CHAPTER SEVEN

MINORITY RECOGNITION IN NATION-STATES—THE CASE OF SILESIANS IN POLAND

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Introduction

Ethnic issues have always been at the top of the agenda of many countries hosting significant numbers of minorities, as ethnic differences quite often cause tensions among these groups. Establishing responsible and farsighted policies to create favourable environments for the co-existence of these groups with respect to cultural differences has been an important element of good governance. Great Britain having implemented its multiculturalism and *communautarisme* policies may be referred to as an example (Parzymies 2005, Janicki 2007). However, in some countries other approaches have been applied. In these cases, minority groups have been kept under the control of the dominating *ethnos*¹, which curbs any activity leading to possible improvement of the political position of minorities, as in case of Myanmar’s attitude towards their ethnic Karen minority (Delang 2003). Poland, on the other hand, seems to have introduced yet another approach—denying recognition of some minority groups in order to avoid a “minority problem”.

A state, as a political territorial organisation of a particular community, needs to derive its legitimisation from features that distinguish it from other states. The most apparent such feature is a separate nation (Wnuk-Lipiński 2004). Consequently, nation-states are territorial entities providing exclusive geographical space for cultural, ethnic or political communities called nations. This implies that, in the world of nation-

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¹ *Ethnos* is understood further in the paper as a neutral notion addressing a group identified on the basis of ethnic features, without attempting to attribute a particular status (national, ethnic, ethnographic or any other) to the group.
states, nations should be awarded the right to their own geographical and political space in the form of states, or at least the right to autonomy. Hence, recognition of another nation in the nation-state is often believed to be an insidious step. Yet, denial of recognition must be based on firm grounds, otherwise the vague boundary between lawful operation and discrimination on the basis of ethnic belonging may be crossed. In nation-states all state institutions are expected to secure the development of the dominating nation, often neglecting the needs of minorities (Zwoliński 2005). There is, therefore, an urgent need to address the issue of the recognition of Silesians, the largest officially unrecognised ethnos in Poland, since in present-day Europe there should be no room for discrimination of minorities (Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union 2000, art. 21).

This paper draws upon information from a variety of primary and secondary sources which include, among others, academic articles by political geographers, sociologists, political scientists, ethnographers, historians and linguists. Polish legal acts concerning the minorities are also analysed. In light of these analyses, the results of the last Polish national census of 2002 are presented and commented upon. In addition, interviews with Silesians and with activist-members of one of the Silesian ethnic societies provide valuable additional support. The latest sources provided information concerning Silesian self-perception, language use, attitude towards Poles and Poland, daily life of Silesians, their cultural activity and many other aspects of life. Comments upon the usual interpretation of historical facts associated with Silesia, based on the individual experiences of interviewees, shed new light on some events in the history of the region.

**Ethnic structure before 2002**

Until the population census of 2002, the 1921 census was the only one which had directly asked about nationality. All successive post-war censuses of 1950, 1960, 1970, 1978, and 1988 avoided this question, as according to the official interpretation, Poland was a one-nation state. Because of the lack of direct data about ethnic nationalities, the ethnic structure of these time periods can only be estimated with the use of indirect information. In some cases, doing so is quite reasonable—many East Orthodox inhabitants of the eastern borderland were properly suspected to be of Belarusian nationality and theoretical support for such assumptions was extensive (Chałupczak, Browarek 1998). However, there exist groups where no unambiguous criterion may be applied. As a result,
reliable information does not exist and the estimates used vary greatly. This is particularly so for the number of ethnic Silesians who were not considered a national minority, and their population can only be estimated without straightforward criteria. As a result, figures have varied from 600-800 thousand (according to interviewed activists of “The Movement for Autonomy of Silesia”, MAS), through 1.4 million (Wyderka 2004, Nijakowski 2004), 1.6 million (Kijonka 2004), to well over two million (Heffner 1999).

The above numbers need further comment. In most cases, activists of almost any organisation tend to overestimate the number of people who belong to the group they represent in order to increase their own importance and to get more attention from the authorities and the media. Yet in the case of the Silesians, this estimate is the lowest. In regard to the estimate of 1.4 million, the figure was presented independently by two researchers who represent two different academic fields (history and sociology) and who both consider approximately 30 per cent of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia to be autochthonous inhabitants of Silesia (although the sociologist Nijakowski (2004) emphasises that only part of these people feel Silesian). The estimate of two million, on the other hand, by a political geographer, includes all the inhabitants of the central industrial part of Upper Silesia who feel different from the Polish nation (Heffner 1999). The vast majority of them are undoubtedly Silesian.

**Ethnic structure according to 2002 Census**

All the figures cited above become extremely important when compared with the results of the 2002 census. In this census—which was the first in eighty years to ask about ethnic nationality—the total number of people who declared a non-Polish nationality reached 447 000—which is not even half of the estimate of national and ethnic groups made by researchers which was usually put at around a million (Chałupczak, Browarek 1998). It is important to note, however, that the largest non-Polish national group were not the Germans (ranked second, with about 153 000 declarations), but the Silesians, with a figure of 173 200 (see Tab. 7-1).
### Tab. 7-1 Minorities in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>37700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemko</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsy / Roma</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaite</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silesian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashubian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not stated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>38.7 mln</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

In addition, as many as 774 900 respondents did not allocate themselves to any nationality. Since this group is far more numerous than any determined non-Polish nationality, and even larger than all minority groups added together, further investigation is crucial in order to determine the reasons behind such a large number of unstated nationality declarations and which nationalities may be attributed to these people.
First of all, it is worth emphasising that there is no reasonable motive for the ethnic Polish not to declare their Polish nationality in a free, democratic country where they constitute the great majority of the population. Conversely, minority group members may be afraid of declaring their true nationality (see Barwiński 2006). Thus, the discussed number may be referred to as a significantly increasing minority population within Poland. Secondly, a lack of information about nationality in the individual census questionnaire should, in a great majority of cases, reflect the actual lack of declaration. Although reasonable, this assumption needs further comment in regard to the 2002 census. Interviewed activists of MAS describe in detail a large number of situations that happened during the first four of the eight days of the census. All of these incidents were quite identical: the individuals’ own declarations of “Silesian” as nationality were written down on the datasheet in pencil (unlike all the other information which was completed in pen), or the declaration was rejected. When actuaries were asked for reasons for such behaviour, they answered that they had been verbally instructed to act in this way (for more information see www.raslaska.aremedia.net). According to MAS members, only half-way through the census did the situation change, when the private media in Tarnowskie Góry, a Silesian city, informed the local public about these unusual practices. After that, only a few more reports of such actions occurred.

In light of the situation described above, it seems reasonable to contest the conclusions included in the articles by Nijakowski and Łodziński (2003) who explained the lack of national declarations mostly physical absence during the census, and attributed uncertainty about declaration of nationality to about 40 thousand respondents in the whole country.

A number of conclusions may be drawn using the above information in a straightforward manner. First, determining the exact number of people declaring Silesian nationality continues to be problematic, because of the circumstances described above. Second, the number of not-stated-nationality declarations seems to include a significant proportion of Silesians whose declarations of “Silesian” as a nationality were rejected by actuaries. Third, the number of refused Silesian nationality declarations may be estimated at the number of registered Silesian declarations, as the change in registering procedure took place exactly in the middle of the census. Therefore, the number of people declaring Silesian nationality could reach a remarkable 350 thousand, which is exactly a quarter of
previous estimates by some researchers (see Wyderka 2004, Nijakowski 2004). This is striking, but the average proportion of pre-census approximations and census results for all minority groups in Poland computed on the basis of Tab. 1, amounts to 24.8 per cent. This cannot be considered a coincidence, as numbers in both columns are closely correlated (0.850, statistically significant at 0.01 level), showing the high quality of the estimations of proportions between numbers of different minority groups, although the overall number was overestimated fourfold.

Whatever the true number of Silesians living in Poland is, far more important is the fact that the 2002 Population Census was yet another official document that failed to adequately register, and therefore recognize, the Silesians as a non-Polish group. This was done in spite of the fact that O/IV/33 question of the census sheet precisely separated Polish and non-Polish nationality, and the latter was expected to be supplemented by a nationality declaration not chosen from any list. Refusal of the recognition of “Silesian” as a nationality imputes Silesians a nationality they claimed not to belong to.

Further evidence of this is found in the official census report on ethnic nationalities enumerating Germans in first position, while Silesians are referred to as being “another community” (Raport... 2003, 40). In light of this, further discussion in this article focuses on two issues: first, on the status of Silesians in Poland according to Polish researchers, based on discussion of the definition of a nation and second, Silesians’ status in the Polish legal system, as well as the reasons for the government’s refusal to recognize them.

A nation–Setting the background

Discussion concerning the definition of a nation and nation recognition criteria has been going on for as long as the existence of sociology of nationality as a scientific discipline. As almost every single approach is different from others, probably the only broadly acceptable statement is a thesis about the lack of a widely recognized definition of what constitutes a nation (Kwaśniewski 2004, Wódz & Wódz 2004). According to Seton-Watson (1977), most researchers look for criteria of a nation itself and national belonging, rather than for any precise definition. Worldwide, they recognise the existence of objective criteria (such as common history, culture, customs, and/or language) as well as subjective criteria, with self-consciousness as a leading choice.
Over the span of history, there has existed a noticeable tendency to choose and justify one out of the two possibilities outlined above—using the one which better explained and supported the right of a represented nation to its own territory, state and sovereignty. Weaker countries tend to prefer the objective criteria developed by Fichte—for instance, as when used to explain the justified struggle of Germans defeated in the early nineteenth century by the French. Militarily and politically stronger countries, on the other hand, would rather choose the subjective criteria proposed by Renan (1904)—evident in the reasoning for the French defeating the Germans. It seems to be clear each approach favours one group of countries and nations over another.

The traditional approach to national debate recognised a nation as an objectively existing social entity, deeply rooted in the culture of its members. According to this approach, it should be possible to unambiguously articulate whether a nation exists or not thanks to ethnographic, linguistic and other research. Some researchers believe a nation is a primeval concept resulting from ethnocentrism understood as growing ethnic nepotism toward extended kin, hence soundly interconnected with racial differentiation (van den Berghe 1981). Critique of this approach relies on the fundamental assumption, that biological differences between humans are too insignificant to allow us to distinguish varied races, hence there is no racial reference for ethnicity (see Cornell, Hartmann 1998). Much wider support was gained by Smith (1986) and his followers who define nation with the use of a list of its pre-defined attributes. According to this objectivistic approach, subjective declarations of members of a discussed group concerning their ethnic status do not influence the final verdict of whether a nation exists or not.

Opposing this is the subjectivistic attitude with an emphasis on the importance of common identity and the way a community defines it (see Weber 1964, Connor 1990, Connor 1994). This approach grants individual statements the right to create nations. It is worth mentioning that the nationality question may be answered by both members of a potential nation and other members of a society. The latter opinions may legitimise the first answer or reject it. Some authors point out the fact that this community is an “imagined community” (Hall 1992, Anderson 2006), in other words, it exists as long as its members believe they belong to it.

However, the scene of the debate is much wider than just a simple contradiction of objective versus subjective study. The institutional
approach perceives a nation as a social construct important for the existence of the state. Hence, the state itself, along with various political institutions, is ranked high in the creation, shaping and development of nations (Giddens 1987, Brubaker 1996). Instrumentalists set the starting point of the national debate at nationalism that is consequently held responsible for the creation of an ideological construct of a nation (Gellner 1983, Kedourie 1993, Anderson 2006). Yet another approach treats a nation as an outcome of processes of communication linking a particular community (Deutsch 1966). Constructivists argue that a nation is formed as a result of the creation of borders between social entities in people’s minds, hence national research should be focused on the processes of interaction that result in creation of separate identities (Barth 1998).

Each of the three briefly sketched groups of approaches to the concept of nation is the subject of discussion and controversy. Objectivists may be accused of creating a mechanistic algorithm where the final judgment depends on subjectively approved criteria, while Renan’s famous statement, that a nation is a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their neighbours (Davies 1981) provides one of the best examples of how flawed the subjectivistic concept of a nation can seem to be. Therefore, current attempts to define a nation more and more often involve the use of more than one theoretical framework, frequently linking concepts which, up to today, have been regarded as contradictory.

**Outline of the history of Silesia**

As history is commonly perceived as one of the objective criteria justifying the existence of nations, the historical relationship between Poland and Silesia needs at least a brief analysis (see Tab. 7-2). It is important to note that Poland lost national control over Silesia in the mid-fourteenth century only to regain it over parts of the region after World War I. In the meantime, Silesian principalities were quasi-sovereign, dependent on Prussia, on the Hapsburg Empire, on Czechoslovakia and other political units. The first writings mentioning Silesians as a nation date back to the sixteenth century (Kwaśniewski 2004). During the mid-nineteenth century, political organisations uniting Silesians in their endeavours existed—some even aiming at full independency and the creation of a separate state—the Republic of Upper Silesia (Faruga 2004, Gorzelik 2004, Szczepański 2004). Even in the inter-war period, when parts of Silesia were incorporated into Poland, Silesians had their own
Parliament, with relatively wide local autonomy, and their Treasury was separated from the central Polish State Treasury (Szczepański 2004). In addition, in 1921 a party called “Upper-Silesian Unity” was created, aiming at waking up Silesian national awareness (Gorzelik 2004).

**Tab. 7-2. History of Silesia–selected facts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1163</td>
<td>beginning of political independence of Silesian principalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1348</td>
<td>Poland resigns from superiority over Silesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>last sovereign Silesian principality loses independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th century</td>
<td>beginning of Silesian Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th century</td>
<td>first written mention of the Silesian nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Silesian Parliament restored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>first of Silesian political organisations created (Union of Austrian Silesians, Vienna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 (December)</td>
<td>rise of a committee aiming at the creation of a free Silesian state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922 – 1939</td>
<td>Poland / Germany / Czechoslovakia; wide autonomy, local parliament, Silesian Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945 – 1956</td>
<td>labour camps and resettlement time; use of German banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 1956</td>
<td>large out-migration (till 1989 - nearly 1,2 million) and Polish in-migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to the present</td>
<td>part of Poland / Germany / Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There can be no doubt the history of Silesia does not mirror the history of Poland during many historical periods, when Silesians’ aspirations have clearly been opposite to those of the Poles—this being especially visible after World War 2 (Davies 1981, Nijakowski 2004). According to oral reports by interviewed autochthonous Silesians and activists of Silesian political or social movements, Nazi concentration camps located in Upper Silesia and liberated by allied armies, within months, became transformed into camps where new political prisoners were kept (see also Urban 1994). This time the Polish authorities imprisoned Germans along with Silesians who were not able to prove their Polish origins—a clearly pronounced Polish *Pater noster* was the test of being Polish. All Silesians who failed
to pass the test were co-identified with the hated Germans. The largest transit camps existed in Jaworzno, Oświęcim, Gliwice-Łabędy, Mysłowice, Łambinowice and Świętochłowice (see also Faruga 2004 and Nijakowski 2004), and prisoners were expelled to Germany or transferred to the Soviet Union (Faruga 2004). Testimony of surviving prisoner family members state that the Oświęcim camp existed more than two years and the last transit camp (Jaworzno) was finally closed down only in 1956. What is shocking to most Poles is that sometimes these post-war transit camps are referred to as “Polish concentration camps”, as Silesians were gathered (“concentrated”) there by the Polish authorities. However, in most cases this expression is completely misleading as it improperly suggests the Nazi (German) camps located on the territory of wartime Poland. Use of this expression was prohibited by Polish law in 1998 (Ustawa... 1998).

The more or less formal and institutional discrimination of Silesians induced emigration. It is estimated that the number of those who left Poland may be as high as 1.2 million between 1955 and 1989 and the most common destination was the Federal Republic of Germany (Szajnowska-Wysocka 2003). Immigration of Silesians to Germany was stimulated by the FRD governments, which considered Germans all those, who were born and lived within the 1937 borders of Germany, and granted immigrants significant institutional support (Jałowiecki 1996). Hence, Silesians inhabiting the pre-war Polish part of Silesia were not awarded the same rights. Evidently, economic differences between Poland and Germany increased the motivation for emigration. In summary, the driving factor was Silesian ethnic origin while economic divergence enhanced inclination towards emigration and the right place of birth facilitated it.

When talking about their history, many Silesians are especially embittered about the post-war period. They state that even those with a confirmed role in the Silesian uprisings after World War I and those persecuted by Germans during World War 2, but who considered themselves more Silesian than Polish, did not manage to avoid persecution in the post-war period and felt themselves to have become second-class citizens (Jestem... 2006). Many of these people perceive the actions of the consecutive Polish governments in carrying out the in-migration of ethnic Poles to Silesia (the so-called resettlement) as a clear and successful attempt to “dissolve” Silesians within the growing mass of the ethnically Polish population.
Yet in spite of these events, the vast majority of indigenous Silesians continue to live in the two administrative regions of Śląskie and Opolskie (see Fig. 7-1). However, the overwhelming character of the circles on the chart map is somewhat confusing. These two provinces altogether are inhabited by about 5.8 million people (Mały... 2003), hence Silesians make up 3-34 per cent of the population of these regions (depending on the estimated number of Silesians), with the most reliable figure at about 24 per cent (1.4 out of 5.8 million). In addition, surveys conducted in Upper Silesia in 1994 and in 1998 confirm the reliability of this rate: 27-27.5 per cent of respondents declared Silesian nationality, 0.5 per cent Silesian-Polish and another 0.5 per cent Silesian-German (Kwaśniewski 2004, Nijakowski 2004). Silesians interviewed have commented interestingly upon the numbers above:

“How shall I answer the question my kid keeps asking me: why is it allowed to be a Polish-Silesian, why is it allowed to be a German-Silesian and why it is not allowed to be a Silesian?”

Silesian identity is not tied to either the Polish or Czech part of historical Silesia. Research conducted abroad, as far away as Texas, has proved that even the fourth generation of emigrants use Silesian slang as a means of group identification (Szmeja 2000, Nijakowski 2004). Therefore, the identity belongs first to the group, only then to the territory. It seems to result from the borderland character of Silesia and constant changes of its political affiliation over centuries, when group members could be recognised through linguistic and cultural features and not through allegiance to any state. Further discussion on Silesian identity is conducted in Silesian self-consciousness section of this article.

\[2\] for more extensive comment on language issues see Language or dialect? section of the hereby paper
Fig. 7-1. Distribution of Silesians in Poland

Cultural distinctiveness?

Various sources state that, at least since the nineteenth century, local cultural movements existed within Silesia. One of their main aims was propagation of local culture, emphasising the difference of Silesia from Poland and Germany and waking up national awareness (Gorzelik 2004, Faruga 2004). The existence of such movements itself may be fully legitimately considered to be a proof of cultural differences among ethnoses inhabiting the area of Silesia, in the days when Silesia for the most part was Prussian. These differences were in quite a common way verified by everyday life, as Prussians used to call Silesians Wasserpollacken, which was a derogatory term translatable as “watered-down Poles” or “diluted Poles” (Faruga 2004, Simonides 2004). At the same time, the neighbouring Polish often perceived Silesians as being flattering and ingratiating to Germans. Therefore, on the social ladder, Silesians were placed in-between Germans and Poles.

Before World War I, Silesians inhabiting the present territory of Poland were strongly Germanised (Faruga 2004), and the period between world wars, when historical Silesia was divided among Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, remained in the memory of Silesian families as a time of Germanisation, Polonisation and Czechisation (Simonides 2004). Post-war history points to a further, intensive Polonisation of Silesians (Faruga 2004, Krawczyk 2004). Yet, what is probably most unexpected, is the present on-going process of so called soft Polonisation, as interviewed Silesians call it. Even today, Polish authorities at different levels still disturb Silesian cultural activities. One of the most striking recent examples concerns a radio debate on post-war Upper Silesia, in which a journalist who was about to lead the programme, was informed a few hours before the program that he would be forced off the air by external intervention (source: interview with the journalist himself; regional station: Radio Piekary 88.7 FM, date of cancelled programme: 8 April 2006). Local leaders also cite many other cases of harassment in propagating local culture, and a report concerning Poland, adopted by the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, calls such actions clear examples of indirect (structural, institutional) discrimination, obstructing equality through legal regulations and/or with the use of public institutions (Minority... 2001). It seems too obvious to question that the existence of actions leading to assimilation of any group, like the Polonisation of Silesians, is in itself, proof of the existence of differences between the groups.
Language or Dialect?

Language differences are commonly believed to be one of the most objective criteria of nation recognition. While this paper does not intend to discuss widely known cases of nations with multiple languages (the Swiss, the Belgians, the Canadians) or multiple nations using the same language (Portuguese and Brazilians) it is worth mentioning that a clear, commonly respected definition of a national language does not exist. Therefore, it is a matter of recognition based on subjectively approved and interpreted criteria whether the language that a particular national group uses earns the label of being a separate language or stays at the sub-level of a dialect. Consequently, subjective factors decide the criteria to be used to objectively judge the case of national belonging. In further considerations, the term: *ethnolect* will be used in order to avoid attribution of the particular status of language or dialect to the Silesian verbal code.

A great majority of Polish research reports conclude that Silesian is a dialect of the Polish language (Nijakowski 2004, Wyderka 2004). Some also claim that the lack of a codified, written version of the Silesian ethnolect and the fact that Silesians write in Polish, deprives this ethnolect of the right to language status (Nijakowski 2004). The lack of belles-lettres or specialist literature written in Silesian is treated as another proof, and newspapers published by Silesian organisations, folk stories and books with fairy tales available in many bookstores in the region do not influence this verdict. The experts reject Schwytzer Tütsch, spoken in Switzerland, as an example of a possible alternative interpretation. All attempts of Silesians to prove their ethnolect to be distinct from Polish are met with skepticism, and Silesians are regarded as desperately trying to prove their distinctiveness (see Faruga 2004). One of the most commonly used proofs is the fact that in the census of 2002, the number of Silesian language declarations (56.6 thousand) is far less numerous than the number of Silesian nationality declarations. Thus, researchers refer to the subjective census language declarations they rejected to acknowledge, as a reliable source of information on nationality. They also seem to disregard the fact that two autochthonous Silesians speaking their ethnolect can scarcely be understood by the Polish and cannot be understood at all by the Germans.

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3 effort of codification of the Silesian ethnolect has just been undertaken; for details see http://punasymu.com
Interviews conducted with autochthonous Silesians confirm that they use their ethnolect commonly in private and often in communication within the group in a public space. However, in schools, in state offices and during ceremonies in church Polish is almost exclusively spoken. Exceptions to this rule may be found mostly in small villages inhabited mostly by autochthonous Silesians. In shops, post offices and sometimes also in local state offices, Silesian was spoken when both parties of a conversation were aboriginal Silesians. When spoken in schools or other places, even during informal meetings, children were stigmatised for using Silesian, which gradually eliminated it from public space (see also Nijakowski 2004).

More detailed investigation of Polish research on Silesian ethnolect leads to other astonishing results. Wyderka (2004) in his linguistic deliberations demonstrates that for 95 per cent of Silesians, their dialect is their primary code, so it exists as a means of identification, and one of the most famous Polish ethnologists, while discussing the nineteenth-century history of Silesians, wrote: “(...) inhabitants of neighbouring villages not only speak separate languages, but cultivate different customs as well (...)” (Simonides 2004, 158, transl. by the author). An additional breach in the unified bulwark presented by Polish sociologists may also be found when reading that Kwaśniewski (1997) believes: “(...) national language is what people speaking it claim and not what linguists judge.” (Kwaśniewski 1997, 137, transl. by the author). All these citations seem to support the thesis of the presence of a separate Silesian language quite unintentionally and accidentally. Yet, at the end of their considerations, the authors of all the cited articles conclude that the Silesian language does not exist—it is only a dialect of Polish.

However, opposing conclusions may also be found in many reports. Unsurprisingly, the authors of most of these are not Polish. One German authority on Slavic languages even recognises three extra languages in Poland, granting the status of a separate language not only to Silesian, but also to Masurian and Podhalan (G.Henschel, cited in Wyderka 2004). There is no room here in this article for a wider linguistic discussion about Silesian ethnolect, but whatever we conclude, there is a common agreement that language difference is not crucial for nation recognition. In many cases it occurs centuries after a nation has been undoubtedly established in common perception—as in the case of American English (Wyderka 2004) or the presently observed attempts to create two separate languages on the basis of Serbian-Croatian.
Yet, the most important support for recognising Silesian as a language has come recently from overseas. The US Library of Congress granted Silesian the status of a regional language in June 2007, also SIL International acknowledged Silesian as new language (see www.sil.org). Interestingly, discussions with Polish academics interested in the ethnic problems of Silesia lead to a conclusion that the vast majority of them do not respect this verdict and still maintain their former opinions.

**Silesian self-consciousness**

The most important subjective feature deciding whether a nation does or does not exist is national self-consciousness. When asked about their ideological fatherland, Silesians often answer that they do not have any. Instead, they point to Silesia as their *Heimat*, which is a German name for “little” fatherland or region of belonging (Gorzelik 2004). As this term is not widely used in highly centralised Poland, unlike in regionalised and federalised Germany, Silesians are often referred to as “marginal men”, after Park (1937)—people without any country affiliation, a mixture of peoples typical of border regions. There is no doubt that Silesians possess their own, strong identity, but the question of whether it is of regional or national character, still remains unanswered, and researchers usually point to the constant changes of political affiliation of Silesia over history that resulted in a lack of national affiliation. In the words of a political geographer,

“(...) the Silesian autochthonous population has changed their national mind in the last eighty years more than twice and still remained an ethnic group (...) with an unstable national identification.” (Heffner 1999, 80).

This interpretation, although seemly reasonable, lacks basic reference to the historical background, which is crucial here. The constant changes in declaration of national identity of Silesians were enforced by political circumstances. The fact of being a “border people” creates a self-preservation instinct—Silesians declared themselves as German or Polish, depending on the political situation and the attractiveness of such a declaration—or rather the severity of the threat for expressing an opposing declaration (see also Faruga 2004 and Szczepański 2004). Silesians were always expected to declare their allegiance, which is typical for border people living between two more powerful neighbours, and the fact they survived centuries with no political support in the form of their own state at least to some extent may be owed to their flexibility in national
declarations and adaptation to changing circumstances. Probably the only feature that remained unchanged over centuries was the exceptionally deep devotion of Silesians to the Catholic Church. This factor does not distinguish Silesians from Poles, who are also Catholic in vast majority of cases.

Today Silesians potentially have probably the first opportunity in their history to stop being “marginal” and to be granted a status that would help them support their struggle to maintain identity. Instead, however, sociologists conclude:

“Silesian declarations do not mean we have a Silesian nation in sociological terms. We have instead, a strong Silesian ethnic group, not a fully shaped nation or even nationality.” (Szczepański 2004, 114, transl. by the author).

Others claim that autonomic Silesian culture does not exist and Silesians are an ethnographic group, a part of the Polish nation characterised by a mixture of Polish cultural features and German additions (Kwaśniewski 2004, Nijakowski 2004). They advise Silesians, instead of working towards the creation of a recognised nation, to implement multiculturalism, which is usually explained as working for the region, developing cultural diversity, writing textbooks on regional education, organising public cultural meetings and other similar activities (Nijakowski 2004, Wódz & Wódz 2004). Such an approach may be surprising, especially in the context of the more observable inclination of sociologists towards subjective criteria of nation recognition, often expected to be supplemented by either some objective criteria or at least less subjective criteria. Thus, another question arises, why are the researchers’ conclusions so disadvantageous for Silesians’ attempts to formally confirm their distinctiveness? The answer needs additional light in the form of an in-depth investigation of the Republic of Poland’s legal regulations.

**Legal Approach**

A discussion of Polish legal regulations regarding national identity finds its best beginning in the Preamble to the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997, currently in force: “(...) We, the Polish Nation–all citizens of the Republic (...)”. Clearly, the Polish constitution approaches nation and nationality in a western European way, where nationality is derived from citizenship and they are mutually identified with each other. Yet, Polish
researchers entirely separate these terms, acknowledging ethnic-states eastern European style and treating citizenship as an expression of belonging to a state, while nationality is deemed as an indication of belonging to a nation. Therefore, it must be strongly emphasised that the legal and systematic approaches to national identity do not match each other in Poland.

After the political changes that took place in Poland in 1989, a legal act regulating minority status was long awaited. However, a parliamentary act on national and ethnic minorities and regional language was enacted only on the 6 January, 2005, and it is Article 2 paragraph 1 of this act which presents the legal definition of a national minority. To depict properly the background of the discussion, it seems reasonable to cite it in its extent:

“Art.2. p.1. National minority, in the light of the act, is a group of Polish citizens, who fulfils all of the following conditions at a time:
1) is less numerous than the rest of RP inhabitants;
2) significantly differs from other citizens by language, culture or tradition;
3) aims at preservation of its own language, culture or tradition;
4) is conscious of its own historical national community and is directed at its expression and preservation;
5) its ancestors have inhabited the present territory of RP for at least 100 years;
6) identifies with a nation organised in its own state.”
Source: Dziennik Ustaw 2005 No. 17 it. 141, transl. by the author.

The next paragraph of this act enumerates nine groups officially recognised as national minorities. Silesians are not on the list as they do not match the last criterion–the Silesian state does not exist. Two other conditions (1 and 5) are met, while the other criteria have already been discussed above and Silesians seem to match them. Further discussion here may be perceived pointless. However, it is worth noticing that at least some of the conditions in the act are controversial (see also Barwiński 2006). Moreover, such an act implemented in the nineteenth century would have deprived Poles during over a century of partition (1795-1918), of the right to national minority status in the then dominating states, and the same interpretation would have affected Jews before 1948, presently affects Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, and many other ethnoses commonly considered to be nations.

Article two paragraph three enumerates the necessary conditions of ethnic minority recognition. They are only slightly changed from the
already cited paragraph: “ethnic” instead of “national” community in item four and “does not identify” instead of “identifies” in item six. Yet, Silesians are not even listed in paragraph four among officially recognised ethnic groups, and no further paragraph exists that would justify such motion.

Many other objections to this act may be raised—one being that a large number of new immigrants of a given nationality, having lived less than 100 years in Poland, cannot be granted minority rights. Enumeration of national and ethnic minorities in paragraphs two and four closes the door for recognition of any other groups unless their existence is legally confirmed. But before we conclude, one more paragraph of the same act needs attention. Article five paragraph one forbids the use of any measures leading to the assimilation of minority group members (Dziennik... 2005). Further interpretation of this short expression leads to the conclusion that minority groups without an official status of a national or ethnic minority are simply Polish and no further discussion on a legal basis is necessary to determine their status. Hence, the door to the assimilation of all such groups is open (see also Gorzelik 2004).

The ongoing debate on the goals that should be set ahead of a multi-ethnic society has not yet yielded a commonly respected answer to the question of whether a democratic country should affirm differences through multicultural policy or rather aim toward integration of minority groups into the mainstream culture. Cautious advocates of the identity politics approach point out the intolerance that arises in homogenous societies that are not capable of accepting any significant deviation from the mainstream they belong to, while enthusiasts of the second option emphasise the hazards of multiculturalism that lead, according to their views, to further marginalisation and ghettoisation of minorities and still stronger intolerance of the dominating ethnos against minorities (see Auster 1991, Schmidt 1997, Schlesinger 1998, Hollinger 2006). Both sides of the debate claim to search for the best solution for both mainstream and minority groups sharing the same space. Clearly, minorities are granted more considerable support from the identity politics approach, as it openly affirms minorities as they are, without trying to adjust them to the dominating culture.

However, the Polish legal system does not leave space for further discussion about the case of Silesians. The Prime Minister’s regulation of 23 July 2007 concerning organisation of a new body called the Collective
Commission of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities promptly brings disillusionment: common debates will be held only with representatives of those minorities, which have been recognised by the act on national and ethnic minorities and regional language (Zarządzenie... 2007).

Judicial Struggle for recognition

Presently, four different organisations uniting Silesians exist in Poland, and none of them has set themselves the goal of international and national recognition of the nation of Silesia. However, in 1996, a group of members of MAS decided to apply for registration of a new organisation—the Organisation of the Upper Silesia National Minority (OUSNM)\(^4\). Their statute in paragraph seven defines the aims of the organisation, including arousing and strengthening national consciousness of Silesians and protecting the ethnic rights of persons declaring Silesian nationality. The organisation was registered in a provincial court in 1997, but in few days, after an appeal by the local authorities, this decision was overturned. An epic fight for registration then began, with successive courts rejecting consecutive appeals, including that of the highest European judicial authority—the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), sitting as a Grand Chamber. As ECHR decisions are ultimate, OUSNM failed to achieve registration.

Detailed investigation of the decisions of the various courts leads to the conclusion that three objections against registration are regularly raised and many others occur in individual court decisions (see for instance Annual... 2004, Postanowienie... 2005, Postanowienie... 2006). First, according to Polish legal authorities the Silesian nation objectively does not exist. Second, nobody can declare Silesian nationality, as the Silesian nation does not exist, so having registered such an association, the court would confirm an untruth. Third, registration of such an association would grant Silesians undue electoral privileges, as from the day of registration on, they would have to be considered a national minority.

These three reasons for court objections are clearly misinterpretations, if not manipulations. The first objection does not take into account the fact

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\(^4\) the name of the organisation after its official documents in English; more precise translation from the Polish official name, which is “Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej” would be “The Union of Population of Silesian Nationality”
that objectivity in national debate does not exist, which has already been discussed here. The second objection was interestingly commented upon by MAS activists. They reminded the court of the case of the “Polish Party of Friends of Beer”, registered by a Polish court in the early 1990s—and which won 16 seats in the state Parliament—with the activists mentioning in passing that while one can treat beer as one’s friend, the situation is not reversible. In regard to the third objection, the reader is reminded that this is a logical misjudgement, since the electoral act influences the judgement as to whether a group constitutes a national minority or not.

The ECHR judgement may also be perceived as disputable—which became obvious the very moment the judgement was announced. Three out of twenty judges, although in general agreement with the final judgement, declared separate opinions. They stated that the decision of the Polish courts’ registration rejection was a political choice and made reference to similar cases regarding Macedonian minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, which were recognised unlawful by the ECHR (Council... 2004, see also Kwaśniewski 2004). What is more, neither of the ECHR judgements stated that the Silesian nation does not exist, as the complaint concerned Polish courts decisions in the light of The European Convention on Human Rights, article 11 (freedom of association).

On 8 December 2005, the name of the organisation was changed to fulfil the requirements of the Polish courts. The new name is translated into English as: The Organisation of the Upper Silesia National Minority—Association of People Declaring Their Belonging to Silesian Nationality (OUSNM-APDTBSN). This lengthy name was expected to find acceptance in the courts, because in a free, democratic country there is a freedom of declaration and association, confirmed in the Constitution and other legal acts. However, on 5 July 2006, the latest appeal was rejected by the district court under the pretext of a discrepancy with the Constitution and with other legal acts, including the constitutional expression of Poland as a unitary state (sic!). Then, on 14 February 2007 the latest cassation was rejected by the Supreme Court. The courts persistently declare that the Organisation cannot be registered, as it uses a name of an objectively non-existent nation (Postanowienie... 2006). Interestingly, this objectively non-existent nation is legally recognised as existing in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Faruga 2004).

The OUSNM’s struggle for registration has been commented upon by the local population several times in surveys. One such survey was
conducted in Katowickie Province\(^5\) in September 1997, therefore after the creation of the OUSNM and before the court refusal of registration. The main interest in the survey was the attitude towards the relationship between the state, the region and the European Union, but three questions concerned attitudes towards the OUSNM. About 52% of the surveyed population was against registration, 28% supported the OUSNM’s efforts for registration and 20% did not have any particular opinion (Gruszewski 1999). Again, these proportions strikingly resemble those shown in the section “Outline of the history of Silesia” in this paper with a share of 24-27% of the region’s population of Silesian descent.

The tenacity of the courts becomes even more astonishing when the aims of another Silesian organisation are enumerated here. The Movement for the Autonomy of Silesia was registered by Polish courts in 1990 despite the fact it has openly declared its main goals, also in the statute of the organisation: Silesia should be an autonomous, individual entity in a united Europe, having its own parliament, treasury and government (see www.raslaska.aremieda.net). These goals are evidently opposed to the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and surprisingly this does not mean the MAS cannot continue its activity.

**The Polish case within the European framework**

Contemporary Europe faces two opposing tendencies. The first aims at centralisation and the maintenance of strong individual nation-states in a unified Europe and its roots may be found as early as in Charles de Gaulle’s idea of a “Europe of Nations” (Czachor, Mojsiewicz 2001). The other pursues a vision of a “Europe of Regions”, of decentralised, federal states consisting of relatively autonomous, small regions that enable local communities or mini-nations to create and implement their own policies (Leonard 2000, Sroka 2003). Within this vision, nation-states are perceived as untenable isomorphisms trying and failing to unite political allegiance (state) and cultural belonging (nation) (Antonsich 2006). The vision of a “Europe of Regions” has been represented on the forum of the European Parliament by “European Free Alliance”, a federation of parties representing nations not possessing their own states and regional

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\(^5\) Katowickie Province covered the core of present Silesian Province in the administrative division in force from 1975 to 1998
movements struggling for autonomy. According to the LOGON Report (2002, 94), “(...) nowhere are there any tendencies for increased centralism; but almost everywhere the regions have increased their powers.” The situation within individual nation-states confirms this thesis, as many of them have witnessed an increase in centrifugal forces. For example, in 1998 Scotland was granted the right to have its own Parliament for the first time since 1707, and the spectrum of its legislative domain covers as diverse fields as agriculture, education, environment, health, police, research, social work, income tax and many more (Scotland Act 1998). May 2006 furnishes the further example of the Catalanons who have been allowed to declare themselves a separate nationality within Spain. In addition, Italy of the last days of Berlusconis’s rule saw a step made towards the federalisation of the state and the long history of Italian fragmentation did not ignite fears about a less-centralised state.

Some of the examples shown above, concern the political and administration system of states, while others directly touch upon the question of ethnic diversity. However, these two aspects are firmly interconnected, especially in nation-states defending their position at the pan-European level. Therefore, it can be said that politically centralised one-nation state will not allow the vigorous growth of regional ethnic movements, as they will often be perceived as threats to the unity and cohesion of the state. Although this thesis sounds precarious, the last OUSNM-APDTBSN appeal rejection by a district court, confirms it in its extent:

“Concluding, par.1 of the statute [of OUSNM-APDTBSN, added by the author] contradicts art.3, art.6. and art.58 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland–establishing unity of the state and obliging the state to creation of conditions enabling the Polish nation to last and develop. The preamble to the Constitution itself, results in the statement that the Republic of Poland is a state of one nation–the Polish nation, and national minorities’ rights are guaranteed at the same time (art.27 and 35 of the Constitution).” (Postanowienie... 2006, 2, transl. by the author).

The fatal paragraph one of the statute reads as follows:

“The Association’s name is the Organisation of the Upper Silesia National Minority–Association of Persons Declaring Their Belonging to Silesian Nationality and will be called the Organisation.” (transl. by the author).

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6 MAS is a member of European Free Alliance; presently the Alliance is represented by 5 MPs
The court’s statement concerning the existence of a contradiction between the cited expressions means that recognition of Silesian nationality is suspected of threatening either the unity of the Polish state or the persistence and development of the Polish nation. However, the explicit absurdity of such a statement has not been noticed by the court.

It is likely the court follows the common belief, often emphasised by sociologists, that nations have the unwritten right to sovereignty and their own states, so recognising Silesian nationality may result in an increase of the struggle at least for autonomy (Wódz & Wódz 2004)—no matter, whether such fear is reasonable or not. Thus, if the conclusion drawn is right, then the lack of recognition of the Silesian nation is strictly a political affair that has nothing to do with the objectiveness of the judgement of factors determining national existence.

The position of the state towards this Silesian group, demonstrated by the courts, clearly follows Polish (non-)regional policy. The Republic of Poland is not only highly centralised, but any regionalisation attempts are more or less purposely and consciously hampered. In regard to this, since the World War 2, Poland has had three vital changes of administrative regions of the first order: the number of provinces jumped from 14 in 1946 to 17 in 1950, then to 49 in 1975 and back to 16 in 1999. Presently, most of the borders of administrative units do not follow either the historical borders of regions or physical (geographical) ones, and economic regions. In addition, electoral wards and diocese borders are also different (Waniek 2004). In such circumstances, it is extremely hard to create and maintain regional identity. Such actions, although unlikely to be conducted fully purposely, prove the lack of regional policy and lack of interest in real regional policy—at least over the decades. The only visible goal that can be seen in these actions is that they were done to undermine any embryo of regional identity. Silesia also witnessed this policy, as the last change of administrative division in Poland divided historical Upper Silesia into two provinces—to some extent because of the temporal interest of more influential groups, mostly the Germans who inhabit the present Opole Province (Faruga 2004). Additionally, almost half of the present Silesian Province is constituted by lands that have never been a part of Silesia (Waniek 2004). Therefore, regional policy goes hand-in-hand with Poland’s “one-nation-one-state” policy.
Desire for minorities?

One article discussing Silesians’ right to claim separate nationality enumerates *expressis verbis* reasons justifying the thesis that minorities are not necessarily desired (Nijakowski 2004). First, it is easier to govern a homogenous society, as there exist typical behaviours and standards followed by the majority–and minority members must adapt. Second, minority status generates extra costs for the state and complicates governance, as ethnic diversity must be then protected and any discrimination prevented. Third, minorities are supported from abroad and that generates complications for administration. Fourth, the existence of minorities limits majority leaders in their support, as minority members vote for their own leaders (Nijakowski 2004). In brief: minorities generate only problems. The author also admits, that

“(…) setting limitations for freedom of national declaration is to some extent a symptom of lack of democracy in the system (…)” (Nijakowski 2004, 139, transl. by the author).

At the same time he justifies the state’s actions in hampering and slowing down minority recognition processes with the reasons enumerated above.

Such open declaration of intolerance towards minorities is a very relevant summary of Polish policy concerning Silesians, officially aiming at tightening control within the region of Silesia. Frankly, though indirectly, this is an admission that Poland institutionally discriminates against Silesians.

Conclusions

After World War 2, Silesia became part of Poland. Since that time, Poland through institutional actions has attempted to integrate this region into its territory, and many Polish researchers support these efforts within their various fields of study. Many conclusions concerning the native inhabitants of Silesia are drawn by both Polish institutions and researchers with no respect to either factual reality or arguable subjective theoretical judgements, and from the constitutional expression of Poland being a unitary state, a misleading judgement of a nation-state excluding existence of other nations within Poland, is drawn by the courts. The Silesians who, while fulfilling the legal criteria of an ethnic group described in the
parliamentary act (Dziennik... 2005), are not granted even this status. Researchers notice that

“The Silesian has always been the Silesian, loyal citizen of the state, which annexed his/her regional and local (private) homelands.” (Szajnowska-Wysocka 2003, 85)

and

“(…) on borderlands, nationality is being chosen, man is nurtured within it, it is not granted with birth, it is a fruit of tough and conscious choice (…)” (Simonides 2004, 158, transl. by the author).

However, the right to choose non-Polish, Silesian nationality is not so generously granted to those interested in doing so. Instead, Silesians are imputed to be Polish, a nationality many of them declared they do not belong to, and a Silesian-European instead of Silesian-Polish identity does not fit the Polish nation-state reality. Although Poland has often supported nations struggling for recognition or for more ethnic-national sovereignty within other countries, the state does not find it unfair to institutionally discriminate against a group living in Poland. Even if historically out-of-date and politically extremely incorrect, probably the most comprehensive summary of the case is comprised in the opinion of a famous linguist, a candidate for the president of Poland in 1922, Jan Ignacy Baudouin de Courtenay:

“(…) the politician from Warsaw who wanted to turn the Kashubs, the Silesians, or the Byelorussians into Poles could hardly claim to be aggrieved when Tsarist officialdom tried to turn Poles into Russians” (Davies 1981, 60).

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