

Given the importance of the institutional barrier, the split analysis discussed in this study might be advisable if each member state were to enforce a separate migration policy for the remaining EU members, a policy different from the one enforced with respect to its own citizens. Though the European Union as a whole has not debated or drawn up any common definition of
the terms “migration” and “migrant”, each individual state possesses a profound understanding of their implications, acknowledging them and presenting them in a slightly different light each time (Kupiszewski 1996, Poulain 1996). While the movement of their own population and that of other member states is registered according to different criteria (Janicki 2006), restrictions to the free and uninhibited movement of people have gradually lost importance over the last years (Sinn 2000). Attempts have also been made to introduce common criteria in migration registration for all the countries of the European Union. Likewise, the disparity in the treatment of a country’s own citizens and other EU residents by the legislation that functions in each country belonging to the Union decreases over time (Szydłowska 2002). Council Directive 68/360 lifted the existing limitations on free movement and residence for workers and their families in the European Union, whilst EEC Regulation No 1612/68 states clearly that nationality cannot be a discriminating factor in the hiring and equal treatment of EU citizens in any area where EU laws apply. Foreign nationals cannot be expected to fulfill any additional requirements or criteria. The only circumstances that warrant a separate approach to individuals originating from different parts of the European Union are instances where public order, national security or public health are jeopardized (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2008). These regulations exemplify the continued process of internal integration among the European Union countries, which also applies to the standardization of the rules governing internal and international migration.

The ratification of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 can also be taken to constitute a step in the direction of reducing the gap between the national and regional border. The document lifted passport control at border checkpoints and made a series of declarations, on subjects such as the harmonization of international

1 According to information obtained during the international conference “Public Statistics in the European Integration Process, with a Focus on Transnational Areas” (Lublin, 22–24. 09. 2008) in the course of a discussion on the rules of registering migration, all international migrations in the European Union will be registered under a common set of guidelines starting January 2009.

border control and a common visa policy (Komisja Europejska 2008). The number of signatories of the Agreement continues to grow, which again indicates a further reduction of the internal-international dichotomy within the European Union. From the point of view of a potential migrant, therefore, international boundaries as an administrative barrier in the Schengen Area are ceasing to exist. Their complete eradication will become reality once free access to the labor markets of all the EU member states is granted to all EU citizens.

The ongoing development and cultivation of transborder cooperation between the members of the European Community is another factor suggestive of the mitigation of the constraining role of international borders in determining migratory flows between countries. Documents that have formed the foundation of and fostered collaboration include the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (the so-called Madrid Convention, 1980), the European Charter for Border and Cross-Border Regions (1981), the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985) and several other legal regulations (Office of... 2002).

Conclusions

One of the fundamental features of international migration is its forming a bridge between nations, whereby migrants wishing to enter a given country do not possess a set of rights and obligations identical to that of the said country’s permanent residents – and are therefore given different legal treatment (Bilsborrow et al. 1997). In light of the conclusions drawn up to this point, one can assert that the discernible differences between internal and international migration within the European Union are currently minuscule and that their significance continues to dwindle. The character of transnational migration in the EU therefore places it on a continuum somewhere between typical international migrations and internal movements.

The European Union is a confederation of autonomous states that have handed over part of their jurisdiction to the administrative structures of the EU. Though the range of these
responsibilities is enhanced with each passing year, in view of the low popularity of Churchill’s concept of a federally integrated United States of Europe, it is less than likely that international borders will simply cease to exist within the foreseeable future. Migration from one state to another will therefore technically remain an international phenomenon, but will in reality converge on internal migration. International boundaries will no longer be genuine barriers to migration, but rather indicators of entering a different cultural and linguistic zone, at least for EU nationals. However, the scarcity of empirical studies that would support or reject this postulated joint migration analysis compels caution in formulating unambiguous declarations (Janicki and Kubik-Komar 2007).

All of the information and examples given above hint that the dogmatic reliance on dividing internal and international migration analysis is in most cases unnecessary and unfounded. Instead, it would be better to argue that there are areas where, due to the existence of significant institutional and political barriers, jointly analyzing the two categories in question would be counterproductive, as well as others where a dogged insistence on splitting the dichotomy could have an adverse effect on the results of the investigation. Within the European Union, in the face of both continued economic and political unification and increasingly integrated migration policies, the concurrent analysis of internal and international migration is a premise to be pursued.

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Bell, M. 2003. Comparing Internal Migration Between Countries: Measures, Data Sources and Results. Paper presented during the conference of the Population Association of America, Minneapolis.


Articles in this book clearly show the significance of looking for new research topics and questions that reflect the diversification and ramifications of migratory types and the changing nature of social reality towards greater mobility, and the tendency of social actors to organize their lives and activities across borders of nation states. The book contributes to interdisciplinary discussion on theorizing and researching contemporary migration events departing from current paradigm shifts in migration studies that question established conceptual, analytical and methodological approaches. This shift challenges established boundaries, whether those between social and analytical categories (e.g. settled/mobile people, temporary/permanent immigrants) or methodological approaches and disciplines. We have pointed out that social scientists should reflect on and rethink the boundaries used in the research on migration and should avoid reifying them. Boundaries and borders should not be taken for granted in migration research. They should rather be treated as one among other socially constructed phenomenon and their significance should be determined in the process of analysis.

Context sensitive theorizing is an important strategy to deal with this issue and it is one of the important features of the chapters in this volume. The papers have been based on up-to-date and highly analytically relevant empirical cases, written by authors sharing a belief that context sensitive migration research frameworks could generate better insight into contemporary migration events. This approach does not only have value for academic work, but could perhaps also lead to better policymaking reflecting the character of lives of many migrants nowadays.

The contributions to this book, written by both renowned scholars and young doctoral candidates from various social
science backgrounds, is another step forward towards promoting critical and reflexive interdisciplinary research on migration. Despite the differences in the perspectives of each discipline, it seems to be possible to find not only common points of interest for academic research, but also common concepts or interpretative frames. As a result, it is possible to jointly contribute to uncovering the migration mosaic of individual stories and motivations, but also various interests and policies. In turn, we will gain a better understanding of the complexity of migration processes. The concept of transnationalism and related critiques of methodological nationalism represent in our view one of the most inspiring theoretical and methodological directions in migration studies facilitating a common basis for a multi- and interdisciplinary approach.

We have pointed out that that transnational paradigm poses a particular challenge for migration theorizing, researching and policymaking that are closely interlinked and still to a large extent dominated by the assumptions of methodological nationalism. Although this rather obsolete view of migration issues has long passed its warranty period, it still strongly influences not only migration research but mainly migration policies that are formed and put into practice on a national level. An emphasis should be put on careful analysis of the ways research results inform policymaking. Accordingly, we have proposed the importance of critical evaluation of politicization of migration research agendas that are often under the influence of national paradigms. The examination of the practices that transform an event into a research topic and the interests that stand behind it are fundamental parts of critical migration research. Researchers themselves do not stand outside such analysis. There exist several research interests and these should be uncovered and made as explicit as possible. Those themes will be addressed at our next multidisciplinary conference. We hope that their conclusions and contributions will provide an inspiring basis for the next book.

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BOUNDARIES IN MOTION
Rethinking Contemporary Migration Events

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